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Caro-Kann: Smyslov System 4... ∅d7

by

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Translated and Edited by Ken Neat

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Conventional Signs


!	good move
!!	excellent move
!?	move deserving consideratio
?!	dubious move
?	incorrect move
??	blunder
±	clear advantage for White
∓	clear advantage for Black
±	slight advantage for White
∓	slight advantage for Black
=	equal position
1-0	White wins
0-1	Black wins
1/2-1/2	draw
Ch	Championship
corr.	correspondence game
CT	Candidates Tournament
IZ	Interzonal Tournament
OL	Olympiad
WC	World Championship

Introduction

The popular branch of the Caro-Kann Defence, characterised after 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 by the developing move 4... 2d7, enjoys the reputation of having been a favourite defence of the classic World Champions. Introduced by the famous chess researcher of the first third of our century, Aron Nimzowitsch, this continuation forms the basis of a promising system of play, in which Black, despite his somewhat passive position, avoids serious positional concessions and can gradually hope equality, which is fully in accordance with the classical views on playing the opening.

Therefore it is no accident that in the 1940s it drew the attention of one of the pre-war World Championship contenders Salo Flohr, and that in the 1950s and 1960s it was actively developed by two excellent 'defenders', the seventh and ninth World Vasily Champions Smyslov and Tigran Petrosian. The variation could well have been named after them both (in fact Petrosian's claim is perhaps played stronger. as he throughout his career), but in the West the name of the Smyslov System has become customary.

In recent years this variation has become a major weapon in the black repertoire of the twelfth World Champion Anatoly Karpov.



With ... Dgf6 (or ... Ddf6) Black plans to drive away or exchange the centralised white knight, avoiding the doubled pawns after 4... Df6, as well as the positional concessions that arise after the bishop development 4... f5. Then ... e7-e6 leads to a pawn structure where Black's main way of freeing his game is by preparing the advance ... c6-c5, which can lead to White gaining a queenside pawn majority and the long-term prospect of obtaining an outside passed pawn in the endgame.

One drawback to the system is the delay in the development of Black's light-square bishop, which he often has to fianchetto in analogy with the Rubinstein Variation in the French Defence, an operation that takes time and allows White a persistent initiative, based on his occupation of e5 with a knight. However, despite the


outward passivity of Black's position, the absence of pawn weaknesses enables him, with accurate play, to maintain the balance, as though confirming the philosophical thesis, that drawbacks are sometimes the consequence of virtues. This was sensed most subtly by the World Champions, and in the years when the variation was being established, in the games of Smyslov and Petrosian their opponents' attempts to gain an advantage by simple means were equally simply parried by Black, as he imperceptibly eroded White's initiative. With the development of more complicated variations. Black was also able to find counter-actions. Here are a few examples from the early experience of the World Champions.

Game 1 Matanovic-Petrosian USSR v. Yugoslavia 1959

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	4 0d7
5	D B	Øgf6
6	②xf6+	②xf6
7	⊈c4	≗ f5
8	₩e2	

Matanovic carries out the plan with queenside castling (nowadays 8 0–0, to support the knight at e5, is more usual), being under no doubt that Petrosian would have prepared for 8 \$\infty\$e5, where in the analogous 1957 match he had an unfortunate

experience in his game with Gligoric: 8...e6 9 \(\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitext{\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\tex{



10 ... \(\hat{\mathbb{L}}\mathbb{g}4!\)

Simplicity is the basis of beauty, and the outwardly simple means, with which Petrosian outplays his opponent, allow his play to be compared with the strategic masterpieces of Capablanca, the third World Champion. With this exchange of White's most important piece – the knight, which was aiming for e5 – he demonstrates a subtle understanding of the position.

13 - ≜xe7

After 13 2d2 Black can launch a counterattack: 13...b5 14 2b3 a5.


Even Bobby Fischer himself was unable to shake Petrosian's position (Bled 1961): 14 \$\displaystyle{2}\$b1 \$\mathbb{Z}\$d8 15 \$\displaystyle{2}\$\displaystyle{2}\$d6 18 g3 b4 19 c4 \$\displaystyle{2}\$f6, and Black maintained the balance.

14		00
15	\$ b1	≝ ad8
16	≜b 3	₩f6
17	₩e2?	

White is labouring under an illusion. Had he appreciated the change in the situation, he would have exchanged queens by 17 \(\mathbb{\psi}\)xf6 \(\Delta\)xf6, with prospects of a draw. But he is still thinking about the initiative, as indicated by his pawn offensive on the kingside.

17		ℤ d7
18	c3	b5
19	g3	ℤfd8
20	f4	

It was not yet too late to think about equalising with 20 \(\Delta \text{xd5}. \)



21 \(\frac{\pi}{13}?!\)
For the sake of his illusory

x 0013

initiative, White allows a weakening of his queenside pawns. Of course, 21 axd5 axd5 22 cxb4 was necessary.


Now Black firmly seizes the initiative. If 23 c4 he was intending 23... \Db4! 24 dxc5 \Dd3.

23	ℤe 5	cxd4
24	≜xd5	 X x d 5
25		exd5

A further subtlety. Here the isolated pawn is not a weakness, whereas after 25... \(\tilde{\mathbb{Z}} \) xd5 \(26 \) \(\tilde{\mathbb{Z}} \) xd4 \(\tilde{\mathbb{W}} \) hite can successfully defend.

	20	AXU4		по	
	27	g4			
27	7 ℤ xd5	loses	to	27 ℤ b8+	28
\$c2	₩b6.				

27		₩e7
28	₩f2	≌ b8-
29	\$a1	₩a3
30	₩c2	≖e8
31	Th4	



Again a simple solution. By exchanging his d5 pawn for the pawn at

h3, Black takes play into a won queen ending.

32		 ■e1+
33	Z d1	≖xd1·
34	₩xd1	₩xc3
35	Ġ b1	₩xh3
36	a4	h5
37	gxh5	₩f5+
38	Ġb2	₩xf4
39	\$ b3	W f5
40	\$ c4	\$ h7
41	₩a2	0-1


Game 2	
Simagin-Smyslov	
Moscow 1963	

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	②d7
5	êc4	Dgf6
6	②g5	e6
7	(1)a2	

Fully in the manner of Vladimir Simagin, who was a grandmaster with an original style of play. The main continuation is 7 We2.

9 单f4 is also not dangerous: 9... 单xf4 10 ②xf4 豐c7 11 ②d3 b5 12 单b3 c5 with complete equality.

Usually this knight is played to g3. At c3 it as though provokes Black into trying to seize the initiative, which Smyslov immediately does.



10		b5
11	⊈d3	b4
12	②e4	②xe4
13	≜xe4	Ð f6
14	≜ d3	

Obviously, without good reason White cannot concede the advantage of the two bishops (14 we2 2xe4 15 wxe4 2b7). But now Black implements ...c6-c5, the main strategic idea of the variation.

14		0-0
15	₩e2	≗ b7
16	ı⊈d2	c5
17	dxc5	₩xc5
18	h3	

Preventing the transition into an endgame after 18 \(\Delta = 3 \) \(\bar{\psi} + 5 \), with the threat of exchanges on f3.


If 20 ②d2 there would have followed 20...e4! 21 ②c4 (or 21 ②c4 we5) 21...wd5 22 ②xd6 exd3 23 wf3 wxd6 24 wxb7 dxc2 with advantage to Black.

20		Z ac8
21	≝ fd1	≜ b8
22	20.30	

4)d2

If 22 \(\hat{2}\) b3 Black has the good reply 22... #c7 with the threat of 23...c4.

22		₩c7
23	.≜b3	₩c6
24	ß	



e4! 24 ...

A decision opening of the position, clearing the a8-h1 diagonal.

25 fxe4

After 25 f4 there could have followed 25...a5 26 a4 \(\)a6 27 \(\)#f2 單fd8 28 包f1 (28 单b6 單d6 29 单xa5 e3 30 \wxe3 \mathbb{m}e8 31 \wxe3 \mathbb{m}f2 \mathbb{m}e2 is crushing) 28... 2d5 with a positional advantage for Black (Smyslov).

It is important to retain control of d5.

If 29 \frac{\psi}{12}, then 29...a4 is decisive, since after 30 ad5 axd5 31 xxd5

₩xc2 White cannot play 32 &c5 on account of 32... Exc5!

29		₩xf3
30	gxf3	≜.e2
31	L e1	≜xf3
32	ı⊈a4	≗e5
33	ℤd2	ı⊈xb2
34	I f2	≜ c6
35	≜ xc6	E xc6
36	∕ Dg3	ℤe8
37	Df5	\$ h7
38	Z ef1	 ■ xe3
39	② xe3	ı⊈d4
40	Z e1	ℤe 6
	0-1	


Game 3 Bronstein-Petrosian Moscow 1967

	1	e4	c6
	2	d4	d5
,	3	Dc3	dxe4
	4	②xe4	4)d7
	5	c3	包gf6
	6	Ø g3	e6
	7	Df3	c5
	8	≜ d3	cxd4
	9	②xd4	≜ e7

Nowadays the more active development 9... ac5 is normally preferred.

1	10	0-0	∕ De5
1	1	ı⊈c2	≗ d7
1	12	≖ e1	Dc6
1	13	D f3	₩c7
1	14	₩e2	h6
1	15	≜ d2	g5!?

One of Petrosian's favourite stratagems was to delay castling, with the aim of saving as much time as possible for carrying out a concrete plan. Here, with his king for the moment out of reach, he begins an attack on the kingside, but on this occasion, as they say, it is a case of diamond cut diamond. Bronstein cleverly finds a way of keeping the opponent's king in the centre.




16 Hac1!

In Nimzowitsch's terminology, a 'mysterious' rook move: in the event of 16...g4 17 ②d4 ②xd4 18 cxd4 it comes alive.

16		Ød5
17	b4	Ðf4
18	≜xf4	gxf4
19	②f5!?	₫18

Petrosian believes in the impregnability of his position, and the exchange 19...exf5 20 b5 2g8 21 bxc6 2xc6 22 2xf5, which breaks up his pawn structure, does not suit him.



23 Dxf7!

White begins a sudden attack, but in surprising fashion Black finds defensive resources.

23 ... \$\psixf7 24 \$\psi\b3! \$\psif6!

Observing these optimistic king manoeuvres, one gains the feeling that hovering over the position is the spirit of the first World Champion Wilhelm Steinitz, who used to assert that the king was capable of defending itself. Black parries the threat of 25 \(\text{\textit{Lxe6}} + \text{\text{Lye6}} + \text{\text{Lye6}} + \text{\text{Lye6}} + \text{\text{Lye6}} = 27 \(\text{\text{Lye6}} + \text{\text{Lye6}} + \text{\text{Lye6}} = 28 \(\text{\text{Lye6}} + \text{\text{Lye6}} = 6.

25	E cd1	_ Z ad8
26	₩g4	■hg8
27	Wh5	⊉g7
28	2 xe6	⊉h7 !


After 28... 2xe6 29 Exe6 the linear attack of the heavy pieces is decisive.

By repeating moves Bronstein acknowledges the brilliance of Petrosian's defence.

31		 Ig6
32	₩f7 +	Ig7
33	₩f5+	 Ig6
34	₩f7+	1/2-1/2

Game 4 Parma-Smyslov Lugano Olympiad 1968

1	e4	с6
2	d4	d5
3	②c3	dxe4
4	②xe4	⁄Dd7
5	≜c4	Øgf6
6	 2 g5	e6
7	₩e2	�b6
8	.⊈d3	h6
9	2 5f3	c5
10	dxc5	



10 ... **⊘bd7!**The exclamation mark is for

Smyslov's invention. Before this only 10... 2xc5 had been played.


11 De5

On encountering a new idea, Parma avoids the critical move 11 b4.

12	₩xe5	₩a5+
13	⊈d2	₩xc5
14	Df3	₩xe5+
15	②xe5	≜c5
16	⊉ h5+?!	

This assists Black's development. The immediate 16 ≜e2 is better.

16		⊈ e7
17	⊈ .e2	②e4
18	€]d3	⊈d6
19	O 03	≙ 47



The lost tempo has also cost White the initiative. The game is equal.

20	≜ d4	f6
21	≜ ß	≜ c6
22	0-0-0	Thc8
23	h4	b6

If 23...e5 there would have followed 24 The1.

24	H hel	Dc5
25	≜g4	≜d 7
26	oʻ⊅h1	


In the event of 26 4b4 Black maintains the balance by 26...4b3+.

26		Øxd.
27	 ■ xd3	e5
28	ı xd7	фх4,

29 🗘c3 🕏c7	32	 Id5	≗ e7
30 Z ed1 Z d8	33	c4	 Ixd5
31 å e1 e4!?	34	≅ xd5	≜ .d6
Black is already fighting for the	35	h5	ℤe8
initiative. If 32 \(\mathbb{I}\)d4 there follows	36	ı⊈d2	≜ c5
32e5!		1/2-1/2	

PART I: 5 **包**g5

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	Dxe4	€)d7
5	Da5	




The solidity of this manoeuvre is reinforced tactically. Black cannot immediately drive the knight away with 5...h6? on account of the

possible sacrifice 6 \(\tilde{D} \)e6! \(\tilde{W} \)a5+ 7 \(\tilde{A} \)d2 \(\tilde{W} \)b6 8 \(\tilde{A} \)d3, and now 8...fxe6? fails to 9 \(\tilde{W} \)h5+ \(\tilde{W} \)d8 10 \(\tilde{A} \)a5, winning the queen (Nunn-Kir.Georgiev, Linares 1988), while if 8...\(\tilde{D} \)gf6 White has the promising piece sacrifice 9 \(\tilde{D} \)f3 fxe6 10 \(\tilde{A} \)g6+ \(\tilde{D} \)d8 11 \(\tilde{D} \)e5 with a strong attacking position, since it is not easy for Black to develop his pieces.

Black's main replies are 5... ②gf6 (Chapters 1-3) and 5... ②df6 (Chapter 4).

After 5... 6b6 the knight does not participate in the battle for the centre, and this allows White to gain control of the central squares: 6 21f3 g6, and now:



(a) 7 c3 2g7 8 ₩b3 ②h6 9 2e2 0-0 10 0-0 ②f5 11 Zd1 ₩c7 12 g3 ②d6 with an equal game (Van der Wiel-Karpov, Amsterdam 1988);

(b) 7 \(\hat{\text{d}}}}}}}} \fractrightiles \text{\texi}}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\tex{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}}\tint{\tintet{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\tex{


₩c7 10 c3 ♣f5 (or 10...0-0 11 ᡚe5! ᡚd5 12 ₩f3 ᡚf5 13 ₩h3±) 11 ᡚe4 ᡚg4 12 h3 ♠xe4 13 ☒xe4 ᡚf6 14 ♠f4 ₩d8 15 ☒e2 ᡚbd5 16 ♠e5 with a clear positional advantage (Britton-Arkell, British Ch 1992);

(c) 7 h4 (this flank attack is also possible) 7... \(\Delta \) h6 (7...h6 is risky: 8

②xf7!? \$\Delta xf7 9 ②e5+ \$\Delta g7 10 h5!) 8 h5 \$\Delta g4 9 hxg6 hxg6 10 \$\Delta xh6! \$\Delta xh6 (10...\$\Delta xh6? is bad on account of 11 \$\Omega xf7! \$\Delta xf7 12 ③e5+) 11 \$\Omega xf7 \$\Delta xf7 \Delta xf7 \De

1: 5... 🖄 gf6 6 😩 d3 e6 7 🖄 1f3 😩 d6 8 0-0

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	∕ 2)d7
5	4)05	4)of6



The main and most natural reply.

6 \(\delta d3\)

6 **2c4** is considered in Chapters 5-8 under the move order 5 **2c4** ②gf6 6 ②g5.

6 ②1f3 e6 7 ②d3 transposes into the main line. It should be mentioned that, as in many other instances examined below, here too 6...h6 is risky. For example, Demarre-Andruet, France 1989, continued 7 ②e6 fxe6 8 ②d3 ¥a5+9 ②d2 ¥h5 10 ¥e2 g5 11 g4! ②xg4 12 ②e5 ②dxe5 13 dxe5 ¥g8 14 0-0-0 with a very strong attack for White.

6 ... e6

Without first completing his development, it is practically imposs-

ible for Black to drive the knight away painlessly, since White is able to develop a dangerous attack by sacrificing his knight on e6:

6...h6?! 7 ②e6! ₩a5+ 8 ♣d2 ₩b6
9 ②f3 fxe6 10 ②g6+ \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\delta}\$}} 8 \text{\$\text{\$\delta}\$} 11 0-0
c5?! (more cautious is 11...₩c7 12
\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\delta}\$}\$} 13 c4 ②b7 14 ②e5 ③xe5 15
\text{\$\text{\$\delta}\$} 2d7 16 ③f4±, Malinin,
Poleschuk) 12 c4 cxd4 13 ②xd4 e5
(13...₩xd4 14 ②a5+) 14 c5! ③xc5 15
\text{\$\text{\$\delta}\$} a5 and White won (Tall-Oll, Riga
1986).

6...c5?! 7 ②1f3 cxd4 (7...\\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{b6}}\$ 8 \\ \text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\tex{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$


6...₩c7 7 ₺1f3 (7 ₺e2 is insufficient for an advantage: 7...e6 8 ₺f4 ₺d6 9 ₩d2 ₺xf4 10 ₺xf4 0-0 11 0-0-0 e5=, Nunn-Tal, Skelleftea 1989, although 9...e5! was more vigorous) 7...h6 8 ₺e6 fxe6 9 ₺g6+ ₺d8 10 0-0 ₩d6! (10...b6? 11 g3! ₺b7 12 ₺f4±, De Firmian) 11 ₩e2 (interesting is 11 c4 c5 12 ₺e5 ₺xe5

13 dxe5 豐xdl 14 黨xdl+ 全c7 15 全f4!, when it is not apparent how Black can complete his development without losing material, Malinin, Poleschuk) 11...②d5 12 ②e5 ②xe5 13 dxe5 豐b4 14 c4 ②b6 15 黨d1+ 全d7 16 全e3 with advantage to White (Lauk-Lokotar, Eesti 1992).

6...\$\Delta\beta\beta\beta\6.? \Q\1f3\\\hat{h6?!}\((7...\preceq\gamma\gamma\gamma\fa

The fianchetto plan 6...g6 weakens the kingside, allowing White to make use of his knight at g5, e.g. 7 21f3 2g7 8 2e2 0-0 9 h4 h6 (the attack is also unpleasant after 9...h5 10 2e5 2xe5 11 dxe5 2d5 12 e6 f5 13 g4!) 10 h5! 2xh5 11 g4 2hf6 12 2e6! fxe6 13 2xe6+ 2f7 14 2xg6 15 2d5 16 gxh6 2e5 17 2h7+ 1-0 (W.Watson-Meduna, Prague 1992).

7 21f3 **≜d**6




Black must keep a close watch on the attacking mechanism of the 2d3 and 2g5, which may go into operation in the event of the weakening move ...h7-h6:

7...h6 8 2 xe6, and now:

(a) 8...fxe6 9 \(\hat{\text{\te}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\t the same the king has go pass through the d8 square, and White develops his forces, maintaining an attack with 10 £f4 (also possible is 10 0−0 \(\mathbb{e}\)c7 11 ②e5! ②xe5 12 \$f4 ②fd7 13 ₩h5 \$\d8 14 dxe5 \$\dagger e7 15 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{I}}\ad1 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{I}}\begin{array}{c} 8 16 \mathbb{\mathbb{I}}\ad1 & \mathbb{\mathbb{I}}\begin{array}{c} 8 16 \mathbb{\mathbb{I}}\ad1 & \mathbb{\mathbb{I}}\begin{array}{c} 8 16 \mathbb{\mathbb{I}}\ad1 & \mathbb{\mathbb{I}}\ad2 & \mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{I}}\ad2 & \mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{I}}\ad2 & \mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{I}}\ad2 & \mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{I}}\ad2 & \mathbb{\mathb ⊈f7±. Malinin, Poleschuk, but if White plays 11 Ze1, then after 11... \$\d8! Black can defend - cf. Game 5, Wolff-Granda Zuniga, New York 1992) 10...\#a5+ 11 c3 \delta d8 12 0-0 @e7 13 볼e1 夕f8 14 @d3 @d7 15 ②e5 \$c8 16 b4 \$\begin{array}{c} \pmu \begin{array}{c} \pmu \begin{array}{c} \pmu \begin{array}{c} \pm \begin{arra White's initiative fully compensates for the sacrificed piece (McDonald-Summerscale, London 1994):

(b) 8...₩e7 9 0–0 fxe6 10 \(\textit{\$\textit{\mathbb{g}}\$}\) 6+ \(\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{\$\mathbb{g}}\$}}\) 6 when we consider:



(b1) 11 **\$**f4, when:

(b11) 11... ₩b4 12 a3 ₩xb2? 13 ₩e2 ②d5 14 &d2 and Black was in difficulties (Geller-Meduna, Sochi 1986), but 12... ₩b6 13 c4 &e7 14 c5 wxb2 was more accurate, and therefore 12 we2!± would have been stronger (Rogers);

(b12) 11...b5 (to prevent c2-c4) was played by Kasparov in his famous game with the computer *Deep Blue* (New York 1997), but after 12 a4! 鱼b7 13 罝e1 公d5 14 鱼g3 全c8 15 axb5 cxb5 16 豐d3 鱼c6 17 鱼f5 exf5 18 罝xe7 鱼xe7 19 c4 he resigned;

(b2) 11 c4! ₩d6 12 ₩e2 ₩c7 13 Id1! Ad6 14 De5 If8 15 Af4 with a complete bind (Leko-Bakhtadze, Las Palmas 1995) – Game 6.


7...豐c7?! 8 豐e2 h6 9 皇g6! (a hint that Black's f7 is inadequately defended) 9...hxg5 10 皇xf7+ 堂d8 (after 10...堂xf7 11 ②xg5+ 堂g6 12 豐d3+ the king is drawn out of its shelter) 11 ②xg5 ②b6 12 g3! (weaker is 12 皇xe6?! 墨xh2! 13 0-0 墨h5 as in Van der Wiel-Karpov, Amsterdam 1987) 12...皇d7 13 皇xe6 皇e8 14 皇f5 皇f7 15 皇f4 豐e7 16 豐xe7+ 室xe7 17 0-0 皇g8 18 b3! and White creates dangerous threats (Van der Wiel).

7... **2e7** 8 **W**e2 (the practically unexplored 8 ②xf7!? also comes into

consideration: 8... 金xf7 9 包g5+ 金g8 10 包xe6 鱼b4+ 11 金f1! 豐e7 12 包c7 包b6 13 包xa8 包xa8 14 c3 with the better chances for White) 8...h6 9 包xe6 fxe6 10 鱼g6+ 金f8 11 0-0 (not 11 豐xe6? 豐a5+ 12 鱼d2 豐d5干) 11...包b6 (or 11....鱼d6 12 包e5 豐e7 13 f4 全g8 14 鱼d2 包f8 15 鱼f7+ with a strong attack, Nadanian-Sedrakian, Armenia 1992) 12 包e5! with a dangerous initiative for White:

(a) 12... **I**g8 13 c4! (13 a4?! **Q**d7 14 a5 **Q**bd5=, Z.Almasi-Kumaran, Kopavogur 1994) 13... **Q**d7 14 **Q**e3 **Q**e8 15 **Q**c2 with dangerous threats (Z.Almasi);

8 0-0



This move restricts White's possibilities, although even here

accurate play is demanded of Black. The main continuation **8 We2** is considered in Chapters 2 and 3.

8 ... h6 9 2e4 2xe4 10 2xe4 0-0


The plan with queenside castling comes seriously into consideration:

10...公f6 11 单d3 b6 12 里e1 单b7 13 b3 豐c7 14 单b2 c5 15 dxc5 豐xc5 16 单xf6 gxf6 17 单e4 0-0-0 with equal chances (Emms-Tisdall, Gausdal 1996).

10... ****c7** 11 *****Ee1 b6 12 b3 *****£b7 13 *****£b2 0-0-0 14 *******Ee2 *****£b8 15 *****£d3?! c5 16 dxc5 *****Dxc5 and Black stands better (Emms-Speelman, Britain 1996).

11 c3 e5

White also retains a solid initiative after 11...c5 12 全c2 豐c7 13 互e1 互d8 14 h3 公f6 15 豐e2 cxd4 16 公xd4 全h2+ 17 全h1 全f4 18 公b5 豐b8 19 a4! (Kamsky-Karpov, Tilburg 1991).



Although the position looks quiet, Black has a hard job to equalise, since he is behind in development. Thus if 15... 22 White has the unpleasant manoeuvre 16 2d2! 2c5 17 1h4 167 18 2g5, while after 15... 2c5 Black has to reckon with an attack on h6: 16 16 16 17 2xh6! gxh6 18 18 16 (Gallagher-Huss, Switzerland 1994).

16 **≜f4 £xf4** 17 **₩xf4 ②f8**

Weaker is **17...②f6?!** 18 **X**e1 **2**e6 19 **2**b3.

Or 19...**Ed8** 20 h4 with the initiative for White (Kasparov-Karpov, Amsterdam 1988) – *Game 7*.

Smirin-Khalifman (Moscow 1989) now continued **20 g3 變d8** 21 **基**d1 **a**h3! 22 **a**f3 **w**e7 23 **w**d6 **w**e2 24 **w**d3 **w**e6 25 **a**b3 **w**f6 with equal chances.

More energetic was 20 ②xe6!? ⑤xe6 21 we4 with a slight but enduring advantage for White (Khalifman).

Game 5 **Wolff-Granda Zuniga** New York 1992

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 5 d2

In recent years this move has been played much more often that 3 ②c3. Since all the same Black has no better reply than 3...dxe4, White effectively excludes the plan with 3...g6,

followed (after e4-e5) by the attack on his centre by ...c6-c5, which can now he neutralised by c2-c3. It is worth mentioning that this plan, introduced by grandmaster Gurgenidze, was successfully employed by Petrosian against Fischer in the 1970 'Match of the Century'.

3		dxe4
4	②xe4	Ød7
5	≜d3	Dgf6
6	4 0g5	e6
7	\$\1f3	h6


A committing move, provoking the following knight sacrifice.

10		₩ c7
11	≝e1	\$ d8
12	0.4	

White is aiming for a complete bind. After 12 **Exe6 ad6** Black threatens 13...**a**\displays 8 and so White is forced to retreat.

12		ı⊈b4
13	ℤe2	D18
14	Øe5	②xg6
15	②xg6	ℤe8
16	c5	≜ a5?

As Granda Zuniga rightly indicated, Black should have cleared his own pieces that were obstructing his king: 16...豐f7! 17 包e5 豐h5 18 包c4 b5 19 包e5 鱼d7 20 a4 bxa4 21 里xa4 a5 22 f3 里e7, and White's attack does not compensate for the sacrificed piece.



17	₩a4	Ød5
1/		
18	②e5	⊈ d7
19	a3	b5
20	₩c2	₩Ъ8
21	₩h7	⊈.c7
22	₩xg7	≜xe5
23	Exe5	\$ 0\$
24	≜ xh6	₩c7
25	⊈d2	Ġ b7
26	a4?!	

The three pawns fully compensate for the knight, and their rapid advance by 26 h4!? would have given White very real chances.

26		a5
27	₩g3	 g8
28	₩d3	b4
29	Z ae1	¤h8
30	<u>.</u> ⊈g5	
31	h4	₩c8
32	g3	₩f8
33	f4	₩f7
34	₽12	②e7
35	≗xe7	₩xe7
36	₩f3	₩f6
37	1 1e3	 Ig7
38	 d3	♠e8

An oversight in time trouble. After 40 d5! cxd5 41 we2 White would have broken through to the enemy king.

40 ... **≜**h5 41 **¤**xe6

White has to reconcile himself to the loss of the exchange, since 41 #f4? fails to 41... #g4.

₩xe6 41 42 ¤xe6 **≜xf3** 43 dext3 ãhg8 44 **f6** ¤xg3+ 45 **⊈**f4 **28g4**+ 46 œe5 \#\xh4 47 **¤e7**+ **\$**26 48 IIf3 **f**7 49 Ïe6 ¤xf7 ¤xc6+ 50 **⊈**a7 51 d5**¤e7**+ 52 фd6 ¤eh7 0-1


Game 6 Leko-Bakhatdze Las Palmas 1995

1 **e4 c6** 2 d4d53 5)c3 dxe4 9)xe4 2)d7 5 2)g5 2)gf6 6 ≜d3 **e6** 7 **4)1f3** h6 8 **€**)xe6 ₩e7 9 0-0 fxe6 **≜**g6+ \$648 10 11 c4!?

A new move. Before this 11 \(\hat{2}\)f4 used to be played.

11 ... ₩d6

It is not easy for Black to develop his pieces. After the more 'active' 11... 數64 Leko was intending 12 數e2 全d6 13 ②e5 宣f8 14 全d2!, including his bishop in the attack with gain of time.



15 ... \(\textit{\Pmaxe5?!}\)
After this it is not possible to free

After this it is not possible to free the king.

15...b6 was better, not fearing 16 c5 盒xe5, while 16 ②f7+ can be met by 16... 基xf7 17 盒xd6 豐xd6 18 盒xf7 ②f8 or 18... 全e7.

16 dxe5 夕g8 17 全g3 豐b6 18 豐g4! c5

Or 18...\$c7 19 \$\text{\cong} \text{xe6 c5, when 20}\$
\$\text{\textsuper} \text{d6 is again decisive.}\$

19 罩d6 響xb2 20 罩ad1 當c7 21 ₩xe6 ②df6 22 ¼d7+! 1-0

Game 7 **Kasparov-Karpov**Amsterdam 1988

e4 **c6** 2 d4d54)d2 3 dxe4 4 9)xe4 9)d7 5 20g5 Def6 6 **≜**d3 e6 7 \$\1f3 **≜**d6 0-0

One of the first famous clashes between the twelfth and the thirteenth World Champions takes place on a reserve field. The main continuation is 8 \(\mathbb{w}\)e2.

8 ... h6 9 ②e4 ②xe4 10 ②xe4 0-0


As shown in the analysis, the plan with queenside castling can also be considered.

c3! 11 e5 ₾ c2 12 He8 Ϊe1 13 exd4 14 Exe8+ Wxe8 15 ₩xd4 ₩e7 16 **∲** f4 **∳** vf4 17 ₩xf4 \$1f8 **¤e1** 18 **≗e6** 19 9)d4 86**Z**

After 19... **Ze8** White can maintain a slight advantage by 20 ②xe6!? ②xe6 21 **We4**.

20 h4 ₩c5 21 ℤe3 ₩d6

22 Dxe6



22 ... fxe6?!

White's symbolic advantage now assumes real proportions, and it is instructive to follow the World Champion's technique in capitalising on it. After the natural 22... 2xe6 23 we4 2f8 Black would have maintained the status quo.

₩g4 ₩d2 23 фhЯ 24 **⊈** h3 ℤe2 ₩46 25 26 **a6 93** He8 27 фg2 Ξe7 28 Ξe3 **¤**f3 ¤d7 29 ₩e7 30 ₩h5 ₩e5 31

The key to Black's position is now apparent – it is the f7 square, and by subtle manoeuvring Kasparov has added a spatial advantage to his positional one. The invasion on f7 is yet to come.

31 ... **Zd8**32 a4 b5
33 **We4 W**c7

34	IIf4	c5
35	₩f3	₩ d6
36	axb5	axb5
37	III7	 ■b8
38	E a7	b4
39	ı£c2	bxc3
40	bxc3	₩e5
41	II 17	
41 c4	!!? is also	useful
41		�h7
42	₩g4	⊈g8
43	ℤe7	2)18
	35 36 37 38 39 40 41 41 c ⁴ 41 42	35 \ \ \delta_3\ \delta_5\ \delta_5\ \delta_5\ \delta_7\ \delta_7\ \delta_6\ \delta_2\ \delta_6\ \delta_1\ \delta_17\ \delta_1\ \delta_1\ \delta_17\ \delta_1\ \delta_117\ \delta_1117\ \de

W13

≙e4

\$c6!

c4


фhЯ

Øb7

44

45

46



47 **\(\psi\)f7**The decisive queen invasion. After ne exchange of rooks the difference

in the strength of the minor pieces becomes more apparent in view of the e6 pawn.

47		2)18
48	⊈ e8	E xe8
49	≜xe8	⊘h7
50	⊈d7	D f6
51	≜ xe6	h5
52	♠xc4	₩e4+

After 52... wc3 53 wf8+ sh7 54 wc5! in view of the threat of 55 sg8+ Black is again forced to concede space.

53 \$\dot{\phi}h2 \$\dot{\phi}h7?!


53...\(\mathbb{H}\)f3 is more active, although after 54 \(\mathbb{H}\)f8+ \(\mathbb{C}\)h7 55 \(\mathbb{H}\)c5 the defence would have merely been prolonged.

Now, however, White combines threats to the enemy king with the advance of his c-pawn.

54	₩e6	W13
55	₩e1	Øg4+
56	\$g1	₩ c6
57	≜ d3+	g6
58	₩e7+	\$ h6
59	≗e4	₩b6
60	₩f8+	ŵ h7
61	₩f7+	\$ h6
62	c4	₩ a6
63	c5	1-0

2: 8 \(\vee{2}\) h6 9 \(\vee{2}\) e4 \(\vee{2}\) xe4 10 \(\vee{2}\) xe4 \(\vee{2}\) f6

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	⊘d7
5	⊘g 5	Øgf6
6	ı⊈d3	e6
7	113	≜ d6
Q	W/62	



White prepares queenside castling and takes control of the e5 square, restricting the possibility of Black freeing his queen's bishop by means of ...e6-e5.

8 ... h6 9 **2**e4

Here the knight sacrifice no longer works: 9 ②xe6?! fxe6 10 鱼g6+ 空e7 11 0-0 ②f8 12 鱼d3 鱼d7 13 ②e5 豐e8 14 f4 堂d8 15 c4 堂c7 16 鱼d2 星c8, and Black successfully evacuates his king (Arnason-Ostenstad, Torshavn 1987).

10 ₩xe4


After the capture on e4 with the queen Black is no longer able to carry out the freeing move ...e6-e5 and is obliged to switch to ...c6-c5.

10 ②xe4 is harmless: 10... 👑 c7 11 ②d2 b6 12 0-0-0 ②b7 13 c4 0-0-0 14 ③c3 Ine8 15 Ine1 ②f6 16 ②c2 c5 with equal chances (Roiz-Speelman, Oviedo 1992).

10 ... Df6

The other fashionable continuation 10... #c7 is considered in Chapter 3.

Also deserving of a special mention is 10...c5, a move which Karpov, keenly seeking defensive resources, has recently employed several times:



 3 鱼xb7 里ab8! 19 鱼f4 豐b5 20 .xb8 里xb8 21 鱼f3 豐xb2 Black's ttivity fully compensates for his ight material deficit (Z.Almasiarpov, Tilburg 1996);

(b) 11 0-0 ②f6 (11... ₩c7 12 ₩g4 f8, Illescas-Karpov, Dos Hermanas 997, leads to a position considered in

hapter 3, p.43), and now:

(b1) 12 鱼b5+ 全e7 13 管e2 管c7 14 cc5 管xc5 (14...鱼xc5 15 包e5±) 15 e3 管c7 16 鱼d4 罩d8 (Topalovarpov, Dos Hermanas 1997), and though in the end Black managed to fend himself, White's chances look etter;


actically ruling out the possibility of lack castling kingside in view of the reatened bishop sacrifice at h6) 2...cxd4 (at the tournament in Dortund, 1997, Karpov played 12... ₩c7 ainst Ivanchuk, and although after 3 **X**el **2**d7 14 **2**g5 **2**e7 15 dxc5 xc5 16 De5± he eventually gained a aw, his position was very dubious) Bel! \ d7 14 \ \ \ xd4 (we must also ention the game Shabalov-Gulko. SA Ch 1996, where after 14 2d2 c7 15 \add ad1 0-0-0 16 \wxd4 \wc5 17 e3 \wxd4 18 \alphaxd4 White obtained e better ending) 14... Was 15 \(\mathbb{L} e3, \) id Black was unable to cope with the sulting problems (Lautier-Karpov, iel 1997) - Game 8.

11 ₩e2

The aggressive 11 \text{\mathbb{\math}\m{\mt}\mt\m{\mth}\mt\m{\mth}\mt\m{\mth}\mt\m{\mth}\mt\mth\mt\mt

(a) attempts to simply - 11...₩a5+ r 11...\(\Delta\)d5 12 \(\W\)xd8+ \(\Delta\)xd8 13 c3 \$e7) 12 \$d2 \$\forall h5 13 \$\forall xh5 \$\Omega\$xh5 14 \$\Omega\$e5 0-0 15 0-0-0 c5 16 g4 \$\Omega\$f6 17 g5! give White the better ending (Hector-Hodgson, London 1991);

(b) 11...\$\times^{7!}\$, when the threat of ...g7-g5 forced White to sacrifice a pawn by 12 \$\times^{12}\$ e5 (nothing is achieved by 12 \$\times^{13}\$ d2 g5 13 \$\times^{13}\$ h3 e5 or 12 \$\times^{14}\$ \$\times^{15}\$ e3 b6 (15...c5 16 0-0-0 g5 17 \$\times^{15}\$ g3! \$\times^{15}\$ k2 s3 b6 (15...c5 16 0-0-0 g5 with sharp play (Kamsky-Karpov, Dortmund 1993) - Game 9.



11 ... b6

Black mobilises his queenside, preparing for the possibility of removing his king there. After kingside castling he risks coming under an attack in view of the weakening h6, with the white g-pawn being assigned the role of a battering-ram:

11...c5 12 dxc5 \(\text{2xc5} \) (12...\(\psi a5+!? \)
13 \(\text{ad2} \) \(\psi xc5\(\pm \) 13 \(\text{ad2} \) 0-0
(13...\(\psi b6 \) 14 0-0-0!? \(\text{axf2} \) 15 \(\pm hf1 \)
\(\text{ac5} \) 16 \(\text{ac5} \) with a dangerous initiative for the pawn) 14 0-0-0 \(\psi c7 \)

(14...b5 15 g4 ②d5 16 国hg1 豐c7 17 ②e5 b4 18 g5 hxg5 19 国xg5 f5 20 国dg1±, Benjamin-Arkell, Reykjavik 1990) 15 g4 e5 (15...②xg4 16 国df1±) 16 g5 hxg5 17 兔xg5 e4! 18 兔xe4 国e8 19 兔xf6 豐f4+ 20 ②d2 豐xf6 21 豐h5 兔d4 22 c3 国xe4! 23 ②xe4 豐f4+ with a double-edged game (Smirin-Kharitonov, Svedlovsk 1987).

In this last variation Black can also consider a fashionable method of defence, whereby he 'sacrifices' castling for the sake of activity in the centre: 11... 27 12 2d2 b6, and now:

- (a) 13 包e5 c5!? 14 鱼b5+ 含e7 15 c3 鱼b7 16 0-0 量hd8 17 f4 包e4 18 鱼e3 含f8 19 罩ae1 含g8 20 豐g4 cxd4! (20...包f6?! 21 豐g3±, Kamsky-Anand, Dos Hermanas 1996) 21 cxd4 f5! 22 豐g6 鱼d5 with an equal game (Kasparov);
- (b) 13 0-0-0 \triangle b7 14 \triangle e5, transposing into variation 2.1.


White can also consider the preparatory 13 ②e5 ₩c7 (13...c5 14 dxc5 ≜xc5 15 f4±) 14 f4!, deferring castling:

(a) 14...c5 15 dxc5 (if 15 鱼b5+?! 含e7=) 15...豐xc5 (the alternatives 15...鱼xc5 16 0-0-0 and 15...鱼xe5 16 fxe5 ②d7 17 cxb6 axb6 18 鱼c3 favour White) 16 0-0-0 0-0 17 含b1

單fd8 18 單hel 單ac8 19 g4 鱼xe5 20 fxe5 ②e4! 21 鱼c1! (White loses after 21 鱼xe4? 鱼xe4 22 豐xe4 單d4 23 豐e2 豐xc2+ 24 含a1 罩cd8) 21...豐b4 22 含a1 ②c5 23 c3, and after the necessary prophylaxis it transpired that White's attack was the more dangerous (Tiviakov-Adams, Wijk aan Zee 1996);

- (b) 14...0-0-0 15 0-0-0 c5 16 dxc5 2xc5 17 2a6 2d5 18 2xb7+ 2xb7 19 2e3 2xe3+ 20 2xe3 2xd8+ 2xd8 23 2d1+ 2xe8 24 2xg3, and the dominating position of White's knight at e5 gives him the advantage (Leko-Bacrot, Erevan Olympiad 1996);
- (c) 14...0-0 15 0-0-0 c5 16 **L**hg1 cxd4 17 g4 with an attack.

13 ... ₩c7




The two sides have almost completed the mobilisation of their forces, although Black has not yet determined the position of his king. Here three practically equivalent continuations are encountered: 14 \$\overline{2}\cdot e5\$ (2.1), 14 \$\overline{2}\cdot he 1\$ (2.2) and 14 \$\overline{2}\cdot b1\$ (2.3).

2.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 公c3 dxe4 4 公xe4 公d7 5 公g5 公gf6 6 全d3 e6 7 公1f3 全d6 8 豐e2 h6 9 公e4 公xe4 10 豐xe4 公f6 11 豐e2 b6 12 全d2 全b7 13 0-0-0 豐c7)

14 De5

White immediately occupies e5, nd if he should succeed in consollating the position of his knight, he hay be able to develop an unpleasant nitiative.



For example: 14...0-0-0 15 f4! c5 6 dxc5 \(\hat{2}xc5 17 \) \(\hat{2}b1 \) \(\hat{2}b8 18 \) \(\hat{2}he1 5 19 h3 h4 20 \) \(\hat{2}a6! \) \(\hat{2}xa6 21 \) \(\hat{2}xa6 17 \) \(\hat{2}xa6 21 \) \(

14 ... c5

An equally energetic reply. Black islodges the support from under the night and hopes to slip away with his ing via f8.


Maintaining the momentum. After 16 \(\Delta f4 \) \(\Delta hd8 \) 17 \(\Delta he1 \) \(\Delta d5 \) the game is level.

16 ... ₩xc5

17 a3

Again a pseudo-sacrifice of the knight (17...豐xe5? 18 豐xe5 鱼xe5 19 鱼b4+) — it is important to detain the king in the centre. In the event of 17 鱼c3 單hd8 18 鱼d4 豐c7 19 單he1 墊f8! 20 c3 a6! 21 鱼d3 b5 (21...鱼c5!? 22 鱼xc5+ 豐xc5 23 f4 b5 is also interesting) 22 �b1 b4 23 氫c4 鱼c5 the king is safe and Black has adequate counterplay (Leko-Karpov, Dortmund 1995).

The tactical 17 2c6 (17...2xc6? 18 2b4!) is parried by 17... 2ac8! 18 2e3 2xe5 19 2xb7 2c7 20 2a6 2c5 21 2xc5+ 2xc5 (Leko).



17...a5 weakens Black's queenside pawn pair: 18 \(\Delta c 3 \) \(\Delta hd8 \) (18...\(\Delta d5 \) 19 \(\Delta he1 \) \(\Delta he1 \) \(\Delta c 8 \) 20 \(f3 \) \(\Delta f8 \) 21 \(\Delta b1 \)

18 ⊈f4 ②d5

The reinforcement 18... Lhd8 is too late: 19 Ld4 全d5 (19... 全f8 20 全b1 a6 21 Lxd6! Lxd6 22 公c4 e5 23 wxe5 axb5 24 wxd6+ wxd6 25 公xd6 全xg2 26 Lg1 全h3 27 公xb5 and White wins a pawn, Ye Jiangchuan-Schlosser, Groningen 1996) 20 Lhd1 全f8 21 全b1 with advantage to White — 22 c4 followed by 公xf7 is threatened (Sutovsky-Nisipeanu, Columbia 1996).


But in the recent game Istratescu-Nisipeanu (Bucharest 1997) after 18...\$\(\textit{\textit{2}}\)d5!? 19 \$\(\textit{\textit{2}}\)c6+ (doubling rooks on the d-file should perhaps have been considered) 19...\$\(\textit{2}\)f8 20 \$\(\textit{\textit{2}}\)xd6+ \$\(\textit{\textit{2}}\)xd6 21 \$\(\textit{\textit{2}}\)e5 \$\(\textit{\textit{2}}\)c5 22 f4 g6 23 \$\(\textit{\textit{2}}\)hf1 h5 (to prevent g2-g4) Black gained equal chances.

The eighth game of the Kamsky-Karpov match (Elista 1996) now continued 19 \(\Delta g3 \) \(\Delta d4! \) with active piece play for White — cf. Game 10.

2.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2g5 2gf6 6 2d3 e6 7 21f3 2d6 8 2e2 h6 9 2e4 2xe4 10 2xe4 2f6 11 2e2 b6 12 2d2 2b7 13 0-0-0 2c7)

14 **Z**he1

White calmly strengthens his position.



14 ... 0-0-0

14...0-0 looks risky, but in Game 11 (Kamsky-Karpov, 12th Match Game, Elista 1996) Black succeeded in parrying White's attack: 15 g4 c5 16 g5 hxg5 17 ②xg5 ②f4! 18 h4?! Zad8! with a good game. Ftacnik recommends as better 18 dxc5 bxc5 19 Zg1, and if 19...②xh2 20 f4! ③xg1 21 Zxg1 Zfd8 22 Wh2 with an attack for White.

15 **≜**a6 b5!

Forestalling White's possible activity associated with c2-c4 after 15... 2xa6 16 xa6+ b8 17 c2, although even here Black's defensive resources are quite adequate:

- (a) 17... 2\d5 18 c4 2\f4 19 \fflaggref{f4} f4 and White's chances are only slightly preferable (A.Sokolov-Karpov, Belfort 1988) Game 12;
- (b) 17... he8 18 \$\delta\$b1 \$\overline{\Omega}\$d7 19 c4 e5 20 dxe5 \$\overline{\Omega}\$xe5 and Black equalises (Kuczynski-Sapis, Polish Ch 1989).
- 15... ■he8 16 ②e5 ②xe5 17 dxe5 ②d5 18 ②xb7+ ₩xb7 is more passive, and here in Woda-Sapis

(Polish Ch 1989) White could have maintained his initiative with 19 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{w}}\)g4!

16 ≜xb7+ \$\psi xb7 17 \$\psi b1 \$\psi a8


And now:

18 **Lc1 L**b8 19 c4 bxc4 20 **L**xc4 **L**b5 21 **W**d3 **L**bb8 with counterplay for Black (McDonald-Hodgson, British Ch 1990);

18 এc1 b7 19 신d2 요b4 20 c3 এd6 21 신b3 신d5 with equal chances (Chandler-Adams, Blackpool 1990).

2.3 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2g5 2gf6 6 2d3 e6 7 21f3 2d6 8 2e2 h6 9 2e4 2xe4 10 2xe4 2f6 11 2e2 b6 12 2d2 2b7 13 0-0-0 2c7)

14 🕸 b1



White is not in a hurry to disclose his plans, since it is not easy for Black to free himself.

14 ... 0-0-0

 fully oppose the plan of positional pressure:

- (a) 15 c4 0-0, and now:
- (a1) 16 g4, when the open nature of the position allows Black counterplay: 16... 查f4! 17 包e5 全xd2 18 基xd2 (18 對xd2 互xd4 19 全h7+ 包xh7 20 對xd4 c5于) 18... 基xd4 19 重g1 c5 20 g5 包e4 with a complicated game (Z.Almasi);
- (a2) 16 Ac3 Ife8 (if 16...We7?! White attacks with 17 g4 c5 18 Hhgl!, Z.Almasi-Adams, Groningen 1995, but 16...c5 is possible - 17 The1 Tfe8 18 dxc5 ≜xc5 19 4De5. Aseev-Epishin, Russia 1997, and now Aseev suggests 19... \$\preceptre{6}\$f8!? 20 \$\overline{9}\$g4 ②xg4 21 \ \ xg4 f5 22 \ \ g6 \ \ f7 with an equal position) 17 De5 (here too 17 g4 is premature: 17...c5 18 **Z**hg1 \$xf3 19 ₩xf3 cxd4 20 \$d2 \$\d7 21 We4 g6! with a sound position for Black - Karpov) 17...c5 18 dxc5 @xc5 19 f3 a5 20 @c2 @a6 with a double-edged game (Z.Almasi-Karpov, Groningen 1995);

- (c1) 17...0-0?! 18 g4 \d5 19 g5! \dxf3 (19...hxg5? 20 \dxg5 \dxf3 21 \dxf3 \dxf3 22 \dxf6 g6 23 \dxfdel±) 20

gxf6 g6 (if 20... wxf6 White attacks with 21 &c3 e5 22 f4!) 21 &xh6 &xh2 22 Ih1 wxe2 23 &xe2 Ixd1+24 Ixd1 Ic8 25 f3 with an attack for White (Topalov-Ivanchuk, Las Palmas 1996);

(c2) 17...a5 18 **Qe3 W**c7 19 **Qb5+ 20 Qd4!** with the better game for White (Timman-Leko, Groningen 1996) – *Game 13*.

A practically unexplored alternative is 14...虽c8!? 15 虽hg1 c5 16 dxc5 默xc5 17 皇c3 0—0 18 皇d4 豐c7 19 g4 ②d5 20 g5 h5 21 ②e5 ②f4 with equal chances (Wolff-Orlov, USA Ch 1995).

15 🙎 a 6


15 c4 can be met by 15...c5, although here too after 16 ♠c3 White's chances are better:

- (a) 16... The8 17 The1 \$\displays 8 18 g3 \$\displays 8 19 \$\displays 2 a6 20 dxc5 \$\displays xc5 21 \$\displays 5 (A.Sokolov-Spraggett, match (9), Saint John 1988);
- (b) 16... **E**hg8 17 **E**he1 **\$\delta\$** b8 18 **\$\delta\$** c2 cxd4 19 **2**\dxd4 a6 20 g3 (Svidler-Vyzhmanavin, Novgorod 1995).

15 ... **I**d7

16 ≜xb7+ ₩xb7

If 17 c4 Ind8 18 2c3 2b8 19 Inel c5 with equal chances (Kudrin-Kamsky, New York 1989).



Now after 17...全xe5 18 dxe5 公g8 19 c4 公e7 20 全c3 Ind8 21 Ixd7 Ixd7 22 Id1 Ixd1+ 23 Wxd1 c5 24 Wd6 White has a significant advantage in the ending (Thorsteinsson-Kamsky, Reykjavik 1990).

Game 8 **Lautier-Karpov** *Biel 1997*

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	∕ 2d7
5	 ②g 5	Dgf6
6	₽d3	e6
7	113	≜ d6
8	₩e2	h6
9	De4	②xe4
10	₩xe4	c5


This basically thematic attack on the centre has the drawback that Black remains behind in development, and it is not easy for him to secure the position of his king.

11 0**–**0 ∮∖66

13 He1!

A useful developing move, putting the black king under 'X-ray' (White gains the possibility of 🖸 d4-f5).

13 ... \(\daggerd{\text{\tint{\text{\tint{\text{\tint{\text{\ti}\text{\texit{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\tex{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texit{\text{\ti}\text{\texit{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\texit{\text{\texi}\



15 ... **☆**f8?!

It would have been more natural to expect of Karpov his 'patent' 15... \$\dot\delta 7\$, but here this loses outright to 16 \$\delta f5+.

Since later Black's defence involves trying to exchange queens, it would have been simpler to do this immediately by 15... \$\text{Wh5}\$ 16 \$\text{Wxh5}\$ \text{2xh5}\$ 17 \$\text{Df5}\$ \$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{a}{2}\$}\$ fs 18 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{a}{2}\$}\$}\$ ds 18 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{a}{2}\$}\$}\$ (18...0-0-0 19 \$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{a}{2}\$}\$ xa7 \$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{a}{2}\$}\$ c7!? is also interesting, threatening 20...exf5 as well as to cut off the bishop's retreat by 20...b6) 19 \$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{a}{2}\$}\$ fd 0-0-0 20 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{a}{2}\$}\$}\$ ds 21 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{a}{2}\$}\$}\$ ds, and after 21...\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{a}{2}\$}\$ c6 or 21...\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{a}{2}\$}\$ d5 Black has an inferior but defensible ending.

 19 ₩f3 or after 15...g5 16 ₩h3 0-0-0 17 ②b3 ₩a4 18 &d4 e5 19 ₩f3 leaves his kingside irreparably weakened.

16 \$f4 \$xf4


16...e5 can be met by the simple 17 色b3 豐b4 18 单g5 豐xh4 19 单xh4, with an obvious advantage in the endgame.

17 ₩xf4 ℤc8 18 ᡚf3!

The main theme of White's strategy is occupation of e5.

18 ... 堂e7 19 豐g3 豐b4 Or 19...公h5? 20 罩e5!

20 De5



20 ... g5?!

There was no justification for such an optimistic sortie. 20... \$\mu\$hg8, avoiding weakening the kingside, was more solid.


21 c4! **Zhd8**?!

If Black is going to suffer, then he might at least have some material in compensation: 21... \$\psi\$xb2 22 \$\pma\$ab1 \$\pma\$xb2 23 \$\pma\$xb7 \$\pma\$hd8 24 \$\pma\$hd8! \$\pma\$a6

22 \#h3 h5?

This leads to loss of material. It was essential to return with 22... \$\mathbb{L}\$h8, although after 23 b3 White has a clear advantage.

The initiative is more important than a pawn; 24 \(\mathbb{\psi}\)xa7 b6 would have left Black with some hopes.



26 ②xf7!

By the threat of a discovered check (26...\$\precept xf7 27 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g6+) White exposes the enemy king. Black's attempt to buy him off by giving up the exchange proves fruitless.

26		₩c5
27	②xd8	₩xe3
28	E xe3	⊈xd8
29	 ■ xb7	a5
30	¤ a7	IIc5

31	f4	gxf3
32	Exf3	De8
33	I f7	Dc7
34	∐h 7	êe8
35	⊈ 12	⊈c8
36	Th 8	Ф ₫7


After 36...⊈b8 White wins by 37 ⊈xc7.

37	⊈e3	e5
38	≜.e2	. ⊈ .g6
39	🕰 xh5	≜ f5
40	≜ e2	≜ e6
41	h4	\$ c6
42	¤ h6	⊈ d7
43	h5	1-0

Game 9 Kamsky-Karpov Dortmund 1993

1	e4	с6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	⊘d7
5	包g5	Dgf6
6	ı⊈d3	e6
7	D1 13	≜ d6
8	₩e2	h6
9	De4	②xe4
10	₩xe4	Df6
11	₩h4	⊈ e7!

Nowadays the appearance of Karpov's king at e7 is nothing unusual, but at the time this move created the impression of an exploding bomb. All the participants in the tournament left their games and gathered around the board where the future finalists of the FIDE World Championship in Elista were playing.



12	De5	≜xe5
13	dxe5	₩a5+
14	c3	₩xe5+
15	≜e3	b6
16	0-0-0	g5
17	₩a4	c5
18	¤ he1	


White has a strong initiative for the sacrificed pawn, but Karpov is accusomed to defending such situations.

If 20 f4 gxf4 21 &d4 Black holds he position by 21... #g5 22 \$\mathbb{Z}\$e5 #h4.

Karpov considers the strongest to be 22...2c6! 23 2e5 47 24 2c2 757 when the initiative passes to 3lack. Now, however, Kamsky finds a way of adding fuel to the fire.

The outcome of the game is

decided to a certain extent on the d-file, Black's control of which assists his king, as is seen in the following variation: 24 \$\textrm{\$



24		 ■ 5d6
25	≜ xf6+	\$ xf6
26	fxg5+	hxg5
27	xd6	Exd 6
28	c4	⊈ e7
29	₩e3	f6
30	h4	gxh4
31	gxh4	₩ d 7
32	₩h6	e5?


Activity on the d-file was more appropriate: 32... \(\begin{align*} \ d2! \) 33 \(\begin{align*} \ g7+ \text{\omega} f7 \) 34 h5 \(\begin{align*} \ d4, \) counterattacking (Karpov). Now, however, the h-pawn becomes very dangerous.

33	h5	₩g4
34	₩h7+	\$ d8
35	h6	¤ d2
36	₩f5!	

This is where the difference in the placing of the queens tells. In view of

the threat of the h-pawn's further advance, Black has to agree to their exchange.

36 ... ₩xf5 37 ₾xf5 ₾d7



38 ≜g6?


After 38 \$\colon c!\$ in view of the threatened pin Black would have nothing better than 38...\$\top[Delta]\$ d4, but then after 39 \$\colon xd7\$ he would have to give up a piece, since 39...\$\top[Delta]\$ xd7 40 \$\top[Delta]\$ d1 or 39...\$\colon xd7\$ 40 \$\top[Delta]\$ h1 allows the h-pawn to queen. Now, however, it comes under the firm control of the rook, and matters are decided by Black's pair of connected pawns.

38 ≌h2 . . . 39 **h**7 **ф**e7 40 **⊈d3 2** e6 Ig1 41 f5 42 **\$**f6 43 **X**xa7 e4 44 ı<u>≜</u>e2 f4 45 b3 f346 ⊈d1 **≜**f5 47 фc1 ⊈xh7 48 **¤**b7 фe5

49 **X**xb6 **X**xa2 0-1

Game 10 Kamsky-Karpov Match (8), Elista 1996

1 e4 **c6** d4d52 9)d2 3 dve4 4 9)xe4 4)d7 5 20g5 Def6 6 **≜**.d3 e6 9113 **≜**d6 8 ₩e2 h6 9 9)e4 9\xe4 Wxe4 9)f6 10 11 ₩e2 ₩c7 ₫ d2 12 h6 13 0 - 0 - 0**≜b**7 9)e5 **c5** 14 **©**e7 15 **≜**b5+ dxc5 ₩xc5 16 17 **a3**




The knight offer is a pseudo-sacrifice: 17...\wxe5? 18 \wxe5 \arrowxe5 xe5 19 \arrowb4+.

As mentioned in the analysis, after 18... Ind8 19 Id4 2d5 (19... 18 20 Ixd6) 20 Ind1 18 21 18 19 Index threatens 22 c4 followed by 19xf7 (Sutovsky-Nisipeanu, Columbia 1996).

However, 18... d5!? (Istratescu-Nisipeanu, Bucharest 1997) is a possible improvement.

A subtle manoeuvre. White not only threatens to double rooks, but also eyes the weak c6 square.

Continuing the battle for c6, whereas after the retreat of the bishop Black would have consolidated the position of his knight at d5 by 22...b5.



Black has to agree to an isolated pawn, since if he interposes 25...\$\times\$xg3? White too can interpose 26 \$\times\$xe6! \$\times\$xf2 27 \$\times\$f4 \$\times\$e8 28

26	≜ xd6	₩xd6
27	Z d4	b 5
28	₩d3	⊈g8
29	g3	₩e6
30	Z d1	X ad7
31	h4	 ■ d6
22	94.30	

One is unlikely to outplay Karpov with prophylaxis, and therefore the vigorous 32 g4!? **\#6** 33 **\#g**3 should have been considered, with some initiative.


32		₩e1-
33	⊈a2	₩e7
34	₩f3	₩ e6
35	∐ e2	₩c8
36	₩d3	 □c6
37	∲ b1	Z e6
38	Ee3	₩c6
39	₩d2	E xe3
40	Wxe3	

Nothing is promised by 40 fxe3 \blacksquare e8 41 \blacksquare xd5 \blacksquare xe3 42 \blacksquare d8+ \blacksquare e8.

40		₩e
41	₩d2	ℤd€
42	g4	₩f6
43	g5	₩f3
44	ന്നാ	

After the exchanges 44 gxh6 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xh6 45 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xh4 46 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d8+ \(\frac{1}{2}\)h7 the game is equal.

44	• • •	Wf
45	c3	Wf:
46	 IIf4	₩h
47	gxh6	



47 ... ₩e6! 48 ₩d4

If 48 hxg7 White has to reckon with 48...d4+ 49 \$\displays 1 dxc3, when 50 \$\displays xc3\$ fails to 50...\$\displays d1+ 51 \$\displays c2\$\$\displays 2+ 52 \$\displays b3\$ \$\displays d3\$, winning the queen.

48		₩xh6
49	IIf5	₩e6
50	ℤ e5	₩d7
51	\$a1	f6
52	ℤe3	I c6
53	h5	Ic4
54	₩b6	d4
55	Z d3	₩f5
56	 x d 4	E xd4
57	cxd4	

57 \(\mathbb{w}\)xd4 \(\mathbb{w}\)xh5 58 \(\mathbb{w}\)d6 \(\mathbb{w}\)f3 59 \(\mathbb{w}\)xa6 \(\mathbb{w}\)d1+ 60 \(\mathbb{w}\)a2 \(\mathbb{w}\)d5+ would have led to equality.

	7	
57		₩xf2
58	₩e6+	\$1 \$€
59	₩d6+	⊈ f7
60	₩d7+	\$1 \$
61	₩d6+	∲ f7
62	₩d7+	
	1/2-1/2	

Game 11 Kamsky-Karpov Match (12). Elista 1996

1	e4	с6
2	d4	d5
3	Dd2	dxe4
4	②xe4	Ød7
5	②g5	Øgf6
6	⊈d3	e6
7	2113	≜ d6
8	₩e2	h6
9	De4	②xe4
10	₩xe4	Ð f6
11	₩e2	₩c7
12	≜ d2	b6
13	000	≜ b7
14	■ he1	

Kamsky switches to another of the three main alternatives.

14 ... 0-0

This is considered risky, as White's attack has something to latch on to – the h6 pawn. The main continuation is 14...0-0-0.


15 g4 c5

One is unlikely to find volunteers willing to play 15... 2xg4? 16 **\(\mathbb{Z}**\)g1 f5 17 h3 2x6.

This natural move in fact reduces the potential of White's attack, as Black is able to make an energetic counterattack in the centre. 18 dxc5 bxc5 19 \(\frac{1}{2}g1! \) was stronger.

18		≖ ad8!
19	dxc5	bxc5
20	ı≙e3	

Now if 20 Ig1 Black has 20...c4 21 2xc4 Ixd2 22 Ixd2 2xd2+ 23 2xd2 Id8+ 24 2xe1 In with the better chances.



20 ... Id4!

A pretty move, indirectly attacking the h4 pawn, and if 21 h5 Black was planning to seize the initiative by 21... 數e5 22 置g1 c4!


Karpov defends, but it was already the time to launch a counterattack: 24... \$\mathbb{L}\$! Now 25 \$\mathbb{W}\$xf6? fails to 25... \$\mathbb{W}\$xe3+! 26 \$\mathbb{C}\$b1 gxf6, 25 \$\mathbb{W}\$e1 \$\mathbb{L}\$d8 with the threat of 26... \$\mathbb{L}\$xd3 is unpleasant for White, while after 25 \$\mathbb{W}\$g3 \$\mathbb{W}\$xg3 26 \$\mathbb{L}\$xg3 \$\mathbb{L}\$d7 Black is a pawn up in the endgame.

27... Ih 1 28 Ixh 1 2xh 1 came into consideration, with the better chances.

28 \wxf6+

White's attack has petered out, and he considers it best to go into a slightly inferior ending.

28 ₩xf6 29 Exf6 ₾xd3 30 **□**xf7+ **¤xf7** \#h1+! 31 Ø**xf7** 32 **ф**d2 ⊈xc2 33 SP/S



33 ... 里h2+ 33...全f5! 34 e4 里h8! was stronger, and now in the event of 35 ②b7 全xe4 36 ②xc5 里h2+! 37 全c3 里c2+ Black has real winning chances (Vasyukov).

In time trouble Karpov misses the superior 35...\(\hat{2}\text{b1}\) 36 \(\beta f3+\text{ \psi e5}\) 37 \(\beta f1\) \(\hat{2}\text{e4}!\) 38 \(\hat{\psi}\)xc5 \(\beta c2+\text{ 39}\) \(\psi b4\) \(\beta xb2+\text{ (Vasyukov)}\).

36 9 xc5 #c2+ 37 **₫**d4 **¤**d2+ 38 **\$**c3 **¤c2**+ 39 **☆**d4 e5+ 40 **\$**d5 **¤**d2+ **\$**c4 ¤c2+ 41 42 **罩d2+** 43 **\$**c4 g5 44 e4!

This move, restricting the bishop, saves the game, since the win of the e4 pawn by 44... \(\begin{align*} \begin{align*} \delta & \delta

44		≜c8
45	\$c3!	Xd1
46	 1 1 3 +	⊈ g7
47	Ød3	g4
48	ℤ g3	\$ f6
49	D12!	Ec1+
50	d 2	Ľ a1
51	②xg4 +	≜ xg4
52	¤ xg4	Exa2
53	\$c3	 a4
54	b4	1/2-1/2

Game 12 A.Sokolov-Karpov Belfort 1988

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	€)d2	dxe4
4	②xe4	∕ 2)d7
5	∮)g5	Øgf6
6	≜d3	e6
7	4 0113	⊈ d6
8	₩e2	h6
9	De4	②xe4
10	₩xe4	D f6
11	₩e2	b6
12	ı⊈d2	. ₽b7
13	0-0-0	₩ c7
14	H he1	0-0-0
15	≜ a6	

15 c4 is considered more promising.



15 ... \(\hat{\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\xitte{\$\xrt{\$\xitit{\$\text{\$\$\}\$\$}\text{\$\exittit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}\exittit{\$\exittit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}\$}\exittit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}\exittit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}}}}\text{\$\text

te's play with c2-c4.		
16	₩xa6+	& b8
17	₩e2	2)d5
18	c4	Df4
19	₩f1	Dg6


This retreat is forced, as 19...g5 20 g3 g4 21 \(\mathbb{I} = 4 \) gxf3 22 \(\mathbb{L} \) xf4! leads to an advantage for White.

20	g3	≗ e7
21	h4	h5
22	₩e2	≖ d7
23	≜g5	≜ f6
24	I d2	∡ hd8
25	Z ed1	₩b7
26	⊈b1	⊈ a8
27	a3	₩a6

27...b5 28 cxb5 \(\mathbb{W}\)xb5 29 \(\mathbb{W}\)e4 has its drawbacks in the form of the weak c6 pawn, but now all Black's kingside pawns are weak, and the one at h5 is virtually doomed.

Preparing ...b6-b5, which was not good immediately because of 30 d5.

30 ②c2 b5 31 ②b4 ₩b7



32 d5!

This breakthrough gives the game a new turn!

32 ... cxd5

White has the advantage after both 12...c5 33 dxe6 單xd2 34 單xd2 罩xd2 15 豐xd2 cxb4 36 exf7 豐e4+ 37 豐c2 豐xc2+ 38 墊xc2 ②g6 39 cxb5, and 12...exd5 33 cxd5 ②xd5 34 ②xd5 xd5 35 罩d4 (Sokolov).


33 cxb5 **Ec8**?

Now White wins a pawn for free, ut also after 33... 20g6 34 a4 the h5 nawn causes concern.

34	₩xh5	4∆ g6
35	₩e2	②e5
36	b3	∡ dc7
37	ℤc2	Exc2
38	②xc2	a6
39	4 2d4	axb5
40	2xb5	₩b6
41	a4	₩c5
42	₩d2	D f3
43	₩c1	₩xc1+
44	E xc1	Z d8

As shown by Sokolov, Black could have regained the pawn by 44... 2d2+45 \$\displays b2 \displays c1 46 \$\displays c1 \Displays b3+ 47 \$\displays c2 \Displays c5, but only at the cost of allowing the h-pawn to advance - 48 h5 \$\Displays d7 49 h6 \$\Displays f8 50 \$\Displays d6, and the f7 pawn is lost.

45 IIc7 d4 46 IIxf7 d3 47 IIc1 d2+ 48 IIc2



Black has done everything possible, but the pawn has been firmly blockaded, and if necessary White's rook can control it from the rear.

49	21C/T	A DO
50	②a6+	⊈ a8
51	②c7+	\$ b8
52	②xe6	 ⊈ xb3
53	 18 +	⊈ a7
54	Zd8	Ľ b1+
55	⊈e2	≖ e1+
56	⊈xf3	d1₩+
57	X xd1	x d1

10-71

Despite winning the exchange, the ending is hopeless for Black.


58 \$f4 **I**f1

59	f3	⊈ b6
60	包g7	\$ c6
61	Dh5	Ġ d6
62	②xf6	⊈ e7
63	包h5	⊈f7
64	g4	⊈ g6
65	Dg3	Z a1
66	h5+	⊈f 7
67	g5	I xa4+
68	∲ f5	
69	⊈g4	 2a4+
70	f4	 □b4
71	Df5	 ■b1
72	h6	E g1+
73	⊈ h5	In
74	Ød6+	фе6
75	⊈ g6	1-0

Game 13 **Timman-Leko** *Groningen 1996*

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	∕ 2\d2	dxe4
4	Dxe4	ᡚd7
5	夕g5	Øgf6
6	ı⊈d3	e6
7	D113	≜ d6
8	₩e2	h6
9	②e4	②xe4
10	₩xe4	4 ∆f6
11	₩e2	b6
12	≜ d2	≜ b7
13	0-0-0	₩c7
14	doh1	86.


In recent times this move has become fashionable, as after 14...0-0-0 15 \(\mathbb{L}\)a6 White is guaranteed a slight but enduring advantage.



15 **Z**hg1!

Deterring Black from castling kingside.

In the game Topalov-Ivanchuk (Las Palmas 1996) Black risked castling, but after 17...0-0?! 18 g4 \dots 45 19 g5 \dots xf3 20 gxf6 he ended up in a difficult position.



20 ... ≜xh2?

Over-optimistic, but White also has he advantage after 20... ≜e5 21 f4.

21 包f5+ \$f8

22 **X**xd8+ **W**xd8

23 ≝d1 ₩c7

24 &d4!

Now all of White's pieces join the attack, and he is also threatening to out off the retreat of the black bishop it h2.

24 ... e5


If 24...exf5 there follows 25 \(\text{\$\text{\(\circ}\)} \) xf6 26 \(\text{\$\text{\$\circ}\} \) d7 \(\text{\$\text{\$\circ}\} \) e5 27 \(\text{\$\text{\$\circ}\} \) with the hreats of \(\text{\$\circ} \) c4 and \(\text{\$\text{\$\circ}\} \) h5.

25 ≜xb6! ₩xb6

26 **ℤ**d6 **Ψ**c7

27 \#c4!


After this diverting move there ollows a decisive infiltration by the ook.



27		₩b8
28	 □b6	₩c8
29	¤ xb7	₩xb7
30	Ød6	₩e7
31	₩c8+	De8
32	Df5	h5
33	②xe7	⊈xe7
34	₩d7+	10

3: 10... **營**c7


1	e4	с6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	Dd7
5	 2 1 g 5	Øgf6
6	≜d 3	e6
7	2113	≜. d6
8	₩e2	h6
9	②e4	②xe4
10	Wxe4	₩c7



A fashionable move. By developing his queen at this natural post, Black prepares ...c6-c5. However, here he has to reckon with \(\mathbb{\mathbb{W}} g4\).

White's main replies are 11 ₩g4 (3.1), 11 \(\ddot{2}\) d2 (3.2) and 11 0–0 (3.3).

3.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2g5 2gf6 6 2d3 e6 7 21f3 2d6 8 We2 h6 9 2e4 2xe4 10 Wxe4 Wc7)



The most critical move. By attacking the g7 pawn, White prevents Black from castling, but at the same time his queen is insecurely placed.

11 ... **⊈**f8

11...g5?! is a risky alternative: 12 ₩h3! **\(\text{\$\mathbb{Z}}\) 8 13 \(\text{\$\mathbb{\O}}\)**d2!, and now:


- (a) 13...\$18?! 14 \$\Delta\$e4 \$\Delta\$g7 (after 14...f5?! both 15 0-0 and 15 \$\Delta\$h5+ favour White) 15 0-0! \$\Delta\$xd4 16 \$\Delta\$e3!, and the weakening of Black's kingside causes him problems (Kasparov-Kamsky, Linares 1994) Game 14;
- (b) 13...g4!? (the immediate 13...c5!? is also possible) 14 \ 23 (14 \ 24 3 \) 14 \ 25 16 \ 3 \) 2f4 leads to a draw by repetition) 14...\(2\) 15 \ 26 2 c5 16 \ 23 \) 2xd2+ 17 \ 2xd2 cxd4 18 0-0-0 with an unclear position (Frolov-Ponomariov, Kiev 1997).

Here the topical continuations are 13 **Ze1** (3.11) and 13 c3 (3.12).

After 13 b3 e5 Black gains good counterplay (Gelfand-Speelman, Munich 1992) – Game 15.

3.11 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2g5 2gf6 6 2d3 e6 7 21f3 2d6 8 we2 h6 9 2e4 2xe4 10 wxe4 wc7 11 wg4 2f8 12 0-0 c5)

13 **X**e1



White intensifies the piece pressure n the centre.

13 ... b6

Removing the central pawn tension avours White: 13...c4 14 \(\) f1 b5 15 14 b4 16 b3! c3 17 \(\) e5 \(\) \(\) \(\) xe5 18 1xe5 \(\) e7 19 \(\) e3 \(\) b7 20 \(\) ad1 g6 11 h4 h5 22 \(\) #f4 \(\) g7 23 \(\) d6! with a lecisive invasion by the rook (De irmian-Gulko, USA Ch 1994).

14 b3

If 14 **2**e5?! Black sacrifices the exchange: 14...cxd4! 15 **W**f3 (15 **2**g6+ fxg6 16 **W**f3+ **2**f6 17 **W**xa8

业xh2+ 18 全h1 全f7 19 實 鱼d6 favours Black, Forster-Khalifman, Bad Wörishofen 1996) 15.... 业xe5 16 數xa8 业xh2+ 17 全f1 业d6 18 单d2 全e7 (18... 公c5 19 b4 公xd3 20 cxd3 數b7 21 數xb7 业xb7 元, Khalifman) 19 數e4 數c5 and gains good prospects (Khalifman-Speelman, Hastings 1995).

14 ... ②f6 15 ₩h4 ♀b7


16 De5

16 ... cxd4 17 \wxd4 \wc5

The chances are equal (Leko-Adams, Dortmund 1996).

3.12 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2g5 2gf6 6 2d3 e6 7 21f3 2d6 8 2e2 h6 9 2e4 2xe4 10 2xe4 2c7 11 2g4 2f8 12 0-0 c5)

13 c3



10...₩*c7* 45

Since Black's plans include the fianchetto of his light-square bishop, White intends to exchange it, for which he reinforces his centre.

13 ... b6
14 ₩h4 ₾b7
15 ₾e4 ₾xe4
Or 15...₾e7 16 ₾g5!?±.
16 ₩xe4 □d8

16 Wxe4 Ad8 17 Ae1!

It is important to intensify the pressure in the centre.

The alternatives are more passive:

17 h3 \$\dot{9}g8 18 \$\overline{\textbf{Z}}\$d1 \$\overline{\textsf{D}}\$f6 19 \$\overline{\textbf{E}}\$c2 c4!= (Z.Almasi-Palac, Vienna 1996);

17 ... **2**f6

17...cxd4 is risky: 18 ②xd4 ②xh2+ 19 ②h1 ②f6 20 ¥f3.

18 Wh4 &e7 19 Wh3! g5 20 dxc5 bxc5


This is better than 20... ≜xc5 21 ②d4±.

Z.Almasi-Speelman (Erevan OL 1996) now continued 21 2dd h5 22 2c4 2f4 23 g3 2xc1 24 2axc1 h4 25 2e5! with the initiative for White.

3.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \(\tilde{\Omega} \)c3 dxe4 4 \(\tilde{\Omega} \)xe4 \(\tilde{\Omega} \)d7 5 \(\tilde{\Omega} \)g5 \(\tilde{\Omega} \)g66 6 \(\tilde{\Omega} \)d3 e6 7 \(\tilde{\Omega} \)1f3 \(\tilde{\Omega} \)d6 8 \(\tilde{\Omega} \)e2 h6 9 \(\tilde{\Omega} \)e4 \(\tilde{\Omega} \)xe4 \(\tilde{\Omega} \)(7)

11 Qd2

A useful developing move, preparing queenside castling.



11 ... c5

This is the most critical reply, but 11...b6 has also been played:

(a) 12 豐g4 g5 (or 12...全f8 13 0-0-0 全b7 14 單he1 單d8 15 全b1 全f6 16 豐h4 全e7 17 全e5 c5=, Khalifman-Epishin, Dos Hermanas 1993) 13 豐h3 單g8! 14 g4 (14 豐xh6 全f8 15 豐h7 全f6!章) 14...全b7 15 0-0-0 0-0-0 with a good game for Black (Sion Castro-Karpov, Leon 1993) - Game 16:

(b) 12 c4 \(\Delta b7 \) 13 \(\mathbb{W} e2 \) c5 14 d5 \(\Delta e5 \) 15 dxe6 \(\Delta xd3 + 16 \) \(\mathbb{W} xd3 \) 0-0-0 \(\Delta be8 \) 18 \(\mathbb{M} be1 \) fxe6 19 \(\mathbb{W} g6 \) with the better game for White (Spangenberg-Servat, Argentine Ch 1994).

12 ₩g4

Or 12 c3 216 13 We2 0-0 14 2e5 Id8 15 0-0 2d7 16 Ifel 2c6 with equal chances (Wittmann-Podgaets, Moscow 1996).

12 ... \$\psi f8\$
13 0-0

13 0-0-0?! is weaker on account of 13...c4 14 \(\Delta \)e2 b5 15 \(\Delta \)he1 \(\Delta \)b7, when Black stands better (Rogic-


Arlandi, Makarska 1996).

13 ₩e4 is a loss of time: 13...c4 14 \$f1 \(\mathbb{L} \) b8 15 a4 b6 16 \(\mathbb{L} \) e2 \(\mathbb{L} \) a6 17 g3 \$\(\mathbb{L} \) b7 18 \(\mathbb{L} \) g2 \(\mathbb{L} \) d5 with equal chances (Ehlvest-Gulko, Novgorod 1995).

If 13...e5?! there follows 14 dxc5 ②xc5 15 ዿf5! with the better game for White.

15...b4 can be met by 16 ②e5.

16 ₩h3




And now:

16... \$\displays 8? 17 axb5 e5 18 \$\displays 25!, and White gained the advantage (Tiviakov-Shabalov, Amsterdam 1996);

16... **2**g7 17 axb5 e5 18 **2**a5 **3**b8 19 **2**d2 **2**f6 20 **3**c3 exd4 with a complicated game (Tiviakov).

3.3 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2g5 2gf6 6 2d3 e6 7 21f3 2d6 8 we2 h6 9 2e4 2xe4 10 wxe4 wc7)

11 0-0



A new plan. White hopes to use his heavy pieces more productively.

11 ... b6

11...c5 12 ₩g4 \psire f8 transposes into variation 3.1.

12 **L**e1

If 12 \(\mathbb{W} g4 \) Black has the good reply 12...g5 13 \(\mathbb{M} h3 \) \(\mathbb{Z} g8 14 \) \(\alpha d2 \) \(\alpha b7 15 \) \(\alpha c4 0 - 0 - 0! \) 16 c3 (16 \(\mathbb{Z} e1!? \) 16...c5 17 \(\alpha xd6 + \) (weaker is 17 \(\alpha e3?! \) \(\alpha f4! \) 18 \(\mathbb{Z} f6! \) \(\mathbb{T}, \) Topalov-Tukmakov, Tilburg 1994) 17...\(\mathbb{W} xd6 18 \) \(\alpha e3 \) cxd4 \(\alpha)f6 \) with a double-edged game (Tukmakov).

12 ... \(\mathbb{L} b7\)
13 \(\mathbb{W}h4 \)
14 \(\Omegag5 \)
\(\Omegag5 \)
\(\Omegag5 \)
\(\Omegag6 \)

14...0-0 would also seem to be possible, since 15 ₺h7 ፟፟፟፟Ife8 16 ₺xh6 gxh6 17 ∰xh6 fails to 17...\$\dot\$xh2+ 18 ₺h1 \$\dot\$f4.


If 18... Ic8?!, as played in Z.Almasi-Lalic, Croatia 1996, White

*10...***₩***c7* 47

19 **≜e3 ₩c7** The chances are equal.

Game 14 Kasparov-Kamsky Linares 1994

e4 c6 1 2 d4d53 6)d2 dve4 Daye4 4 €)d7 5 2)g5 Øgf6 6 **≜d3** е6 7 9)1f3 **≜**d6 ₩e2 8 **h6** 9 9)e4 Dxe4 **≝c7** Wxe4 10 11 ₩g4



11 ... g5?!

An unjustified weakening of the position, as the World Champion subtly emphasises. Here 11... \$\displayset{2}\$f8 is better.

12 ₩h3! **Zg8**13 ②d2!

Not 13 豐xh6? 皇f8 14 豐h7 乞f6 15 豐h3 g4 16 豐h4 gxf3 17 豐xf6 fxg2 18 黨g1 豐xh2.

13 ... **£**f8?!


Black sounds the retreat, yet 13...c5!? (or first 13...g4) was possible.

14 ②e4 **≜**g7

If 14...f5?!, then both 15 0-0 fxe4?! 16 \(\mathbb{W}\)xe6+ \(\delta\)d8 17 \(\mathbb{W}\)xg8 exd3 18 h4 and the simple 15 \(\mathbb{W}\)h5+ \(\delta\)e7 16 \(\delta\)g3 favour White.

If 16...单xb2 White sacrifices the exchange: 17 c3! 单xa1 18 里xa1 里g6, and develops a strong attack after 19 里d1! f5 20 豐h5 全f7 21 单c2! fxe4 22 单xe4 包f8 23 单xg6+ 包xg6 24 豐xh6 豐e5 25 单d4 (Kasparov).

17 **Z**ad1 ②f6 18 ②xf6+ ②xf6



19 单h7! 單h8 20 ₩xh6 单e7

If 20... we7 there is the pretty variation 21 \(\hat{\omega}\)c5! \(\beta\)kh 7 22 \(\beta\)d8+! \(\beta\)kh 8 23 \(\beta\)f8+ with a mating attack.

21	₩g7	 ⊈ f8
22	Z d3	≜d7
23	≜xg5	ı£xg5
24	₩xg5	₩d8
25	₩e5	₩e7
26	₩c7	≜c8
27	₩a5	

Despite White's extra pawn, he has to need to go into an ending, as long s the black king is insecure.

27		b6
28	₩e5	≜ a6
29	≜ .e4	 ⊈c8
30	c4	
31	b3	≜ b7
32	 Ifd1	≜ .a8
33	c5!	bxc5
34	∡ d6	c4
35	bxc4	c5
36	🕰 xa8	X xa8
37	Wxc5	≖ b8
38	g3	₩b7
39	₩d4	\$18
40	Wf6	1-0

Game 15 Gelfand-Speelman Munich 1992

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Ød2	dxe4
4	②xe4	⊘d7
5	Øg5	Dgf6
6	ıd3	e6
7	2113	≜ .d6
8	₩e2	h6
9	②e4	②xe4
10	₩xe4	₩c7
11	₩g4	\$1 €

12 0-0 c5

13 b3

Here 13 **X**e1 is more energetic.

13 ... e5

After 13...cxd4 14 Wxd4 \$\times 65 15 \$\times 62 \times xf3 + 16 gxf3 \$\times xh2 + 17 \times g2\$ the destruction of White's kingside is more than compensated for by his initiative (Speelman).


14 dxc5

14 c3 cxd4 15 cxd4 \(\mathbb{\psi}\)c3 16 \(\mathbb{\psi}\)h4! is possible.

14 ... ②xc5 15 单f5 h5

15... ♠xf5 16 ₩xf5 e4 17 ᡚh4 ♣g8= is safer.

16 ₩h3 ②e6




17 Wh4

A loss of time, leading to a simplification of the position. More active was 17 單d1! 单e7 18 單g3! 单f6 19 单a3+ 堂g8 20 单d6 全f4 21 堂h1 with the better chances for White (Speelman).

17 ... \(\mathbb{L} \) e7
18 \(\mathbb{W}\)g3 \(\alpha\)f4
19 \(\mathbb{L}\)xf4 \(\ext{exf4} \)

10...\#c7 49

20	₩h3	g6
21	≜ xc8	Ixc8
22	c4	⊈g 7
23	€)d4	≜ f6
24	约b5	



₩c5 24 24...\\alphaa5 25 \alphaad1 \alphacd8 26 \alphad7 ₩xa2 27 ②d6 \ hf8 28 c5 \ d4! 29 (Speelman).

> 25 **Z**ad1 \mathbb{\math **Wf3** 26 **Hhe8 ¤**xd8 ¤xd8 27 ₩xb7 ¤d2 28 29 ₩f3 a5 30 9 c3 1/2-1/2


Game 16 Sion Castro-Karpov Leon 1993

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dd2	dxe4
4	②xe4	∕ 2d7
5	 2 1 g 5	Øgf6
6	êď3	e6

7 9113 **₫** d6 ₩e2 8 **h6** med. Dre4 9 ₩xe4 ₩c7 10 **≜**d2 11 **b6** 11...c5 is more energetic.

₩g4 12 g5! ₩h3

13



Hg8!

'À la Kamsky' in a superior version! Now over the course of several moves the capture of the h6 pawn allows Black to develop an enduring initiative, e.g. 14 \windsymbol{w}xh6 \(\textit{\mathbb{\mathcal{L}}f8}\) 15 \windsymbol{\windsymbol{W}h7} 9)f6!

> .**₽.**h7 14 g4 15 0-0-0

And here 15 \wxh6 is dangerous in view of 15...c5 16 ②xg5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xg5! 17 axg5 axh1 18 0-0-0 c4 with a clear advantage to Black (Karpov).

15 0 - 0 - 0. . . 16 Hhe1 **≜f4** ⊈b1 17


Once again 17 \wxh6 \(\textit{x}\text{xd2+ 18}\) ②xd2 \\ f4 19 \\ e4 \\ f6! 20 \\ h3 c5 gives Black the initiative (Karpov).

> ■h8 17 ...

18 \(\percap{1}{2}\)c3?!

It was time for White to think of implifying: 18 ≜xf4 ₩xf4 19 ₩g3 ¥xg3 20 hxg3 c5∓.

18 ... **\$**b8 19 d5




Initiating a series of moves typical

of a game between an amateur and a professional.

19		cxd5!
20	≜xh8	 Xxh8
21	Ød4	a6
22	Dxe6	fxe6
23	E xe6	②e5!
24	£15	Dc4
25	X xh6	 xh6
26	₩xh6	₩e5
27	₩f8+	\$27
28	₩b4	②d2+!
29	Ġ a1	₩e2
30	 g1	₩xf2
31	Z d1	₩e2
32	 g1	₩xh2
33	Ed1	₩e2
34	Xh1	a5
35	₩c3	d4
	0-1	

4: 5...4 df6

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	包d7
5	905	9)df6



This move is an attempt to refute 5 2g5. With his unusual knight move Black tries to release his bishop to take up an active position.


As in the main variations, White's basic plans involve 6 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d3 (4.1), 6 \(\frac{1}{2}\)c4 (4.2) and 6 \(\beta\)1f3 (4.3).

6 ≜d3

With this move White does not prevent the active development of the black bishop.

6...h6 would appear to be possible, although it has hardly been studied: 7

②xf7!? (the critical reply, since if 7 ②5f3 Black simplifies the position by 7... ②f5! 8 ②e5 ②xd3 9 ₩xd3 e6 or 9... ₩d5 followed by ... ②d7) 7... ③xf7 8 ②f3. Shirazi-Burger (Saint John 1988) continued 8...g5 9 h4 g4 10 ②e5+ ③g7 11 c3 h5? (11... ②e6 was essential) 12 ₩d2 ②h7 13 ②xh7 □xh7 14 ₩g5+ ⑤h8 15 ②g6+ ⑤g7 16 ②xe7+1-0.



7 21f3 1h5

A practically forced loss of tempo, since if 7...e6 (7...h6? loses to 8 2xf7! 2xf3 9 2g6!) 8 h3 (here 8 2xf7? does not work because of 8...2xf3) 8...2xf3 9 2xf3 2d6 10 0-0 2c7 11 2c2 2f4 12 2xf4 2xf4 13 2ad1 2c7 14 2c5 2d8 15 c3 with a slight but enduring advantage for White (Nunn-Christiansen, Szirak IZ 1987).

8 c3

Weaker is 8 h3? h6 9 De4 Dxe4

10 ≜xe4 ②f6 11 ≜d3 ≜xf3 12 ₩xf3 ₩xd4, when White loses a pawn.

8 ... e6

Also interesting is 8... 27 9 262 h6 10 266 (10 264 2xf3 11 gxf3 2d5=) 10... 46 11 2xf8 2xf3 12 2g6! 2xg2 13 2g1 2xh2 14 2xg2 2xg2 15 2xh8 2xh1+, and here, instead of 16 2xf1? 4xf4! with advantage to Black (Riemersma-Van der Wiel, Dutch Ch 1987), 16 2xf3 17 3xf5 maintains equality.

9 Wb3 Wc7

9...h6 can be met by 10 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)xb7 hxg5 11 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)xc6+ \(\Delta\)d7 12 \(\Delta\)e5 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)c8 13 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)ad with the threats of 14 \(\Delta\)b5 and 14 \(\Delta\)xg5.

10 ②e5 ♣d6 11 ♣f4

Weaker is 11 ②c4 ♣e7 (11...♠xh2? 12 ℤxh2!±) 12 ②e5 ②d7 13 ②xd7 ∰xd7 14 0–0 ②f6 15 ℤe1 ℤd8 with equal chances (Van der Wiel-Karpov, Amsterdam 1988).

11 ... De7

11... ②d5?! 12 **≜**g3 f6 13 **②**c4! favours White.

12 **≜**g3 0-0

The chances are equal (Van der Wiel).


4.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②g5 ②df6)

6 **Q**c4

This move forces Black to block the a2-g8 diagonal.

6 ... e6

Other ways of defending f7 lead to difficulties:



6... 2d5 7 21f3 g6 8 0-0 2g7 9 2e1 h6 10 2e4 2g4 11 a4 (or 11 c3 2gf6 12 2c5 with the initiative for White, Psakhis-Am.Rodriguez, Sochi 1988 – Game 17) 11... 2gf6 12 2xf6+2xf6 13 2a3 2ef8 14 h3 2xf3 15 2xf3 2eg7 16 c3 2ef7 17 2ef3, and White's two bishops give him a slight advantage (Spassky-Karpov, Belfort 1988).

6... 2h6 7 c3 \$\mathbb{C}\$ 7 8 \$\mathbb{D}\$ 1f3 \$\mathbb{Q}\$ g4 9 \$\mathbb{D}\$ b3 e6 10 \$\mathbb{D}\$ e5 \$\mathbb{Q}\$ d6 11 \$\mathbb{D}\$ xg4 \$\mathbb{D}\$ hxg4 12 h3 \$\mathbb{D}\$ h6 13 \$\mathbb{Q}\$ xe6!? 0-0 (after 13...fxe6 14 \$\mathbb{D}\$ xe6 \$\mathbb{W}\$ e7 15 \$\mathbb{Q}\$ xh6 gxh6 16 0-0-0 the threat of 17 \$\mathbb{D}\$ he1 puts the black king in danger) 14 \$\mathbb{Q}\$ c4 \$\mathbb{D}\$ fe8+ 15 \$\mathbb{D}\$ f1 and White is a pawn up (Benjamin-A.Fernandes, New York 1993).

7 **2**113

7 ... h6

8 Øh3

8 ②xf7 would appear to be insufficient for an advantage: 8... \$\times\$xf7 9 \(\times\$e5+ \$\times\$e8 10 \$\times\$d3 \(\times\$e7 11 0-0 \\ \times\$f5 12 c3 \$\times\$d6 13 \(\times\$g6 \$\times\$d7 14 \\ \times\$xh8 \$\times\$wxh8 with equal chances (Sherzer-Hill, Mamaia 1991).


8 ... 单d6 9 ₩e2 夕e7 10 单d2

Or 10 ②f4 c5 11 dxc5 ¥a5+ 12 2d2 ¥xc5 13 0-0-0 2d7 14 2b3 **c7 15 ②d3 ②c6 with equal chances (Arakhamia-Ledger, Hastings 1991/2).

Hübner-Karpov (Belfort 1988) now continued 10... \$\mathbb{W}\$c7 11 0-0-0 b5 12 \$\times d3\$ a6 13 \$\mathbb{M}\$hell \$\times b7\$ 14 g3 c5 15 dxc5 \$\mathbb{W}\$xc5, and here White could have retained somewhat the better chances by 16 \$\times f4!?.

4.3 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②g5 ②df6)

6 **2113**



With this natural move White prevents 6...h6? in view of 7 \(\Delta\)xf7!

\$\psixf7 8 \Qe5+ \Phie6 (8...\Phie8 9 \Quad d3\pm) 9 \Quad c4+ \Quad d5 10 \Wg4+.

6 ... e6

Other possibilities must also be considered:

6... 2h6 7 c3 g6 8 2c4 2g7 9 0-0 0-0 10 Ze1 2f5 11 2e5 2d5 12 2gf3 Wc7 13 2b3 e6?! (13...b6±) 14 c4 2f6 15 g4 2e7 16 2f4 Was 17 Ze1! with a spatial advantage for White (Smirin-Smyslov, 55th USSR Ch 1988) – Game 19.

6... \(\hat{2}g4 \) 7 h3 (7 \(\Delta xf7 \) is insufficient: 7... \(\hat{2}xf3 \) 8 \(\Delta xd8 \) \(\alpha xd1 \) 9 \(\Delta 6 \) \(\hat{2}h5 \) 10 \(\Delta c7 + \pi d7 =) 7... \(\hat{2}xf3 \) 8 \(\Delta xf3 \) 66 9 g3 \(\hat{2}d6 \) 10 \(\hat{2}g2 \) \(\Delta c7 \) 11 0-0 0-0 12 \(\pi e2 \) \(\pi c7 \) 13 c4 b6 14 b3 \(\pi ad8 \) 15 \(\hat{2}b2 \) and White's position is preferable (De Firmian-A.Fernandes, New York 1993).

7 De5

In A.Sokolov-Spraggett (match (8), Saint John 1988) White played 7 wd3 2d6 8 2e5 2h6?! 9 2d2 a5 and here after 10 2e4! 2xe4 11 wxe4 2f5 12 0-0-0 he could have gained the advantage. However, even after 8...2xe5 9 dxe5 wa5+ 10 2d1! wxe5 11 wd8+! he can transpose into a superior ending.

7 ... 2h6 8 2d3 2d6

Or 8... wxd4 9 Øgxf7 Øxf7 10 Øxf7 &b4+! 11 c3 If8 (11... &xc3+12 bxc3 wxc3+ 13 &d2 wxd3 14 Øxh8 we4+ 15 we2±) 12 0-0 wd5 13 cxb4 Ixf7 14 we2 and White's chances are better (Nunn).

Also good is 10 ②gf3 ②f5 11 we2 ②e7 12 ②g5 ②xe5 13 dxe5 ②d7 14 f4 ②c5 15 ②c2 h6 16 wh5 with an attacking position (Watson-Pedersen, Herning 1991).

10 ... c5

Or **10...0-0** 11 ②gf3 ②f5 12 g4 ②e7 13 h4 with an attack.

11 **≜**b5+ **\$**e7

11... 2d7? loses by force to 12 ②xd7 ②xd7 13 dxc5 **2**xc5 14 ②xe6!

12 0-0

White has the better chances (Nunn-Tal, Brussels 1988) – *Game 20*.

Game 17 Psakhis-Am.Rodriguez Sochi 1988


1 **e4 c6** 2 d5**d4** 3 9)d2 dxe4 9 xe4 9)d7 4 5 2)g5 Ødf6 **©c4** 9)d5

6...e6 is sounder and more natural.

7 \$\1f3 **g6** 8 0-0 ≜g7 Q Ïe1 h6 10 9)e4 <u>⊈</u>g4 11 **c3** 2)2f6 12 9)c5! ₩c7 13 h3 ___xf3?!

A few moves later Black comes to regret this exchange. Stronger was 13...\$\omega\$ f5 14 \$\omega\$ e5\omega\$.

14 ₩xf3 0-0 15 ♠b3 b6 16 ᡚd3 b5 17 a4 a6




18 £f4!

A highly concrete move, based on the weakening of the a2-g8 diagonal, and in particular the g6 square.

18 ... ②xf4
19 ②xf4 ❖h7

Against 19...e6 Psakhis had prepared a whole cascade of sacrifices: 20 🗷 xe6! fxe6 21 🚊 xe6+! \Delta h7 22 \Delta xe6! \Delta fe8 23 \Delta f5 \Delta xe6 24 \Delta 65+ \Delta h8 25 \Delta xe6. But this theme is not yet exhausted.

20 axb5 cxb5



22 ②xg6! **Id8**If 22... \$\prec\$xg6 there follows 23

\$\prec\$d3+\$\prec\$g5 24 **I**e5+.

23 🗓 xa6 🕏 g8

The knight is still taboo in view of a mating attack: 23...\$\text{\$\pi\$}26 24 \$\text{\$\pi\$}64+!\$\$\$\$\pi\$5 25 h4+ \$\pi\$h5 26 \$\text{\$\pi\$}f5+ \$\pi\$xh4 27 g3+.


24	De5	ĭff8
25	Dc6	包d5
26	₩e2	Z d6
27	₩xb5	ℤc8
28	De5	
29	₩a4	¤xb2
30	 ■ xd6	₩xd€
31	②c4	1-0

Game 18 De Firmian-Karpov Biel 1990

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	⊘d2	dxe4
4	②xe4	€)d7
5	Dg 5	Ødf6
6	≜c4	e6
7	②e2	c5
8	0-0	h6
9	DB	a6
10	a4	cxd4
11	②exd4	≜ d6
12	₩e2	∕ De7
13	De5	₩c7
14	Ddf3	0-0
15	h3	

15 \(\hat{\text{\text{\Lambda}}} \) f4 can be met by 15...\(\hat{\text{\text{\Lambda}}} \) ed5 16 \(\hat{\text{\Lambda}} \) g3 b6 17 \(\mathbb{\matha\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mat

15		b6
16	. ⊈ .b2	≜b 7
17	Z ad1	2Ded5
18	 Id4	



18 ... b5!

The position is ripe for active measures. With this pawn sacrifice Karpov aims to take the initiative: 19 axb5 axb5 20 axb5 Za2 21 2xc4 e5.

19	≜xd5	≜xd5
20	②g4	⊈ e7
21	Dfe5	₩b7
22	②xf6+	.⊈xf6
23	 Ig4	\$ h8
24	c4	bxc4
25	⁄2)d7?	

An unjustified loss of time. 25 bxc4 \(\text{\texts} c6 26 a5 was essential. \)


25		.≌.xb2
26	₩xb2	I g8
27	L h4	\$ h7
28	De5	cxb3
29	 ■e1	Zac8
30	₩d2	f5
31	g4	g5
32	I h3	Ic2
	0–1	

Game 19
Smirin-Smyslov
55th USSR Ch 1988

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Ød2	dxe4
4	②xe4	Ød7
5	Dg 5	Ødf6
6	DIB	∳ 0h6

Here 6...e6 is considered the main continuation, but in his later years 3myslov does not think it advisable to engage in theoretical discussions with young players, and prefers paths that are little-explored.

7	c3	g 6
8	⊈c4	⊈g7
9	0-0	0-0
10	∐ e1	②f 5
11	②e5	⊘d 5
12	Øgf3	₩ c7
13	∲ h3	6621



Illogical. Black should have thought about developing his second bishop by 13...b6. Now White gains a great spatial advantage by force.

14	c4	D f6
15	g4	De7
16	₫.f4	₩a5

16... ₩d8 was more circumspect.


17 **Ec1!** b5?!

And here 17...c5 was more natural.

18	≜ d2	₩d
19	⊈b4	bxc
20	êxc4	a5
21	≜a 3!	

Sensibly, Smirin is not tempted by the win of a pawn by 21 axe7 wxe7 22 axe6 wd6, since with the exchange of his dark-square bishop the weakened dark squares in White's position would give Black more than sufficient compensation.

21 ... \(\mathbb{Q}\)a6?



Black underestimates the threats posed by the white bishops on adjacent diagonals. It is true that he was unable to block one of them by 21... 1645 on account of 22 2xd5 cxd5 23 166 16 16xc6 24 2xf8, when he has no compensation for the exchange, but with the 'ugly' 21... 2d7 he could have held on.

5...Ddf6 57

22	②xf7!	E xf7
23	≜ xe6	②ed5
24	A) oF	Waa7

24 ②e5 ■aa7

The simple 25 ②xc6 was also good enough to win.

25 ... 公f4 26 里xa6 里xa6 27 全xf7+ 全h8 28 単f3 1-0

Game 20 **Nunn-Tal** *Brussels 1988*

1 e4 **c6** 2 d4d59)d2 dxe4 Øxe4 9)d7 Ø25 Ødf6 6 **2)113 e**6 De5 4)h6 7 ₫d3 8 ₽ 46 9 **c3** ₩c7 ₩e2 10 c5 11 **≜**b5+ **⊈e7**


As mentioned in the analysis, 11....\(\hat{2}\)d7? loses to 12 \(\hat{2}\)xd7 \(\hat{2}\)xd7 13 dxc5 \(\hat{2}\)xc5 14 \(\hat{2}\)xe6!

12 0-0 cxd4?! 12...a6 13 ♠d3 b6 14 f4± would have been better.

15 fxe3?

White has a spatial advantage and

the more active pieces, but with this one move he makes the position obscure. As shown by Nunn, he should have activated his queen: 15 wxe3 \(\tilde{\Delta} ds \) 16 \(\tilde{\Delta} gs \) f6 17 \(\tilde{\Delta} e4! \) \(\tilde{\Delta} gs \) 18 \(\tilde{\Delta} h4 \) \(\tilde{\Delta} xe5 \) 19 \(\tilde{\Delta} xe5 \) 20 \(\tilde{\Delta} xh7 \).



17 ... \wxg5?


Suicidal, whereas after 17...a6! 18 #a3+ #d6 19 #xd6+ &xd6 20 \(\Delta xf7+ \Delta e7 21 \Delta xh8 axb5 22 g4 \Delta d7 23 g5 \Delta xh8 24 gxf6+ gxf6 Black had the chance to go into a sound enough ending (Nunn). But 'on the way' he could also have considered 22...g5!? 23 h4 \Delta 4, not losing hope of winning the errant knight.

18 ₩a3+ \$\d8 19 \mathbb{\mathbb{Z}} ad1+ \mathbb{\mathbb{L}} d7 20 \mathbb{\mathbb{L}} xd7 1-0

'ART II: 5 &c4

5... ②gf6 6 ②g5 e6 7 豐e2 ②b6)

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	⊘d7
5	₫c4	



An active development of this ishop, by which White retains a hoice of deploying it on the a2-g8 nd b1-h7 diagonals.


5 ... ②gf6

5... ②df6 transposes after 6 ②g5 to a variation examined in the revious chapter.

6 **Dg5**

The main continuation. Black annot get by without playing ... \(\Delta \) b6, which removes his control of e5, and, n contrast to the variations examined n Chapters 1-4, the white knight aims o occupy this square, where it will be upported by the other knight.

But the modest exchange 6 ②xf6+ ②xf6 is also not so harmless. Now the developing 7 ②f3 leads to positions examined in Chapter 9 after 5 ②f3 ②gf6 6 ②xf6+ ②xf6 7 ②c4. Of independent significance is 7 c3, a continuation with which it is useful to be familiar.



(a) 7...\(\mathbb{U}\)c7, and now:

(a1) 8 h3 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ f5 9 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ f6 10 0-0 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ d6 11 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ e1 h6 12 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ e2 0-0-0 13 a4 g5 14 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ e5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ d5 15 a5 f6 16 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ d3 h5, and Black's action on the kingside proved more effective than his opponent's on the other side of the board (Short-Adams, Groningen WC 1997);

(a2) 8 ₩b3 e6 9 ②f3 &d6 10 0-0 (10 &g5 allows Black to seize the initiative: 10... &d7 11 0-0 ②e4! 12 &h4 g5 13 &g3 g4 14 &xd6 ₩xd6 15

Ife1 gxf3 16 Ixe4 0-0-0 17 g3 h5\,\text{\varphi}, Ermenkov-Lago, Palma de Mallorca 1989) 10...0-0 11 **Z**e1 b6 12 **A**g5 \$b7 13 a4 c5 14 \$\text{\$\pi}\$xf6 \$\text{\$\pi}\$xf3 with chances (Bellin-Ostenstad. egual Gausdal 1990):


(a3) 8 We2 2g4 9 f3 2f5 10 g4! \$g6 11 f4 \$e4 12 \$\dagger{2}\$f3 \$\d\$5 (or 12...e6 13 0-0 axf3 14 wxf3 ad6 15 a4! 2d5 16 2d2 h5 17 g5 g6 18 a5 a6 19 \(\textit{\textit{d}}\)d3! with a great spatial advantage for White, Kostyra-Sapis, Poland 1990) 13 Ig1 h5 14 g5 2xc4 15 ₩xc4 ②d5 16 ②e5 and White's chances are preferable (Iruzubieta-F.Garcia, Spanish Ch 1991);

(b) 7...e6 8 **②**f3 **≜**e7 9 0-0 0-0 (here Smyslov has tried 9...b5!? 10 \(\hat{2}\)d3 \(\hat{2}\)b7 11 \(\begin{array}{c}\)e2 0-0 12 \(\hat{2}\)g5 a6 13 Øe5 Ød5 14 \ d2 c5 15 dxc5 \ dxc5 with a double-edged game, Zhukovitsky-Smyslov, 37th USSR Ch 1969) 10 We2 Wc7 11 2g5 (11 2e5 b6 12 £f4 £d6 13 £g3 £b7 14 Zad1 c5 15 dxc5 ₩xc5 16 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd6\(\mathbb{Z}\) is also good, Wittmann-Danner, Graz 1991 11...c5 (weaker is 11...∮)d5?! 12 ≜xe7 ∰xe7 13 ②e5 ₩c7 14 ₩e4!±, Balashov-Smagin, Voronezh 1987) 12 Zad1, and here in Dimitrov-Guerra (Olot 1992), instead of 12...cxd4?! 13 \(\beta\)xd4 \$\d2 d7 14 \Q2 e5 with advantage to White, Black should have played 12...b6±:

(c) 7...g6 8 ②f3 🚉g7 9 0-0 0-0 10 ≖e1 (10 \ 2f4 \ 2g4 11 h3 \ 2xf3 12 ₩xf3 2d5 13 2g3 b5 14 2d3 e6 15 Ifel Wd7 16 h4 h5 17 全e5±. Boe-Arkell, Ostende 1991) 10... 2d5 11 \$g5 \$\ \$\ e8\$ 12 \$\ \$\ d2 \$\ \\$g4\$ 13 \$\ \$\ \ e6\$

14 **A**h6 **W**d6 15 **A**xg7 **A**xg7 16 ■ad1. White's chances are preferable (J.Fernandez-Epishin, Logrono 1991).

Blocking the diagonal by 6... 2d5 involves a delay in development and allows White to build up a persistent initiative: 7 21f3 h6 (7...e6?! 8 2e5 2xe5 9 dxe5±) 8 2e4 27b6 9 2b3 (also possible is 9 \(\mathbb{Q}\)d3 \(\Delta\)b4 10 \(\mathbb{Q}\)e2 £f5 11 a3 £xe4 12 axb4 e6 13 c3 \$d6 14 0-0 ₩f6 15 \$\Dar{2}\d2 \$\Pi\$f5 16 f4 0-0 17 Øf3±, Rychagov-Meduna, Manila OL 1992) 9...\$f5 10 20g3 \$h7 11 0-0 e6 12 €)e5 €)d7 13 f4!? (also good is 13 c4 2)5f6 14 2 f4 2 e7 15 We2 0-0 16 Mad1 Me8 17 2h5 Øxh5 18 ₩xh5±, Salai-Meduna. Stary Smokovec 1992) 13... #c7 14 c4 ②5f6 15 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$h}\$}\$1 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$c}\$}\$2 \$\text{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\xrt{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\xrt{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\e ₩xc2 h5 18 f5 with the better chances for White (Gazik-Meduna. Smokovec 1992).



₩e2

White prevents his knight from being driven away (7...h6? 8 2xf7!) and takes control of e5.


Developing by 7 🖄 1f3 allows Black to drive back the other knight to 13, which assists his attack on the entre: 7...h6 8 🖄 h3 b5 9 2e2 c5 10 10 a6 11 a4 b4 12 🖄 f4 2d6 13 dxc5 14 🖄 d3 🗓 xd3 15 👑 xd3 👑 c7 and Black's position is preferable Schmittdiel-Podgaets, Dortmund 993).

7 ②e2 h6 8 ②f3 has the same lrawbacks:

(b) 8...c5 9 0-0 \(\tilde{D}\)b6 10 \(\tilde{D}\)b5+ \(\tilde{A}\)d7 11 a4 a6 12 \(\tilde{A}\)xd7+ \(\tilde{D}\)bxd7 13 34 cxd4 14 \(\tilde{D}\)exd4 \(\tilde{A}\)c5 with equal chances (Coupet-Spiridonov, Cannes 1992).

7 ... **包b6**


7... we??! (preparing queenside castling) was tried in the game Stein-Flohr (Ukrainian Ch 1957). After 8 2d2 b6 9 0-0-0 2b7 10 21f3 h6 (if 10...0-0-0 11 2e5 with a strong initiative), instead of 11 2b4!? c5! with great complications, White could have retained a positional advantage by 11 2e4.



Now White's main replies are 8 2d3 (Chapters 5 and 6) and 8 2b3 (Chapters 7 and 8).

5: 8 &d3 h6 9 25f3 c5 10 dxc5 &xc5

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	Ød7
5	≜c4	夕gf6
6	2)g5	e6
7	₩e2	Ðb6
0	Ø 43	



This bishop retreat has a tactical basis: 8...\wxd4? 9 \D1f3 \wd5 10 \De5! \wxg2 11 \wxg1 \Def3 \wedge 67 12 \Def3 \wg4 13 \Dxf7 with a dangerous attack for White (Arnason-Helmers, Reykjavik 1982).

8 ... h6

It is best to drive away the active knight as soon as possible. Risky is 8...c5?! 9 dxc5 &xc5 10 包1f3 h6 (or 10...豐c7 11 包e5 0-0 12 &f4 &b4+13 &f1 包bd5 14 &g3 &d6 15 c4 包b4 16 包g4±, Kupreichik-Tamme, Parnu 1975) 11 包e4 包xe4 12 豐xe4 豐d5 13 豐g4 g6 14 0-0 包d7 15 【d1

②f6 16 Wh4 兔e7 17 兔g5 ②g8 18 兔xe7 ②xe7 19 Wf6 罩f8 20 ②e5 Wc5 21 ②xg6 ②d5 22 兔b5+ 1-0 (Rublevsky-Tataev, Azov 1991).

9 425f3 c5

9... 2e7 10 2d2 Dbd5 11 0-0-0 Dd7 is passive. However, if White tries to force matters by 12 De5, then after 12... Dxe5 13 dxe5 C7 14 f4 2d7 15 Df3 0-0-0 16 a3 c5 17 c4 Db6 18 2a5 2a4 Black equalises (Kupreichik-Smyslov, Moscow 1972). More subtle is 12 a3!, and after 13 c4 White gains an enduring advantage.

10 dxc5

The main continuation.

The attempt to defend the pawn by 10 \$\times 2\$ allows Black to exchange this bishop: 10...a6 11 c3 \$\times bd5 12 \$\times 6\$ es \$\footnote{\text{c7}}\$ (or 12...cxd4 13 \$\times xd4 \$\times 6\$ f4 14 \$\footnote{\text{mf3}}\$ \$\times xd3 + 15 \$\footnote{\text{wf3}}\$ \$\times xd3 + 15 \$\footnote{\text{wf3}}\$ \$\times xd3 + 15 \$\footnote{\text{mf3}}\$ \$\times xd3 \text{b5?!}\$ 16 \$\times 6\$ es \$\times 6\$ footnote{\text{c9}}\$ f3\def was essential) 13 \$\times gf3 \text{b6}\$ 16 \$\times gf3\def was essential) 13 \$\times gf3 \text{b6}\$ 14 0-0 \$\times d6\$ 15 \$\footnote{\text{ac1}}\$, and here in Hellers-Adorjan (Thessaloniki OL 1988) Black could have maintained the balance by 15...\$\times xe3!\$ 16 fxe3 \$\times 6\$ b7 17 e4 0-0. Therefore 15 \$\times d2!\del would have been more accurate.

After 10 \(\text{2} f4 \) the bishop again comes under attack by the knight: \(10...\) \(\text{2}\) bd5 (if \(10...\) cxd4?! \(11 \) 0-0-0 \(\text{2}\) d5 \(12 \) \(\text{2}\) b1 \(\text{2}\) d7 \(13 \) \(\text{2}\) e5 \(\text{2}\) d6 \(14 \) \(\text{2}\) gf3 \(\text{White has a dangerous initiative} \) \(11 \) \(\text{2}\) e5 \(\text{cxd4} \) \(12 \) 0-0-0 \(\text{2}\) a5

13 \(\hat{Q} \text{c4} \) (13 \(\hat{Q} \text{xd4}!? \) \(\bar{W} \text{xa2} \) 14 c4 comes into consideration, with the initiative for the pawn) 13...\(\hat{Q} \text{c3} \) 14 bxc3 \(\bar{W} \text{a3} + 15 \\ \delta \text{b1} \) dxc3 \(\bar{Q} \text{tac3} \) \(\bar{W} \text{xc3} \) \(\b

10 ... Axc5

The other main continuation 10... ②bd7 is examined in Chapter 6.

11 De5

White puts into effect the main idea of the 25 move. After 12 25f3 and kingside castling, in a quiet position he will be able to count on an enduring initiative, based on the pressure of the knight at e5.

If 11 \$\hat{2}\$d2, planning queenside castling, White has to reckon with counterplay on that side of the board:


- (a) 11...0-0 12 0-0-0 ②a4!, with the idea of 13 ②xh6 Wb6 14 We5 Wxb2+, while after 13 ③b5 ③d7 14 ③xd7 Wxd7 (Kir.Georgiev-Adams, Groningen 1993) Black's chances are preferable, since 15 ②xh6 Wc6 16 ②e3 Wb6 17 c3 ②xe3+18 fxe3 Zac8 rebounds on White;

11 ... \Delta bd7
12 \Delta gf3

Black's main replies are 12...₩c7 (5.1) and 12...②xe5 (5.2).

5.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2c4 2gf6 6 2g5 e6 7 we2 2b6 8 2d3 h6 9 25f3 c5 10 dxc5 2xc5 11 2e5 2bd7 12 2gf3)


12 ... ₩c7



Black fights for control of e5.

Here White's main plans are associated with 13 0–0 (5.11) and 13 £4 (5.12), since the attack on his central knight prevents the plan with queenside castling: 13 £d2? ②xe5 14 ②xe5 £xf2+! 15 \$xf2 \$xe5 16\$ \$xe5 \$2g4+, and White loses a pawn (Suetin-Kholmov, Budapest 1976).

5.11 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \(\tilde{O} \)c3 dxe4 4 \(\tilde{O} \)xe4 \(\tilde{O} \)d7 5 \(\tilde{C} \)c4 \(\tilde{O} \)g6 6 \(\tilde{O} \)g5 e6 7 \(\tilde{W} \)e2 \(\tilde{O} \)b6 8 \(\tilde{Q} \)d3 h6 9 \(\tilde{O} \)5f3 c5 10 dxc5 \(\tilde{X} \)xc5 11 \(\tilde{O} \)e5 \(\tilde{O} \)bd7 12 \(\tilde{O} \)gf3 \(\tilde{W} \)c7)



13 ... 0-0

It is important not to overdo the pressure on e5, since after 13...\$\delta de?!

14 \$\times c4 \times 67 15 \$\times d4!\$ Black may not manage to castle, as 15...0—0 is met by the unpleasant 16 \$\times f5!\$ At the same time \$\times b5\$ is threatened, and if 15...46 there follows 16 \$\times xe6!\$ (this is where the weakening move ...h7-h6 tells), while after 15...\$\times 5 16 \$\times b5\$ \$\times b8\$ 17 \$\times d1\$ White's pressure is too great (Gufeld-Bagirov, Tallinn 1981) — Game 21.

14 He1

White strengthens his control over e5. In the event of 14 \(\) \(\) 4 \(\) d6 it is easier for Black to attack the knight, e.g. 15 h3 \(\) \(\) xe5 16 \(\) xe5 \(\) xe5 17 \(\) xe5 \(\) d7! (weaker is 17...\(\) d8?! 18 \(\) ae1 \(\) e7 19 f4±, Martin-Ledger, British Ch 1992) 18 f4 \(\) b6+ 19 \(\) h2 \(\) xb2, although after 20 \(\) ad1 White has compensation for the pawn (Martin).

Also insufficient for an advantage is 14 2d2 2d6 (or 14...2xe5 15 2xe5 2d4=) 15 2xd7 2xd7 16 Zae1

Ifd8 17 ②e5 ≜b5! with equal chances (A.Sokolov-Karpov, match (7), Linares 1987).

14 ... ≜d6

Exchanging a pair of knights does not ease Black's problems: 14... \(\) xe5 \(15 \) \(\) xe5 \(\) \(24 \) \(16 \) \(617 \) \(63 \) \(20 \) \(618 \) \(617 \) \(618 \) \(617 \) \(618 \) \(617 \) \(618 \) \(617 \) \(618 \) \(618 \) \(617 \) \(618 \

After 14...b6 15 20xd7:

(a) 15...\(\Delta\)xd7 16 \(\Delta\)e4 \(\Delta\)f6 17 \(\Delta\)xa8 (or 17 \(\Delta\)h4) 17...\(\Delta\)b7 18 \(\Delta\)xa7 \(\Delta\)a8 19 \(\Delta\)xa8+ with advantage to White:

(b) 15...\$\text{xd7} 16 De5 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\color{0}\$}}} \text{26} (if \$16...\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\tex{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\$\text{\$

15 Dc4

15 \$\(\text{\$\texit{\$\text{\$\}\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\tex

15 ... **≜**.e7


16 Dce5

Or 16 2 d4 2 c5 with equal chances (Minasian-Vyzhmanavin, Debrecen 1992) – Game 23.

 18 a3 b5 19 单a2 单b7 20 单e3 ②ce4 21 单d4 罩ad8 22 c3 单c5 with equal chances.

5.12 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2c4 2gf6 6 2g5 e6 7 we2 2b6 8 2d3 h6 9 25f3 c5 10 dxc5 2xc5 11 2e5 2bd7 12 2gf3 wc7)

13 **A**f4



This practically forces Black to exchange his dark-square bishop, although White achieves this at the cost of losing the right to castle.

13 ... **≜**b4+

In the event of 13...\$\\delta\$6 14 \$\tilde{g}3!\$ (insufficient is 14 0-0-0 \$\tilde{Q}\$d5 15 \$\tilde{g}3\$\$ \$\tilde{Q}\$c3 16 bxc3 \$\tilde{W}\$xc3 17 \$\tilde{Q}\$c4 \$\tilde{W}\$al+ 18 \$\tilde{Q}\$2 \$\tilde{b}\$d+ 19 \$\tilde{Q}\$e3 \$\tilde{Q}\$c5+ 20 \$\tilde{Q}\$d2 \$\tilde{b}\$d+ \$\tilde{\tilde{\tilde{Q}}\$c5+ 20 \$\tilde{Q}\$d2 \$\tilde{b}\$d+ \$\tilde{\tilde{\tilde{Q}}\$c5+ 20 \$\tilde{Q}\$d2 \$\tilde{b}\$d+ \$\tilde{\tilde{\tilde{Q}}\$c5+ 20 \$\tilde{Q}\$d5 186 \$\tilde{Q}\$b1 \$\tilde{Q}\$d5 14...0-0 15 0-0-0 \$\tilde{Q}\$c5 16 \$\tilde{Q}\$b1 \$\tilde{Q}\$d5 17 \$\tilde{Q}\$d5 17 \$\tilde{Q}\$d5 18 \$\tilde{Q}\$c2) 17 \$\tilde{Q}\$h4 \$\tilde{Q}\$e7 18 g4 \$\tilde{Q}\$d5 19 \$\tilde{Q}\$xe7 \$\tilde{W}\$xe7 20 \$\tilde{Q}\$c4 White's position is preferable (Stefansson-Vyzhmanavin, Lucerne 1993).

14 **②**d2

After 14 \$\Delta\$ 1 \$\Delta\$ d6 15 \$\Delta\$ 3 0-0 16 \$\Delta\$ d1 \$\Omega\$ xe5 \$\Delta\$ 4 8 \$\Omega\$ c4 \$\Delta\$ xe5 \$\Delta\$ 4 18 \$\Omega\$ c4 \$\Delta\$ xe3 19 hxg3 \$\Delta\$ d7 (in the mutual flank attacks after 19...b5?! 20 \$\Omega\$ e5 \$\Delta\$ b7 21 \$\Delta\$ e1 b4 22 g4 it is White who gets there first: 22...\$\Delta\$ d4 23 g5 hxg5 24 \$\Omega\$ g6 \$\Omega\$ h7 25 \$\Delta\$ xh7 1-0, Popovic-Kosic, Novi Sad 1992) 20 \$\Delta\$ e5 \$\Delta\$ ac8 the chances are equal (Timman-Karpov, Amsterdam 1988).

The active 16... **b6* was tried in the 1993 FIDE World Championship Match, Timman-Karpov. It proved justified only after 17 公c4?! **wc5 18 **wf3 公d5‡ (game 1), but after 17 *\$\delta c1! *\$\delta d5 18 *\delta g3 *\delta c5 19 *\delta c4 (game 3) White's position was preferable.

But then an improvement was found: 16...②c5 17 \$\text{do}\$c5 18 \$\text{2g3}\$ \$\text{2xd3} + 19 \$\text{2xd3}\$ b5! with equal chances (game 7).

17 ♠g3 ᡚxe5 17...ᡚ7f6 can also be considered.


18 **≜xe5** 18 **₩xe5** is stronger.

18 ... ₩a5+
19 �c1 f6
20 �g3 �d7
21 c4 �b4

If 21... ■ac8 White gains the advantage by 22 \(\(\old{\oldsymbol{2}} \) c2! \(\old{\oldsymbol{2}} \) b6 23 b3.

The chances are equal (Topalov-Adams, Belgrade 1995).

5.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \(\tilde{\tilde{2}}\) c3 dxe4 4 \(\tilde{2}\) xe4 \(\tilde{2}\) d7 5 \(\tilde{2}\) c4 \(\tilde{2}\) gf6 6 \(\tilde{2}\) g5 e6 7 \(\tilde{\tilde{2}}\) e2 \(\tilde{2}\) b6 8 \(\tilde{2}\) d3 h6 9 \(\tilde{2}\) 5f3 c5 10 dxc5 \(\tilde{2}\) xc5 11 \(\tilde{2}\) e5 \(\tilde{2}\) bd7 12 \(\tilde{2}\) gf3)



The exchange of knights makes things more difficult for Black, since it allows White strong piece pressure in the centre, enhancing his attacking chances.

13 ... 0-0

Here 13... C7 allows White to gain the advantage of the two bishops in an open position. This is especially appreciable in an ending, since he has the possibility of creating an outside passed pawn on the queenside: 14 \(\text{

(15...♠xb5 16 ₩xb5+ �e7 comes into consideration) 16 ♠xd7 ♠xd7 17 c3 and White's chances are preferable (Blatny-Adams, Adelaide 1988) — Game 24.

14 ≜d2

Preparing the option of castling on both sides. If 14 0-0 Black has the good reply 14...b6!:


- (a) 15 ₩f3 ₩c7 16 ♠f4 ♠b7 17 ♠g4 ♠xf3 18 ♠xf6+ gxf6 19 ♠xc7 ♠b7 with an equal game (Hübner-Lobron, Biel 1986);
- (b) 15 Id1 We7 (also possible is 15...Wc7 16 2g4 2xg4 17 Wxg4 f5 with a complicated game) 16 b4 2d6 (16...2xb4? 17 2c6 Wc5 18 2xb4 Wxb4 19 Wf3±) 17 2b2 2b7 18 a3 Ifd8 19 c4 a5 20 b5 Iac8 and the chances are again equal (Filip).

14 ... Wd5

Here both ways of castling are possible: 15 0-0-0 (5.21) and 15 0-0 (5.22), although they both involve a pawn sacrifice.

If White avoids castling with 15 f4 b5! 16 \$e3 \$xe3 17 \$\times\$xe3 \$\times\$b7 18 \$\times\$g1 \$\times\$fd8 19 g4 \$\times\$e4 Black gains equal chances (Tarjan-Rogoff, USA 1985).

5.21 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 &c4 2gf6 6 2g5 e6 7 We2 2b6 8 &d3 h6 9 25f3 c5 10 dxc5 &xc5 11 2e5 2bd7 12 2gf3 2xe5 13 2xe5 0-0 14 &d2 Wd5)



15 ... **A**d4

Or 15...b5 16 \$\disphi\$1 \$\oxedot{\textit{\textit{2}}} 17 f4 b4 18 a3 a5 19 axb4 axb4 20 \$\oxedot{\textit{2}}\$ad1 \$\oxedot{\textit{2}}\$ad8, and here in Mestel-Speelman (Bath 1987) White could have begun an attack with 21 \$\oxedot{\textit{2}}\$e1! \$\overline{\textit{2}}\$a2 \$\oxedot{\textit{2}}\$h4 \$\oxedot{\textit{2}}\$e7 23 f5.

16 **≜**f4

The alternative is 16 公 f3 单xb2 17 里ab1 单a3 18 单c3 单e7 19 里fd1 豐c6 20 单e5 with a strong initiative for the pawn.

16 ... ≜xb2 17 ⊈ab1!

This is stronger than 17 **Iad1 W**c5 18 c4 **2**d4 19 **2**b1 b6 20 **Id**3 **2**b7 (20...**2**a6!? 21 **Ig**3 **2**c8!∓ is also good) 21 **Ig**3 **Iad8**! 22 h3 **If**e8! 23 **2**c2 **2**f8, when Black defends successfully (Khalifman-Tukmakov, 54th USSR Ch 1987).


17 ... **≜**d4

Shterengas-Sokolin (USSR 1987) now continued 18 c4 \daggerate{W}d8 19 \daggerate{\pi}fd1

₩e7 20 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}\$}}}\$}}}}}}}} \ender{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{

5.22 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2c4 2gf6 6 2g5 e6 7 we2 2b6 8 2d3 h6 9 25f3 c5 10 dxc5 2xc5 11 2e5 2bd7 12 2gf3 2xe5 13 2xe5 0-0 14 2d2 wd5)

15 0-0-0



A double-edged plan, which has hitherto been insufficiently explored by the top players.

15 ... \widetilde{\psi} xa2 \\ 16 \cdot c3 \quad b5

In Gaprindashvili-Zaitseva (Tbilisi 1979) Black played 16... **Wa1+?** 17 含c2 **Wa**4+ 18 含b1 置b8 19 兔c2 **Wa6** 20 **Wf3** b5 21 兔xh6 b4 22 兔xg7 and lost.

Also inadequate is **16...皇a3** 17 皇e3 豐a1+ 18 皇b1, when White's attack is more of a reality.

17 **≜**b1!

This is stronger than 17 2xh6 2b7 (17...gxh6? loses after 18 #f3 b4 19

单b1 響al 20 響g3+ \$\delta\$h8 21 單d8!, Bielchik-Sabolshi, Kikinda 1983) 18 公d7 公xd7 19 響g4 響al+ 20 单b1 g6 21 罩xd7 单a3, and now:

(a) 22 bxa3 wxc3+ 23 ddl fd8 24 dd2 wal! 25 de2 we5+ 26 ddl wal, forcing a repetition of position (Chandler-Speelman, Brighton 1984);

(b) 22 \(\bar{L}\)d2 - Game 25 (Adorjan-Flesch, Hungarian Ch 1975).

17 ... ₩a4

Including the queen in the defence in the event of 18 \dd3 \ddh4! 19 h3 \ddsh5 20 \Qd7 \ddfd8 21 \Qxf6+ \ddfdxf6, when Black's chances are preferable (Reimann-Oll, Tallinn 1986).

If 17... \undersal a1 there naturally follows 18 \undersal xh6!

18 \(\psi \)f3! \(\Delta \)d5
19 \(\psi \)g3 \(\psi \)h8
20 \(\psi \)he1! \(\beta \)4

20... 266? loses to 21 2xh6 gxh6 22 2d8! 2g4 23 2xf7+ 2g7 24 2e4 1-0 (Diaz-Sieiro, Camaguey 1987).

21 He4! Qe7

Not 21...\$b7? on account of 22 \$xh6 gxh6 23 \$\mathbb{\pi}\$h4.

22 **I**g4 g5 Or 22...**2** f6 23 **W**d3! 23 h4!

White has a strong attack (Gugmundsson-Torkelsson, corr. 1992).

Game 21 Gufeld-Bagirov Tallinn 1981

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②d2 dxe4

4	Dxe4	包d7
5	.⊈c4	Øgf6
6	Ø g5	e6
7	₩e2	②b6
8	≜d 3	h6
9	4)5f3	c5
10	dxc5	≜xc5
11	De5	包bd7
12	ᡚgf3	₩c7
13	0 0	

I	1	
A 2/4	2	
	\$\	<u> </u>


13 ... **≜**d6?!

An imperceptible inaccuracy, the drawbacks of which were disclosed in this game. 13...0-0 is the main continuation.

After 16... 48 17 41! a knight nevertheless penetrates to d6: 17... 2xd3 18 4xd3 2d5 19 2cd6+! 2xd6 20 4xd5, securing White the advantage.

17 **□**d1 **□**d7 18 a4! a6 19 **□**d4 **⋓**c7

20 De5!



The knight has triumphantly returned to e5 – White's positional advantage is obvious.

20		②xd3
21		Zd8
22	⊈f4	₩c5
23	Z ad1	4 2d5

24 Wh5!

Preventing 24...0-0, when there follows 25 ≜xh6! ②f6 26 ₩g5 ②e8 27 ₩g3, with an attack and an extra pawn for White.


24 ... g6 25 ₩f3 Дh7 26 处g3 处c8 27 c3! a5

Preventing b2-b4, which was possible after 27... ②f6 28 b4! ₩d5 29 ②dc6 with advantage to White. But now he is able to make a decisive invasion at b5.

28	②b5	g5
29	c4	②f4
30	 Ixd8+	_≜xd8
31	♠xf4	gxf4
32	₩d3	Åb6
33	Ø\d6+	1_0


Game 22 Ivanchuk-Karpov Reykjavik 1991

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	包d7
5	êc4	Øgf6
6	 ②g 5	e6
7	₩e2	D b6
8	≜ d3	h6
9	2 5f3	c5
10	dxc5	≜xc5
11	Де 5	包bd7
12	Dgf3	₩c 7
13	0-0	0-0
14	¤e1	



14	• • •	D6
14 ≜ d6	is more	active.
15	②xd7	≜xd7
16	De5	≜ c6
17	② xc6	₩xc6

Black can consider 18... \$\textit{\textit{L}} b4 19 c3 \$\textit{\textit{L}} e7 20 \$\textit{\textit{L}} ad1 \$\textit{\textit{W}} a4!?, fighting for the d-file: 21 \$\textit{L} e5 \$\textit{L} ad8 (Karpov).}



23 **≜**c3


White has a classic advantage, first formulated by Steinitz — a pawn majority on the queenside and the possibility of creating there an outside passed pawn. Therefore in the spirit of the position was 23 c4! Wa4 (or 23...a5 24 &c3 a4 25 &c2 Ic8 26 Id4±) 24 &c1 Ic8 25 Wf3 &h8 26 &f1 with the idea of continuing b2-b3 and &b2, when White's chances are preferable.

Insufficient is 25 axf6 gxf6 26 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\)g4+ \(\phi\)h8 27 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\)d4 \(\mathbb{\text{a}}\)e7 28 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\)h4 \(\mathbb{\text{g}}\)g7 29 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\)g4+ \(\phi\)h8 30 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\)h5 \(\phi\)g7 31 \(\mathbb{\text{z}}\)xe6 \(\mathbb{\text{x}}\)d3! with equal chances (Karpov).

> 25 ... **2**6 26 **2**c4

Here too White could have tried to use his queenside pawn majority: 26 世行?? 公d7 27 b4 全f6 28 全xf6 公xf6 29 c4.

26		₩c6
27	⊈ d3	X xd3
28	.≜xd3	∡ d8
29	Z d1	 Id5
30	WER	b 5



Black has finally managed to equalise.

31	≡ e1	₩d7
32	Ze5	≜ f8!
33	E xd5	②xd5
34	₩e4	f5
35	₩d4	a 6
36	ı⊈d2	≜ e7!
37	₩e5	≜ f6
38	₩b8+	⊈17
39	₩a8	₩d6
40	b3	≜c3


It is useful to exchange the dark-square bishops, but it was better to do this by 40...\$\textit{\textit{2}}\$5! 41 \$\textit{\textit{2}}\$xg5 hxg5, when the initiative passes to Black.

41	≜xc3	Dxc.
42	₩c8	Ød5

43	b4	∕De7
44	₩b7	⊈ f6
45	⊈ព	1/2-1/2

Game 23 Minasian-Vyzhmanavin Debrecen 1992

1	e4	с6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	Ød7
5	⊈c4	Øgf6
6	∕ 2g5	e6
7	₩e2	少b6
8	≜ d3	h6
9	2 5f3	c5
10	dxc5	🚊 xc5
11	De5	�bd7
12	Φ gf 3	₩c7
13	0-0	0-0
14	≖ e1	⊈d6




15 Dc4

If 15 \(\hat{2}\)f4 White has to reckon with 15...\(\hat{2}\)h5!? 16 \(\hat{2}\)d2 \(\hat{2}\)c5.

15 ... **≜e**7 16 **€**)d4 If 16 \(\Delta \)ce5 Black can return his bishop to d6 or else play 16...\(\Delta \)c5.

19 Dc3 was stronger. 19 **包c3** 20 4)bd6 20 can be met by 20. 97d5!I. ₩c7 20 21 De5 **Zfd8 ⊈f4** 22 ∳ eΩ 23 😩g3 Øxd3 24 **¤**xd3 ¤xd3 4)xd3 Wc4 25 26 h3 Xc8 27 9)e1?

This loses a pawn in an already equal position. 27 \(\Delta e5 \) was correct, occupying the key square in his variation.



27	• • •	≜ b4!
28	₩f3	≜xc3
29	₩xc3	₩xc3
30	bxc3	De4

31	≗e5	f6
32	≜ d4	Øxc3
33	≜ xc3	Exc3
34	 a2	a5
35	\$ f1	Zc4
36	 □b2	≜ c6
37	2 d3	 X xa4
38	Dc5	Z a1+
39	⊈ e2	a4
40	2)xe6	a3
41	¤b3	0-1

Game 24 Blatny-Adams Adelaide 1988


1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	②c3	dxe4
4	②xe4	∕ 2d7
5	≜c4	Øgf6
6	 20g5	e 6
7	₩e2	⊘b6
8	≜d3	h6
9	2 513	c 5
10	dxc5	≜xc5
11	②e5	⊘bd7
12	Dgf 3	②xe5
13	4)xe5	₩c7?!


This allows White to gain the advantage of the two bishops. The main move here is 13...0-0.

14 \(\Delta b5+! \) \(\Delta d7 \) 15 \(0 \) \(0 \) \(0 \)

15...≜xb5 16 ₩xb5+ �e7 comes into consideration.

16	⊌\xd7	€\xd7
17	c3	Z ad8
18	ı⊈a4	a6
19	êc2	Ð f6





21 ... ≜e5?!

The position is one where Black has to reckon with his opponent setting up an outside passed pawn on the queenside, and therefore exchanges, bringing the endgame nearer, are unfavourable for him. On the other hand, there is still the threat of an attack on the kingside, on which the white bishops are trained. In this respect 21... \(\text{D}\)d5 22 \(\text{W}\)e4 \(\text{D}\)f6 23 \(\text{W}\)h4 \(\text{L}\)e7 is more accurate.

Exchanges aid White's aforementioned plan. 26... \$\mathbb{L} = 7 \ 27 \ \alpha c2\$
\$\times c c 5\$ is a tougher defence, although after 28 \ \alpha e 3\$ White retains the advantage.


27 \wxb7! \mathbb{\mathbb{H}}e7

Black has to go voluntarily into a pin, as after 27... 2c5 White gains a

material advantage by the tactical manoeuvre 28 \widetilde{\pi}xf7+! \widetilde{\pi}xf7 29 \widetilde{\pi}xe8+ \vec{\pi}xe8 30 \vec{\pi}xa5.

Taking the game into the technical stage.

29		₩c7
30	₩xc7	≜xc 7
31	Z ed1	Z d8
32	b4	f5
33	ı⊈xd7	Eexd7
34	 x d 7	≅ xd7
35	X xa6	e5
36	⊈g2	g5
37	≜ b6	åd6



38 **X**a8+

After the exchange of rooks by 38 \$\mathbb{\pi}a7! \mathbb{\pi}xa7 \ 39 \ \mathbb{\pi}xa7 \ \mathbb{\pi}f7 \ 40 \ b5 \ \mathbb{\pi}e6 41 \ c4! White would have won more quickly.

38		∲ f7
39	Z d8	xd8
40	≜xd8	\$e6
41	h3!	⊈ d5
42	g4	f4
43	≜ f6	<u>\$</u> .f8

f3	e4
fxe4+	⊈xe4
b5	⊈ d5
b6	\$ c6
⊈d4	≜ e7
c4	⊈ d8
c5	≜e 7
∲ ß	≙18
⊈e4	≜e 7
∲ f5	≙f8
⊈ e6!	f3
b 7	⊈c 7
c6	≜d 6
b8₩+	\$ xb8
\$ xd6	⊈c8
≜ b6	1–0
	fxe4+ b5 b6 ad4 c4 c5 af3 ae4 af5 ae6! b7 c6 b8\darksymbol{w}+

Game 25 Adorjan-Flesch Hungarian Ch 1975

	1	e4	c6
	2	d4	d5
	3	Dc3	dxe4
	4	②xe4	∕ ∆d7
	5	≜c4	Øgf6
	6	 Dg 5	e6
	7	₩e2	€)b6
	8	⊈d3	h6
	9	€ 25f3	c5
	10	dxc5	≜xc5
	11	②e5	Øbd7
	12	Øgf3	②xe5
	13	2xe5	0-0
	14	⊈d2	₩d5
	15	0-0-0	
A	L1-	- d d 1.	TL:

A double-edged plan. The quiet 15 0-0 is less risky for White.

15		₩xa2
16	c3	b5


17 2xh6

White is drawn into forcing play. More subtle is 17 \(\Delta\)b1! \(\Delta\)a4 18 \(\Delta\)f3! (18 \(\Delta\)d3 \(\Delta\)h4!) 18...\(\Delta\)d5 19 \(\Delta\)g3.

17...gxh6? loses to 18 \mathbf{#}f3.

18 **②d**7

19	₩g4	₩a1+
20	⊈b1	g6
21	≅ xd7	<u> </u>



One cannot help asking: who is attacking who?

22 \mathbb{\ma

It transpires that both White and Black should have been satisfied with perpetual check after 22 bxa3 \(\mathbb{w}\)xc3+.

22 ... **I**fd8?

An exchange of mistakes, after which the picture again changes. After 22... Ifc8! 23 Id4 If8 24 Ixf8 Ixf8 Black would have parried the opponent's threats, while maintaining his own (Adorjan).

23	bxa3	₩xc3+
24	⊈d1	¤xd2+

Now White succeeds in defending his king. 24... d5!? came into consideration.


25	ı⊈xd2	Zd8
26	₩g5	⊈f3 +
27	gxf3	₩xf3-
28	ු ආ	Tc2+

In such a mêlée it is not surprising that mistakes are made. After 28... ₩d3+! 29 &c1 ₩xa3+ Black would have held on.

1100 1 0	mora on.	
29	de b2	₩xh1
30	≜xg6!	₩xh2
21	ALEL	1 0

6: 10...\dibd7

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	包d7
5	≜c4	Øgf6
6	 Øg5	e6
7	₩e2	Ðb6
8	≜d3	h6
9	2 05f3	c5
10	dxc5	夕bd7



This move was devised by Smyslov. The idea of retreating the knight, which involves a pawn sacrifice, is to gain the possibility of capturing on c5 with knight or queen.

The simple 11 ♠ f4 can be met by 11... ②xc5 12 ♠ b5+ ♠ d7 13 0-0-0 ₩a5 14 ♠ xd7+ ②cxd7 15 ♦ b1 ♠ e7= (Henao-Isaacs, St Martin 1992).

11 De5 is also insufficient for an advantage: 11...Dxe5 12 wxe5 wa5+ (12...Dd7 13 we2 Dxc5 14 Db5+ Dd7= is also possible) 13 Dd2 wxc5

14 ②f3 ₩xe5+ 15 ②xe5 ②c5 (or 15... ②d6) 16 ②b5+ ②e7 with an equal ending (Parma-Smyslov, Lugano OL 1968) – Game 4.

Of course, White can spoil the opponent's pawn structure by 11 c6 bxc6, but this allows Black to begin active piece play: 12 \(\text{2d2} \) (or 12 \(\text{2d2} \) (d5! 13 \(\text{2e4} \) (2e5) 12...\(\text{\$\text{\$\sigma}\$} b6! 13 \) b3 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\sigma}\$} 3! 14 \(\text{\$\sin\eta\{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$

White's critical decision is of course to defend his extra pawn, despite the obvious defects of his queenside pawn structure.

11 b4

Here Black's counterplay is associated with 11...b6 (6.1), 11...a5 (6.2) or 11... 2d5 (6.3).

6.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2c4 2gf6 6 2g5 e6 7 2e2 2b6 8 2d3 h6 9 25f3 c5 10 dxc5 2bd7 11 b4)


11 ... b6

This obvious frontal attack weakens the c6 square and allows White to activate his knight.

12 **Dd4**

This active move is based on the fact that Black cannot simply capture the pawn: 12...bxc5?? 13 ②c6 Wc7 14 Wxe6+! fxe6 15 ②g6 mate! (Perenji-Eperjesi, Hungary 1984).

10...9\bd7 75



Also after 12... 12xc5 White gains an advantage practically by force: 13 \$b5+ \$\times_cd7 14 a3 \$\times_b7 (14...\#c7 15 åb2 a6 16 åc4!±) 15 Øgf3 åe7 16 \$b2 a6 (16...0-0 17 ②xe6!) 17 \$d3 0-0, and here in Kasparov-Bagirov (Tbilisi 1978) White could have built up a powerful attack by 18 2xe6! axf3 19 gxf3 fxe6 20 ₩xe6+ \$\dispha h8 21 0-0-0 \(\mathbb{\psi} \)c7 22 \(\mathbb{\psi} \)hg1 \(\mathbb{\psi} \)f4+ 23 \(\mathbb{\psi} \)b1 Zae8 24 \ xd7!± (Kasparov).

Black usually plays 12... 2d5 (6.11) or 12...\u20edc7 (6.12).

6.11 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 5)c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2c4 2gf6 6 2g5 e6 7 ₩e2 4 b6 8 Ad3 h6 9 4 5f3 c5 10 dxc5 Øbd7 11 b4 b6 12 **€**2d41

9)d5

In attacking the b4 pawn Black loses time, and the e6 square remains his Achilles' heel.

> 4xh4 13 **≜**b2


14 9 xe6!

This sacrifice, analysed by Sap-

firov, is promising, although it has not been tried in practice. Other moves allow Black to maintain the balance:

14 \(\text{\$\text{e}}\)e4 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$a6}}} - \text{cf. } \(Game 26 \) (Van der Wiel-Balashov, Malta OL 1980).

14 c6?! のxd3+ 15 **w**xd3 のc5 16 ₩f3 ②a4 17 0-0-0 ②xb2 (or 17...\\g5+ 18 \\$b1 \Dxb2) 18 \\$x\b2 ₩c7 and Black's chances are preferable (Tseshkovsky-Razuvaev, Volgodonsk 1981).



9)xd3+

If White retains his bishop he gains a strong attack: 14...fxe6 15 \(\text{\Delta}\)g6+ \$\preceq 16 \preceq f3! bxc5 17 \preceq xa8 \preceq a5 18 0-0-0! ②b6 19 ₩f3 ②xa2+ 20 �b1 ûd7 21 ₩f7+ ŵd8 22 ②f3±.

15 Wxd3 ₩e7

₩e8 18 ₩g3 ②c5 19 ₩c7+ 2d7 20 0-0-0+


16 0-0-0 fxe6

16...₩xe6 is dangerous: 17 ②f3 ≜e7 18 \ #he1+.

Now after 17 We4 Zb8 18 c6 ②c5 19 ₩g6+ ₩f7 20 c7 **Za8** 21 **Zd8**+ \$\delta e7 22 \delta xf7+ \delta xf7 23 \delta f3 \delta a6 24 ②e5+ Black cannot develop without losing material.

6.12 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2c4 2gf6 6 2g5 e6 7 2e2 2b6 8 2d3 h6 9 25f3 c5 10 dxc5 2bd7 11 b4 b6 12 2d4)


12 ... ₩c7



Black maintains the tension, but allows himself to be drawn into forcing play.

White's pieces are impending over the black king's position, and therefore 15...豐xh1 is not possible on account of 16 ②c7+ 堂d8 17 ②f3 豐g2 18 單g1 豐h3 19 ②d4.

16 公c7+ \$e7 17 单c4!



Or 20... 2xc6 21 2xc6 2xf2 22 2f3! and Black cannot develop without losing material.

6.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2c4 2gf6 6 2g5 e6 7 \(\mathbb{\text{w}} e2 \) 2b6 8 2d3 h6 9 25f3 c5 10 dxe5 2bd7 11 b4)

11 ... a5


This attack on the pawns is more justified, since Black has the additional resource of opening the a-file.

12 c3 **≜**e7

12...axb4 13 cxb4 b6 is premature: 14 ②d4! ②xc5 15 单b5+ ②cd7 16 单d2 单b7 17 ②gf3 with an unpleasant

10...⊈∆bd7 77

pin (Rajhman-Leman, Wolfsberg 1985).



13 a3

It is useful to over-protect the b4 pawn in the event of ...b7-b6. 13 **Ad2!?** pursues the same aim, but attempts to activate White's pieces merely create problems for him:

13 ac4?! 0-0 14 2h3 axb4 15 cxb4 b6 and the pawn structure crumbles in favour of Black (Lukov-Meduna, Varna 1983).

13 2d4 0-0 14 2gf3 (14 2b2 axb4 15 cxb4 e5!) 14...e5 and Black firmly seizes the initiative (Martin-Meduna, Bad Wörishofen 1988) – Game 27.

13 ... **②d5** 14 **≜d2** axb4


In the event of 14... 266 15 Icl axb4 16 axb4 White controls the situation on the queenside.

15 cxb4 £f6

Now after 16 ■a2 ②c3 17 ②xc3 ②xc3+ 18 ②f1 ②f6 Black has some compensation for the pawn (he threatens 19...②xb4).

6.3 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2c4 2gf6 6 2g5 e6 7 we2 2b6 8 2d3 h6 9 25f3 c5 10 dxc5 2bd7 11 b4)

11 ... 包d5



Before beginning an attack on the pawns, Black activates his pieces.

12 Ad2 #f6

The inclusion of 12...a5 13 c3 is less effective: 13...\#f6 14 \mathbb{L}c1 axb4 15 cxb4 \@2f4 16 \@xf4 \warf4 17 \mathbb{L}b1 g5 18 \warf4 c2 and Black has no compensation for the pawn (H\u00fcbner-Lein, Chicago 1982).

In Geller-Speelman (Sochi 1982) Black chose 12...g5 13 c4 2 f4 14 2 xf4 gxf4, and after 15 16 16 a3 16 a3 f6 White did not achieve anything. But, as shown by Velickovic, by playing 15 15 16 a3 axb4 17 axb4 2 g7 18 16 a3 ac3+ 19 1 f6 20 g3 he could have retained an advantage.

 16 **₩**d2 **₩**xa3 17 **½**b5! Black comes under an unpleasant pin.


15 \(\hat{\text{\tin}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\t

17 \(\mathbb{U}\)d2 \(\mathbb{U}\)xa3

18 ₩d4 e5

The queen sacrifice 18... ■g8?! 19 ■a1 axb4 20 ■xa3 bxa3 favours White: 21 ②e2 a2 22 \displayed2 \displayed2 23 \displayed3 \displayed2 \din \display

19 ②xe5 ≜g7 20 ≌a1



20 ... axb4! 21 **X**xa3 bxa3

22 ②gf3 0-0

22...a2 23 \$\d2 0-0 followed by ...\$\to\$8 also comes into consideration.

23 &d5 g4!

After 25... 2 xe5? 26 2 xe5 2 xe5


27 wxe5 a6 28 0-0 a2 29 a1 White has the advantage (Mestel-Flear, British Ch 1988).

26 ₩xf7+ \$\dot{\phi}\h8

Now after 27 ₩e8+ \$h7 28 ₩g6+ the chances are equal (Flear).

Game 26 Van der Wiel-Balashov Malta Olympiad 1980

e4 **c6** 2 d4d55)d2 3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 **夕d7** ⊈c4 2)gf6 5 6 20g5 **e**6 ₩e2 9)b6 7 8 ₽d3 h6 9)5f3 9 c5 10 dxc5 **∮**\bd7 11 h4 **b6** 4)d4 12



12 ... 包d5

A questionable move, although it has given Black reasonable results in practice. 12... #c7 looks more natural.

10...**₽**bd7 79

13 **♣**b2 **②**xb4 14 **≜**e4


The evaluation of this variation largely depends on the evaluation of the knight sacrifice 14 ②xe6!? analysed by Sapfirov.

14 ... **≜**a6 15 **₩**f3 **②**xc5

15...皇xc5! is stronger, not fearing 16 ②xe6?! fxe6 17 皇g6+ 當e7 18 豐f7+ \$d6∓.

16 Axa8?

Now Black's well mobilised pieces develop a strong attack. It was still possible to simplify the position by 16 \(\tilde{\Delta} \colon \text{c6!} \) \(\tilde{\Delta} \text{c4 } 17 \(\tilde{\Delta} \text{cd8} \) \(\tilde{\Delta} \text{c2+} 18 \(\tilde{\Delta} \text{d1} \) \(\tilde{\Delta} \text{cd8+} 19 \(\tilde{\Delta} \text{cc2}, \) although after 19...\(\tilde{\Delta} \tilde{d3} + \) the activity of Black's pieces gives him the better chances.




16 ②xc2+! 17 4)xc2 4)d3+ **\$**d2 €)xb2+ 18 19 ⊈c1 4)d3+ фh1 **2** c5 20 9)h3 21 0-0

After these fireworks Black is a rook down, but on the other hand

White's 'castles' are stuck in their corners.

White should have brought up his rook; 24 \(\delta \)f3 \(\delta \)d3 25 \(\delta \)d1, although after 25...\(\delta \)b4! the attack continues.

24 ... ②c4 25 ≜d3



25 4)a3+! **≜** xd3+ 26 4)xa3 9)c2 ⊈b4 27 28 ₩h3 Hc8 29 ¤d1 IIc3 912 ¤xb3+ 30 31 axb3 **≜xc2**+ Фxc2 ₩c5+ 32 0 - 1

Game 27 Martin-Meduna Bad Wörishofen 1988

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \(\hat{O}\)d2 dxe4


4	②xe4	∕ 2)d7
5	ê_c4	Øgf6
6	Øg5	e6
7	₩e2	D b6
8	≜ d3	h6
9	2 1513	c5
10	dxc5	වbd7
11	b4	a5
12	c3	⊈e 7
13	∕ 2)d4	

White should lend additional support to the b4 pawn by 13 a3 or 13 a2d2.

13		0-0
14	Dgß	e5
15	包f5	e4
16	④xe7+	

Or 16 ≜xe4 ②xe4 17 ₩xe4 ≜xc5! 18 0–0 ②f6 and Black has the initiative.

16		₩xe7
17	ı£c4	axb4
18	cxb4	b6
19	<u>\$</u> f4	⊘h 5
20	≜ d6	₩f6
21	Ø\d4	




21 ... ₩xd4?

22 0-0 ②e5 23 ₩xh5 ②xc4 24 Ifd1 ②d2?

An over-committing move, which leaves the knight 'hanging'. Stronger was 24...\(\mathbf{w}\)f6! 25 \(\text{\text{\text{L}}}\) xf8 e3 26 \(\mathbf{w}\)e2 \(\mathbf{w}\)xf2 exf2 \(\mathbf{x}\)f2 \(\mathbf{x}\)f3 \(\mathbf{L}\) \(\mat


7400			≖ (141cm
	25	≜ xf8	e3
	26	₩e2!	exf2+
	27	₩xf2	₩xf2-
	28	⊈xf2	De4+
	29	⊈e 3	⊈ b7
	30	≜ e7	bxc5
	31	 ⊈ d8+	 ■ xd8
	32	≜xd8	cxb4
	33	\$ d4	Dc3
	34	g3	≜c8
	35	≗a5	≜ e6
	36	≜xb4	②xa2
	37	≜ d2	



After h	is inco	rrect 242)d2?	40	 ⊈ f6+	⊈ g7
Black has picked up as much material			41	h4	∲ h7
as possible, but he is obliged to play			42	Exe6!	fxe6
without his knight at a2.			43	h5	⊈g8
37		g5	44	фxe6	⊉ h8
38	⊈ e5	⊈g 7	45	\$ f6	1-0
20	Wes	å-€			

7: 8 臭b3 h6 9 ②5f3 a5

1	e4	¢6
2	d4	d5
3	②c3	dxe4
4	Dxe4	∕Ωd7
5	⊈c4	Øgf6
6	②g5	e6
7	₩e2	Db6
8	≜b 3	



On the a2-g8 diagonal the bishop has no less a future than on the adjacent one, especially as the d4 pawn is immune (8... \widtharpoonup xd4? 9 \leftilde{2}1f3 and 10 \leftilde{2})e5).

8 ... h6

Here too there is no point in delaying this move. The flank operation 8...a5 9 c3! (there is no point in obstinately maintaining the bishop's diagonal: 9 a3 a4 10 全a2 c5 11 dxc5 全xc5 12 包163 署e7 13 0-0 0-0 14 包e5 h6 15 包gf3 包bd7 16 包d3 全d6 17 星e1 星e8 18 全d2 e5!=, Suetin-Wilson, Berlin 1991) 9...a4 10


②c2 a3 11 b3 ②bd5 12 ②d2 ②d6 undertaken in Kasparov-Speelman (Linares 1992) does not bring Black any particular gains. White could have gained an advantage by 13 ②e4.

9 **2**5f3 a5

9...c5 is examined in Chapter 8. Here the main continuations are 10 c3 (7.1), 10 a3 (7.2) and 10 a4 (7.3).

7.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2c4 2gf6 6 2g5 e6 7 \ e2 2b6 8 2b3 h6 9 25f3 a5)

10 c3



White prepares to withdraw his bishop onto the b1-h7 diagonal.

10 ... c5

An important moment. Black is not averse to winning an important tempo by ...c5-c4, and therefore he does not hurry with the natural 10...a4 11 \(\text{\omega}\)c2:

- (a) 11...a3 12 b3 c5 13 单位2 豐c7 14 單c1 单d6 15 色e5 0-0 16 包gf3 cxd4 17 cxd4±, and the further advance of Black's pawns has in fact restricted his possibilities on the queenside (Matkovic-B.Nikolic, Yugoslav Ch 1991);
- (b) 11...c5 12 dxc5 \(\textit{\textit{2}}\)xc5, when Black has to reckon with the loss of a pawn after 13 \(\textit{\textit{b}}\)b5+ \(\textit{\textit{0}}\)bd7 14 \(\textit{\textit{2}}\)xa4, or positional pressure by 13 \(\textit{0}\)e5 \(\textit{c}'\)c7 14 \(\textit{0}\)gf3 \(\textit{0}\)bd7 15 \(\textit{\textit{6}}\)f4!;
- (c) 11...\(\text{Dbd5}\) 12 \(\text{2d2}\) \(\text{Wb6!}\) 13 \(\text{2b1}\) c5 14 dxc5 \(\text{2xc5}\) 15 \(\text{De5}\) 0-0 16 \(\text{Dgf3}\) \(\text{Wc7}\) 17 0-0 b6 18 \(\text{2bc1}\) \(\text{2b7}\) with an equal game (Anand-Epishin, Biel IZ 1993), but here too improvements for White are possible, e.g. 18 \(\text{2d3!?}\) \(\text{2b7}\) 19 \(\text{Dd4}\) with slightly the better chances.

11 a3

J.Polgar-Gulko (Moscow OL 1994) went 11 2d2 a4 12 2c2 2c7 13 2c1 2d6 14 2e5 2bd5 (aiming at c3; Black is already threatening ...a4-a3) 15 a3 b6 16 2gf3 0-0 17 c4 2e7 18 2c3 cxd4 19 2xd4 2b7 20 0-0 2c6 21 2c3 2fd8 22 2fd1 2xe5 23 2xe5 2c5 24 2h1 2xd1 2d8 with an equal game.

11 ... \mathbb{\mathbb{W}}c7!

An important move, controlling e5.


12 **Dh3**

After 12 **De5?!** cxd4 13 cxd4 Black has a choice:

- (a) 13...a4 14 **\(\)**c2 **\(\)**d7 15 **\(\)**xd7 **\(\)**bxd7 − *Game* 28 (Kasparov-Karpov, Linares 1994);
- (b) 13... 2 xa3!? However, Makarychev has dispelled the mirage of this

move, showing that 14 皇xh6! gives White the better chances after both 14...皇xb2 15 豐xb2 里xh6 16 ②gf3, and 14...里xh6 15 里xa3 豐c1+ 16 皇d1 ②fd5 17 ②gf3 f6 18 ②d3.

12 ... **\$**d7 13 0−0



This position was thoroughly studied in the Short-Gulko match (New York 1994).

13 ... cxd4!

In the 3rd game Gulko discovered that 13...\$\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}6?!}\$ was unpromising: 14 dxc5 \$\text{\text{\text{\text{w}}xc5}}\$ (14...\$\text{\text{\text{\text{c}}}xc5}\$ 15 \$\text{\text{\text{\text{c}}}f4\text{\text{\text{\text{t}}}}\$) 15 \$\text{\text{\text{\text{c}}}g4\text{\text{\text{w}}}\$ with strong pressure for White \$-Game 29\$.

14 **£**f4

Or 14 ②xd4 &d6 and now 15 ②f5?! &xh2+16 &h1 &f8 17 g3 exf5 favours Black.

14 ... ≜d6

15 **≜**xd6 **₩**xd6

16 **I**fd1

In the 5th game Short gained the better chances after 16 **Zad1** 0-0 17 **Zxd4 W**c5 18 **Zfd1 2**c6?! 19 **2**e5, but in analysis an improvement for

Black was found: 18...≜b5! 19 **₩**e5 **②**bd7!


16 ... 0-0 17 **E**xd4 **W**c5 18 **Ø**)f4 **W**b5

Also possible is 18... **2b5** 19 **₩**e1 (19 ②xe6? fxe6 20 **₩**xe6+ **�**h8 21 ②e5 **೨**e8∓) 19... **2**c4 20 **2**c2 ②bd7 with equal chances (Gulko).

The seventh game of the Short-Gulko match now continued 19 \(\mathbb{w}\)xb5 \(\text{2xb5}\) 20 \(\mathbb{z}\)e1 \(\varphi\)bd7 with equal chances.

7.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2c4 2gf6 6 2g5 e6 7 \(\mathbb{\text{w}} \)e2 2b6 8 2b3 h6 9 25f3 a5)

10 a3



White maintains his bishop on the a2-g8 diagonal.

10 ... a4

If 10...\$e7 White has the good reply 11 \$\frac{1}{2}\$d2! \$\frac{1}{2}\$bd5 12 c4 \$\frac{1}{2}\$c7 13 \$\frac{1}{2}\$c2 0-0?! (more circumspect is 13...b5 14 \$\frac{1}{2}\$e5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$b7 15 c5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$cd5 16

②gf3±, Bagirov) 14 ②e5! 豐xd4 15 ②c3 豐d8 16 ②gf3 ②ce8 17 g4 b5 18 g5 hxg5 19 ②xg5 罩a6 20 豐f3 with a strong attack (Tal-Speelman, Subotica IZ 1987).

10...g6 is another idea of Speelman:

- (b) 11 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d2! (a much sharper reply, which according to Pieterse virtually refutes 10...g6) 11...\(\frac{1}{2}\)g7 12 0-0-0 0-0 13 h4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)c7 14 \(\frac{1}{2}\)h3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)bd5 15 c4± (Kupreichik-Tukmakov, 54th USSR Ch 1987).

11 \(\hat{\pma} \) a2 c5

After 11... e7 12 c3 c5 White maintains a slight advantage:

- (a) 13 dxc5 ②bd7 14 ②d4 ②xc5 15 ②gf3 0-0 16 ②f4 ③xd4 17 cxd4 ②d5 18 ②d6 【E8 19 0-0 (Cabrilo-Spiridonov, Varna 1983);
- (b) 13 \$ f4 \$ d6 14 \$ g3 \$ xg3 15 hxg3 cxd4 16 \$ xd4 0-0 17 \$ gf3 \$ c7 18 0-0-0 (Suetin-Ciric, Budva 1967).

12 🙎 f4

Karpov in his prime preferred 12 c3, when after 12...\(\Delta\) bd5 13 \(\Delta\)e5! it is dangerous to win a pawn by 13... cxd4 14 cxd4 \(\Pa\) a5+ 15 \(\Delta\) d2 \(\Pa\) b6 16 \(\Delta\) gf3 \(\Pa\) xb2 17 0-0 \(\Delta\)c3 on account of 18 \(\Pa\)c4! Petrosian replied against him 12...\(\Delta\)d7 13 \(\Delta\)e5 cxd4 14 cxd4 \(\Delta\)e7 15 \(\Delta\)gf3 0-0 16 0-0, but could not cope with the difficulties - Game 30 (Karpov-Petrosian, Tilburg 1982).

After 12 ≜e3 Smyslov suggested 12... ②bd5, which has become a standard reaction to the bishop's development. Here Black has no problems:

- (a) 13 c3 \(\hat{Q} \)e7 (also possible is the more active 13...\(\hat{W} \)c7 14 \(\hat{Q} \)e5 \(\hat{Q} \)d6 15 \(\hat{Q} \)gf3 0-0, with a sound position for Black, Karpov-Kavalek, Turin 1982) 14 \(\hat{Q} \)e5 0-0 15 \(\hat{Q} \)gf3 \(\hat{W} \)c7 16 \(\hat{Q} \)c4 (or 16 0-0 b5!, and the initiative passes to Black) 16...b6 17 0-0 \(\hat{Q} \)b7 with equal chances (Liberzon-Smyslov, Biel IZ 1976) Game 31;
- (b) 13 ②e5 Wa5+ 14 &d2 Wb6 15 ②c4 Wa7 with equal chances (I.Gurevich-Epishin, Biel IZ 1993).

12 ... **②bd5**

With 12... 2d6 Black can also count on an equal game:

- (a) 13 \(\text{2g3} \) cxd4 14 0-0-0 \(\text{\$\text{\$w}\$} \) c7 15 \(\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\xi\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\x\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\x\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\$\ext{\$\$\ext{\$\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\$\ext{\$\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exit{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\e
- (b) 13 \$\textit{2}e\$ cxd4 14 0-0-0 \$\textit{2}xe\$ (after 14...\$\textit{w}c7 15 \$\textstar{2}xd4 \$\textit{2}xe\$ 5 16 \$\textit{w}xe\$ 5 \$\textit{w}xe\$ 5 17 \$\textit{2}xe\$ in the endgame the weakness of the a4 pawn is felt) 15 \$\textit{w}xe\$ 5 0-0 16 \$\textit{x}d4 \$\textit{2}bd\$ 5 17 c4 \$\textit{w}c\$ 7 with equal chances (Hazai, Lukacs).


16 Ac4

Or 16 0-0 \$\textbf{a}6 17 \text{ \text{\text{2}}c4 bxa3 18} bxa3 cxd4! with equal chances.

Ivanchuk-Karpov (Tilburg 1993) now continued 16... ≜a6 17 0–0 bxa3 18 \subsection xad 19 \subsection aa1 \subsection eq! 20 \subsection xd4 0–0 with equal chances.

7.3 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2c4 2gf6 6 2g5 e6 7 \ e2 2b6 8 2b3 h6 9 25f3 a5)

10 a4



White nips in the bud Black's threat of ...a5-a4.

10 ... c5 11 ⊈f4

The most energetic move, with which White fights for control of e5 – the key square in many similar variations. But it is also useful to be acquainted with his other possibilities:

 intends to strengthen his control of the centre by f2-f4, has the better chances, Ivanchuk-Epishin, Biel IZ 1993) 13 ②gf3 0-0 14 0-0 ②bd5 (it is useful to exchange the important bishop; weaker is 14... Id8 15 c3 ②d7 16 dxc5 ③xc5 17 ③xc5 Wxc5 18 ②d4 with advantage to White, Ivanchuk-Epishin, Tilburg 1993) 15 c4 ②xe3 16 fxe3 b6 17 ②c2 with slightly the better chances for White (Hazai, Lukacs).

11 dxc5 包bd7 12 包e5 包xe5 13 wxe5 包d7 14 we2 全xc5 (the alternative is 14...包xc5 15 全c4 全e7 16 包f3 0-0 17 0-0 b6) 15 包f3 b6! 16 0-0 0-0 17 c3 wc7 18 全e3 全a6 19 全c4 全xe3 20 全xa6 全c5 21 全d3 and White's position is slightly preferable (Belyavsky-Karpov, Tilburg 1993).

11 ... **≜**d6

12 \(\mathbb{L}\)g3!

For the moment White should not be in a hurry to occupy e5:

12 2e5 0-0. Here in Tal-Petrosian, (41st USSR Ch 1973) – Game 32, there followed 13 0-0-0?! c4 14 2xc4 2xa4 15 2h3 2b6, when Black already stood better, but even after 13 2h3 2xe5 14 dxe5 2fd5 his chances are not worse.

12 ②e5 0-0 13 ②gf3 ₩c7 14 Ձg3 ②bd5 15 dxc5 ₩xc5 16 0-0 b6 17 ℤfd1 Ձa6 with equal chances (Anand-Karpov, Monaco Blind 1994).

12 ... 0-0

In the event of 12... \(\text{xg3?!} \) 13 hxg3 \(\text{Wc7} \) 14 \(\text{De5} \) cxd4 15 \(\text{Dgf3} \) 0-0 16 g4! the opening of the h-file assists White's attack (Mikh.Tseitlin-Spiridonov, Prague 1985).

13 De5

White also retains the initiative with 13 Id1 Dbd5 14 De5 – Game 33 (Mikh.Tseitlin-Lutz, Budapest 1989).


13 ... ₩e7

14 **②gf**3

Or 14 0-0-0 cxd4 15 ②gf3 2d7 16 ②xd7 ②bxd7 17 2xd6 ₩xd6 18 ②xd4 ₩f4+ 19 \$b1 ②c5 with equal chances (Karpov).

14 ... **∆**bd5

15 0-0



15 ... **Dh**5?!

This leads to the creation of an isolated pawn. Black should have maintained the tension with 15...b6!?

16 ≜xd5!

White played less strongly in Anand-Karpov (Linares 1994) - 16 Ifel Wc7 17 Iadl \(\Delta\text{xg3}\) 18 hxg3

②f6 19 ②c4 ②e7 20 ¥e5 ¥c6, and Black achieved an equal game.


Now after 16... 2xg3 17 hxg3 exd5 18 dxc5 2xc5 19 Ife1 White's chances are preferable (Karpov).

Game 28
Kasparov-Karpov
Linares 1994

e4 c6 d4d53 Ø)d2 dve4 4)d7 4)xe4 5 **≜c4** 2)gf6 6 2)g5 **e**6 7 ₩e2 4)b6 8 ⊈h3 **h6** 9 9)5f3 **a5** 10 c3 **c**5 ₩c7 11 **a**3 12 9)e5?!

A committing move. 12 \bigcirc h3 is simpler.

12 ... cxd4 13 cxd4




13 ... a4

At the time it was thought that Black had missed a good opportunity here with 13... 2xa3, but, as shown in the analysis, after 14 2xh6! White gains the better chances.

14 皇c2 皇d7 15 ②xd7 ②bxd7 16 ₩d1

As a result of his poorly played opening, White has been saddled with an isolated d-pawn, and Black can freely use the d5 square as a transit point. For the moment White tries to cover the c-file, which is controlled by Black.

16		≜ d6
17	වුe2	€]d5
18	≜d2	b5
19	Dc3	②xc3
20	≜xc3	Ð f6
21	₩d3	



21 ... 包d5!


22 ≜d2 \$e7!

Karpov's favourite move in this variation.

23	 ac1	₩c4
24	⊈ e2!	≖ hb8?!

Over-hasty. Karpov considers that he should have developed his initiative with 24... 2f4+! 25 \$\omega\$xf4 \$\omega\$xf4 26 \$\omega\$xc4 bxc4 27 \$\omega\$bl 1 \$\omega\$hd1 \$\omega\$g5, although after 29 g3 \$\omega\$f6 30 \$\omega\$e3 White is soundly enough placed.

25	g3	₩xd3
26	≜xd3	b4



27 Za1!

The World Champions are as though competing with each other to see who can play more subtly. With this pawn sacrifice White succeeds in exchanging the targets of Black's attack.

27		bxa3
28	bxa3	 □b3
29	≜ c2!	 E xa3
30	 X xa3	🔔 xa3
31	Xa1	≜b2
32	Xxa4	E xa4
33	≜xa4	≜ xd4

34 f4!

The concluding move of the manoeuvre begun with 27 **Z**a1! The advance of the black pawns is blocked at a distance.

34		⊈ d6
35	\$f3	f5
36	h4!	Ůb2
37	g4!	fxg4+
38	\$xg4	1 0f6+
39	\$ f3	Ød5
40	⊈c2	⊈ f6
41	h5	1/2-1/2


Game 29 **Short-Gulko** *Match (3), New York 1994*

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Øc3	dxe4
4	2xe4	Ød7
5	ec4	Øgf6
6	∮ 2g5	e6
7		Ðb6
8	<u> </u>	h6
9		a5
10) c3	c5
11	a3	₩ e7
12	2 包h3	≜ d7
13	0-0	≜ d6?

In the 7th game of the match Gulko played the stronger 13...cxd4!

14	dxc5	₩xc5
15	ı <u>ê</u> e3	₩c 7
16	≜d4	2)g4?!

An unsuccessful sortie. Had Black anticipated his opponent's reply, he would have preferred 16...0-0!? 17 ₺e5±.




17 නිd2! නිf6

An admission of his mistake. After 17... \(\)\text{2xh2} the knight will be unable to return.

18 **№**h1 0-0?

To castle into such an obvious attack is suicidal. 18... ≜c6 19 f4 0-0-0 was correct.

19	£ xf6	gxf6
20	₩g4+	Ġ h7
21	De4	f5
22	ᡚf6+	⊈h8
23	₩h4	⊈g 7
2.4	¤ad1	≙ e5



25 ②h5+ \$\psi h7\$
26 f4 \$\pm h8\$
27 ②g5+ 1-0

The knight is taboo (27...hxg5 28 \$\tilde{2}\tilde{16}\to \tilde{2}\tilde{2}\tilde{16}\to \tilde{2}\tilde{2}\tilde{2}\tilde{16}\tilde{2}\t

Game 30 **Karpov-Petrosian** *Tilburg 1982*

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2\d2 dxe4 4 2\xe4 2\d7

Was it this game that saw the baton of the variation being passed from the ninth World Champion to the twelfth?


5 ₾c4 Dgf6 6 925 **e6** 7 We2 9)b6 **⊉h3** 8 **a**5 9 **a**3 **a4 ≙** a2 10 h6 11 Ø)5f3 **c**5 **≜**d7 12 c3

12...②bd5 can be answered by 13 ②e5!, when it is dangerous to win a pawn by 13...cxd4 14 cxd4 豐a5+ 15 单d2 豐b6 16 ②gf3 豐xb2 17 0-0 ②c3 on account of 18 豐c4! (Karpov).

13 ②e5 cxd4 **≜e7** 14 cxd4 15 Dgf3 0-0 ⊈e8 16 0-0 17 ₫d2 4)bd5 18 Ifc1


Black was intending ...b7-b5, and after 18 \(\textit{2c4}\) \(\textit{2b8}\) White would be obliged to exchange the light-square bishops. But now 18...b5 would weaken the c6 square: 19 \(\textit{2c6}\) \(\textit{2xc6}\) with advantage to White.

18 ... ₩b6
19 &c4 &c6
20 | Iel



20 ... ②c7?! 20... ♠d6, taking control of e5, came into consideration.

21	2)xc6!	bxc6
22	≜ f4	2cd5
23	≗e5	 ⊈fd8
24	Z ad1	≜ d6
25	 ■ d2	



Although Black's position is cramped, why aggravate the situation? An eventual ...c6-c5 would have eased his defence.


26	dxe5	4)d 7
27	g3!	218
28	Zed1	I d7
29	₩e4	Д b7
30	Ec2	 ab8
31	Z dd2	包e7
32	Ġg2	₩a5
33	h4	I d7
34	ı⊈e2	∡ d5
35	 Id4	¤ xd4
36	₩xd4	Ød5?

With this move Black blunders away a pawn. After 36... \$\bullet\$b7 he could have put up a tough resistance, although White's positional advantage is obvious.

37	E xc6	₩a8
38	Ic4	₩b7
39	Ec2	ᡚb6
40	≜ b5	②g6
41	₩d6	₩a8
42	≜ c6	1-0

Game 31 Liberzon-Smyslov Biel Interzonal 1976

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	€)d7
5	≜c4	Øgf6
6	 ②g 5	e6
7	₩e2	⊘b6
8	⊈b3	h6
9	€ 05f3	a5
10	a3	a4
11	≜a2	c5
12	≜e 3	②bd5!



Black has equalised.

13 c3 **≜**e7

Black can also play the more active 13... #c7 14 \(\Delta e 5 \) \(\Delta d 6 15 \) \(\Delta g f 3 0 - 0 \), with a sound position (Karpov-Kavalek, Turin 1982).

14 ②e5 0-0 15 ②gf3 ₩c7 16 ②c4


After 16 0-0 b5! (17 \widetilde{w}xb5? \overline{\text{a}}a6) Black threatens to advance ...b5-b4.

16		b6
17	0-0	⊈b 7
18	⊈d2	≜ d6
10	deas	

After 19 **I**fel cxd4 White is left with an isolated pawn, but the surrender of the pawn centre also gives Black active piece play.

19		bxc.
20	⊈d3	≖fd
21	E fe1	Øb6
22	c4?	

In defending against 22...c4, White loses a pawn. He should have reconciled himself to 22 **Zad1** c4 23 **b1 2d5**, when Black's position is only slightly more pleasant.




22		≜xf3!
23	Dx 13	≜xh2+
24	包xh2	₩d6
25	Dg4	₩xd3
26	Dxf6+	gxf6
27	🕰 xh6	₩xe2
28	E xe2	②xc4
29	Hc1	5)05

After this lively skirmish Black succeeds in retaining his extra pawn,

since if 30 \blacksquare xc5? there follows 30... \blacksquare d1+31 \clubsuit h2 $\textcircled{\bigcirc}$ g4+.

כינו	1 8117 7	Jg -r '•
30	ı⊈e3	⊘d3
31	Ec4	
32	∐ec2	Z a5
33	≜ .d2	 a8
34	≜e 3	
35	E xa4	
36		②xb2
37		⊈g 7
38	a4	Dc4
39	\$n	②xe3+
40	fxe3	f 5



Things have reduced to a rook ending where White's outside passed pawn, together with the compact grouping of the black pawns within his king's sphere of influence, give him good drawing chances.

41	œe2	\$ f6
42	Ľ a7	≖ e5
43	фß	ℤe4
44	 Ic7	E xa4
45	Exc5	e5
46	g3!	

Restricting the mobility of the black pawns. After the careless 46

Ic2 f4 47 exf4 **I**xf4+ it is much more difficult to defend.

46		¤ a2
47	g4	e4+
48		fxg4
49	ŵxg4	112
50	Zc6+	⊈e 5
51	E c5+	⊈ e6
If 51 ⊈ d	l6 there fo	ollows 52 ∑ f5.
52	E c6+	⊈ d5
53	ℤc8	耳ദ
54	 Z d8+	\$ c5
55	 Ic8+	\$ b5
56		f6
57	Ic8	E xe3
58	⊈ f4	 ■e1
59	 Ic7	e3
60	⊈f 3	f5

Game 32 Tal-Petrosian 41st USSR Ch 1973

61 IIc8

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	Ød 7
5	ı⊈c4	Øgf6
6	 2 1 1 2 1 5 1	e6
7	₩e2	Øb6
8	≜ b3	a5
9	a4	


Tal radically halts the advance of the black a-pawn.

9		h6
10	2 5f3	c5
11	≜ f4	≜ d6
12	<u> </u>	

At the present time, not without the

influence of this game, 12 \(\textit{\textit{g}}3!\) is considered strongest.

A risky decision, since the king is less secure here. 13 \(\Delta h3 \) is sounder, although after 13...\(\Delta xe5 \) 14 dxe5 \(\Delta fd5 \) Black's chances are not worse.



13 ... c4!

By this exchange of pawns Black seizes the initiative and quickly approaches the white king.

18 ②fxg5 came into consideration, allowing the queen to go to h5, which, in view of the threat of exchanging the knight at f6, would have tied its black opponent to the defence of the kingside (by ... ¥f6-h6). However, in this case too Black could have attacked as in the game.

18		a3!
19	b3	≜ b4

20 Hhg1

20 Wd3 is met by the same reply as in the game.

20 ... a2

The tempting 20... 2c3 (with the threat of 21...a2) could have been answered by 21 2xf6 2xf6 22 Wd3.

21	∲ b2	2xc4
22	₩xc4	2)d5
23	②e4	f6
24	₫ f4?	


In a difficult position White overlooks an intermediate check, but even after 24 2g3 f5 25 2e5 2f7 the threat of ...2c3+ cannot be parried without losing the knight.

24 ... \(\mathref{\mathref{Q}} \) \(\mathref{\mathref{Q}

Now if 28 \mathbb{Z} xf4 there follows 28... \mathbb{Z} b2+. White resigns (0-1).

Game 33 Mikh.Tseitlin-Lutz Budapest 1989

1	e4	с6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	€)d7
5	≜c4	Øgf6
6	 ②g 5	e6
7	₩e2	એb6
8	≜b 3	h6
9	2 5f3	a5
10	a4	c5
11	⊈ f4	≜ d6
12	≜g3!	00
13	Z d1	



13 De5 is also good.

13 ... **包bd5**

14 ②e5 cxd4 15 ②gf3 ♣b4+

16 \$\frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{2} \

16... ≜d7!? can also be considered.

17 **Dxd4 Dxe5**


18 @xe5 @d7

19 h4! We8

20 Øb5 f6


21 \(\text{\textit{g}} \) \(\text{\text{\$\text{\$Z\$}}} \) \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$Z\$}}} \)

Black fails to take account of the changed situation – the weakening of the a2-g8 diagonal. He should have preferred 21... **Z**c8 22 h5±.



8: 9...c5

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	ව d7
5	⊈.c4	Dgf6
6	Dg 5	e6
7	₩e2	ᡚb6
8	.≜b3	h6
9	€ 05f3	c5



This logical continuation is the most consistent.

10 **≜**f4

An energetic move: the white pieces aim for control of the important e5 square. But other logical continuations by White must also be considered:

10 dxc5 ②bd7 (this is considered best, but also possible is 10... ♣xc5 11 ②e5 0-0 12 ②gf3 ②bd7 13 ♣f4 ②xe5 14 ②xe5 ②d5 15 ♣d2 a5 16 c4 a4 with an equal game, Duckstein-Pachman, Bad Wörisofen 1992) 11

②e5 (11 c6 is insufficient to retain the initiative: 11...bxc6 12 ②h3 ②e7 13 0-0 ₩b6 14 ②f4 ③a6 15 c4 c5 16 ②d3 0-0=, Suetin-Petrosian, Moscow 1959) 11...②xe5 12 ₩xe5 ₩a5+ 13 △d2 ₩xc5 14 ₩e2 ②e7 15 ②f3 0-0 16 ②e5 b6 17 f4 ②b7 18 0-0-0 ℤad8 19 ℤhe1 ②e4 20 ②e3 ₩c7 with a complicated game (Van der Wiel-Mittelman, Leeuwarden 1995).

10 2e3 2c7 11 2e5 2d6 12 2gf3 0-0 13 g4!? (or 13 0-0 a5 14 c4 2bd7 15 2xd7 2xd7=, Stein-Smyslov, USSR 1964) 13...c4 14 2xc4 2xc4 15 2xc4 2xg4 16 2g1 2xe3 17 fxe3 b5 18 2d3 2b7 19 0-0-0 f5 20 2b1 2d5 with a complicated game (D.Frolov-Krogius, St Petersburg 1994).

10 ... **⊘bd5**

In order to maintain the balance, energetic counterplay is required of Black. With a white rook about to appear on the d-file, the attempt to exchange the dark-square bishops by

10... 2d6 involves a certain loss of time: 11 2g3! ₩e7 (or 11... 2xg3 12 hxg3 ₩e7 13 0-0-0 2d7 14 2e5 cxd4 15 Zh4 0-0-0 16 Zhxd4 with the better chances for White, Makropoulou-Dahl, Manila OL 1992) 12 dxc5 2xc5 13 2e5 2d7 14 2gf3 2h5 15 0-0-0 with the better chances for White (Kasparov-Karapov, Linares 1992) - Game 34.

The recent continuation 10...a6 (with the idea of sacrificing a pawn: 11 0-0-0 c4! 12 \(\hat{\text{x}}\) xc4 \(\frac{13}{\text{ \mathbb{W}}}\) xc4 Ød5 14 ≜d2 b5 15 ₩e2 ≜b7 16 De5, and here in Kurpeichik-Spiridonov. Palma de Mallorca 1989, by playing 16... \(\mathbb{\pi} \)c8. with the idea of ...**≜**e7, ...0–0 and...b5-b4. Black would have gained a dangerous attack) has been compromised by the energetic reply 11 c4! 2d6 (or 11...cxd4 12 0-0-0 **\$**c5 13 **\$**)xd4 with the initiative for White, Watson-Spiridonov, Palma de Mallorca 1989 \$xe5 14 ②xe5 ②bd7 15 ②gf3 ₩c7 16 **xd**4 ②xe5 17 ②xe5 with unpleasant pressure in the centre for White (Cs.Horvath-Kelecevic, Budapest 1992).

11 Ae5


Passive is 11 **2g3** ₩a5+ 12 ②d2 cxd4 13 ②gf3 **2c5** 14 0-0 0-0 with an equal game (Belotti-Kallai, France 1993).

11 ... ₩a5+

After the exchange of queens 12 ₩d2 ₩xd2+ 13 ᡚxd2 cxd4 14 ᡚgf3 \$\(\cdot c \) 5 0-0-0 0-0 the game is equal (Yang Xian-Adianto, Djakarta IZ 1993).

12 ... b5

The voluntary conceding of the centre leaves White with the initiative: 12...cxd4 13 \(\Delta\)gf3 (after 13 \(\Delta\)xd4 \$c5 14 \$e5 \$d7 15 \$h3 0-0-0 16 0-0 \(\mathbb{L} \) c6 17 a4 \(\mathbb{L} \) d7 the game is equal, Ehlvest-Vyzhmanavin, Novosibirsk 1993) 13... e e 7 14 2 xd4 0 - 0 15 0 - 0 - 0! (after 15 0-0 \$\dagger d7 16 c4 \$\Q\dagger b4 17 ②4f3 ②c6 18 এc3 ₩f5 19 a3 耳fd8 20 Ifd1 2e8 21 2fl De4 22 2e1 20g5 the game is equal, Anand-Karpov, Monaco 1993) 15... 2d7 16 \$b1 \$\begin{array}{c} \psi \begin{array}{c} 19 \ xe4 \ c5?! 20 \ c2 \ c6 21 \ \ g4 with a dangerous attack for White (Anand-Khalifman, Biel IZ 1993). Stronger is 19... Ifd8!? (Khalifman).



13 dxc5

13 c4 is also interesting: 13... ②b6 (or 13...bxc4 14 ②xc4 ②b6 15 b4 ∰xb4 16 ☑b1 ∰a5 with equal chances, Short-Speelman, Hastings 1988/9 - Game 36) 14 cxb5 c4 15 ③xc4 ②b7 16 ②gf3?! (16 ❖f1!)

16... 🖾 xc4 17 wxc4 Ic8 18 wd3 2e4 19 we2 2xf3 20 wxf3 2d5, and Black has the initiative for the pawn (Anand-Ivanchuk, Moscow Grand Prix 1994).

13 ... **2**xc5


The pawn exchange in the centre has allowed Black to develop his pieces in active positions. He is ready to develop counterplay and therefore White aims to exploit the slight weakening of his opponent's queenside.

The plan with queenside castling is risky: 14 0-0-0 \(\Delta b \) 7 15 \(\Delta 4 \) \(\Delta c \) (15...\(\Delta x \) x 64!? is even more energetic: 16 \(\Delta x \) x 64!? is even more energetic: 16 \(\Delta x \) x 64!? is even more energetic: 16 \(\Delta x \) x 64! 18 \(\Delta x \) x 68! 18 \(\Delta x \) x 68! 18 \(\Delta x \) x 68! 18 \(\Delta x \) 646 \(\Delta x \) x 66 \(\Delta \) 646 \(\Delta x \) 46 \(\Delta x \) 65 \

In J.Polgar-Leko (Vienna 1996) White immediately counter-attacked with 14 a4 and after mass exchanges – 14... \(\Delta b7 \) 15 \(\Delta xb5 + \Delta xb5 \) 16 axb5 \(\Delta xf2 + 17 \Delta xf2 \Delta yd+ 18 \Delta e2 \Delta xe5 \) 19 \(\Delta xd5 \Delta xd5 \) 20 \(\Delta gf3 \) gained the better ending thanks to her queenside pawn majority. 14... \(\Delta d7 \) would have been more circumspect.

14 ... ₩b6

Also possible is 14... b7 15 \(\text{Qgf3} \)
\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}\$} b6 16 0-0 0-0 17 \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}\$}} ad 8 with an equal game (Eichorn-Morgado, corr. 1994).}



15 a4!

15 \(\text{2}\)xd5, attempting to give Black an isolated pawn, can be met by 15...\(\text{2}\)xd5!, not fearing the complications after 16 \(\text{2}\)xg7 \(\text{2}\)g8 17 \(\text{2}\)xh6 \(\text{2}\)xe3 \(\text{2}\)xe3 \(\text{2}\)t6+ \(\text{2}\)e7 etc., while the two bishops give Black good a good game in the event of 16 b4 \(\text{2}\)f8 17 a4 bxa4 18 \(\text{2}\)xa4 \(\text{2}\)b7.

Ivanchuk-Gulko (Riga 1995) now continued 15...bxa4 16 \(\Delta xa4+ \Delta d\) 17 \(\Delta c4 \) \(\Delta d8 18 \) \(\Delta f3 0-0 19 0-0 \) \(\Delta c8 20 \) \(\Delta d6! \) \(\Delta xd6 21 \) \(\Delta xd6 \) \(\Delta d8 22 \) \(\Delta c5 23 \) \(\Delta c2 \) \(\Delta c6 24 \) \(\Delta d4 \) \(\Delta b7 \) with equal chances.

Game 34 Kasparov-Karpov Linares 1992

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	⊘d2	dxe4
4	②xe4	Ød7
5	 ②g 5	Dgf6
6	êc4	e6


7	₩e2	ᡚb6
8	⊈b3	h6
9	₫ 5f3	c5
10	⊈ f4	≜d6

10... Dbd5 is the main continuation.

11	<u> </u>	₩ e7
12	dxc5	êxc5
13	Øe5	≜ d7
14	Øgf3	夕h5
15	0-0-0	⊘xg 3

If immediately 15...0-0-0, then 16 \(\Delta xd7 \) \(\Delta xd7 \) 17 \(\Delta e5! \) \(\Delta xe5 \) 18 \(\Delta xe5 \) is possible, with strong positional pressure.

16 hxg3 0-0-0



17 **■h**5!

One of Kasparov's creative discoveries. While pressurising the kingside, the rook also joins the attack on the queenside. The threat is 18 Pxf #xf7 19 =xc5+.

17		≜ e8
18	 X xd8+	&xd8
19	₩d2+	≜ d6
20	Dd3	₩c7
21	g4!	\$ c8
22	g 5	≜.f8?!

Were the rook at h1, Black would have 22...h5. However, this total retreat is an unfortunate decision. 22...\$\dots\delta\$8! 23 gxh6 gxh6 24 \$\dots\delta\$b1\dots is stronger.


23 Th4!

The threat is stronger than the execution!

Stronger was 24... 2c8! 25 \$\docume{2}\$b1!?\docume{2}.

25 a5 ②d5 26 \$\dot{\$\dot{\phi}\$\dot{1} \dot{\phi}\$\d8?!

And here 26... Ig8!? 27 Ic4 Id6 28 Id4 hxg5 29 c4 If6 came into consideration (Kasparov).



Now that Black's queenside has been destroyed, it only remains for White to bring up the reserves – his rook.

29		≜xg5
30	②xg5	₩xg5
31	L h5!	₩f6
32	Z a5	≜ c6

33	Dc5	≜ xb7
34	②xb7	ŵxb7
35	₩a6+	⊈ c6
36	≜ a4+	⊈ d6
37	₩d3+	2)d5
38	₩g3+	₩e5
39	₩a3+	⊈ c7
40	₩c5+	⊈ d8
41	Xxa7	1-0


Game 35 Watson-Spiridonov Palma de Mallorca 1989

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	⊘d7
5	ıc4	4 }gf6
6	ᡚg5	e6
7	₩e2	∕ 2)b6
8	≜ .b3	h6
9	€ 25f3	c 5
10	⊈f4	a 6
11	c4	cxd4
12	0-0-0	. ≜ c5
13	2xd4	₩e7

13...单xd4 is risky: 14 公f3 单xb2+ 15 豐xb2 单d7 16 公e5 with a dangerous initiative for White.

A very clever resource, in accordance with classical rules: a flank attack should be met by a counterattack in the centre.

20 gxf5 **X**xd4



The subsequent play resembles a fencing contest, in which the decisive hit is landed by Watson.

21	≜ xh6	I g4!
22	 Ixg4	②xg4
	≜ xg7!	
		g4 \ xg7 25 h3!
②d7 26 ₩ e′	7± (Watso	n).
24	₩x94+	\$ R

As a result White has three, albeit unconnected, pawns for the exchange, and in addition the black king has not yet found any peace.


当f4!

25

25	•••	②d7
26	②xd7 +	₩xd7
27	a3	Z d8
28	f6	₩d3+
29	ı⊈.c2	₩d4
30	₩h6+	⊈e8
31	≙ .f5	₩c5
32	₩h8+	₩f8
33	₩h5	

33... at d6 34 wg5± is a tougher defence.

34 ₩e2+ \$\psi d8



35	₩e5!	Z d1∹
36	\$c2	₩d6
37	₩e7+	1-0

Game 36 Short-Speelman Hastings 1988/9

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	②c3	dxe4
4	②xe4	∕ 2d7
5	≜c4	②gf6
6	 2 0g 5	e6
7	₩e2	Db6
8	⊈b3	h6
9	€ 05f3	c5
10	⊈ f4	Dbd5
11	≜e5	₩a5+
12	€)d2	

Black's game is easier after the exchange of queens: 12 \ d2 \ xd2+ 13 \ \ xd2 \ cxd4 14 \ \ gf3 \ \ c5.

A double-edged move. 13 dxc5 is more natural.

13 ... bxc4


An interesting idea of Ivanchuk is to sacrifice a pawn by 13... 4\(\text{D}\)b6 14 cxb5 c4.

14 **≜**xc4 **②**b6

15 b4!?

With this pawn sacrifice White tries to seize the initiative.

15		WXD4
16	∐ b1	₩a5
17	≜b5 +	≜ d7
18	≜ xf6!	gxf6
19	Ω gf 3	cxd4
20	۸Ă	265



23 **I**fd1


Black's position looks very hazardous, but there are no real threats.

23 ... f5 24 ②g3?

Now the initiative passes to Black. 24 单xd7 罩xd7 25 ②c6 罩xd1+ 26 罩xd1 豐a4 27 ②xe7 豐xe4!? 28 豐b2 e5 29 豐a3 堂g7 30 g3 would have led to a double-edged game (Speelman). 9...c5 101

24		.⊈xb5!
25	②xb5	4 2d5
26	Z b3	h5!?
27	②d4?!	

27 ②xh5!? should have been ventured.



27 ... ②f4!

28	Wf1	₩xa2
29	I f3	h4
30	Dgxf5!	exf5
31	 Ixf4	L h6!
32	E a1?	

White could have picked up a pawn by 32 \(\mathbb{I}\)xf5! \(\mathbb{I}\)hd6 33 \(\mathbb{I}\)f4.


32 ... ₩d2 33 Øe2?

An oversight. As shown by Speelman, the only way to hold the position was 33 wc4! Ihd6 34 Ixf5 If6 35 Ixf6 2xf6 36 Db3, although after 36...wd5 37 wxd5 Ixd5 the ending is clearly better for Black, who has an outside passed pawn.

	•••	≖ e6
34	E xf5	₩xe2
35	₩c1	Z ed6
	0-1	

PART III: 5 🗹 f3 🗸 gf6

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	∕ 2\d7
E	t) es	



The classical continuation, which White retains the option of exchanging knights at f6 or of retreating to g3. In connection with the latter, it is worth mentioning Romanishin's interesting idea of 5 De2 Dgf6 6 22g3, to which the most natural reply is 6...e6, preparing ...c6-c5. Romanishin-Petrosian (USSR 1979) continued 6...g6 7 \(\hat{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}}} c4 \\hat{\text{\text{\text{g}}}} g7 8 c3 0-0 9 0-0 Ød5?! (it was more logical for Black to complete his development by 9...4b6) 10 Le1 e5 11 Lg5 f6? (and here he should have sacrificed a pawn by 11...\#b6) 12 \(\mathbb{L}\)d2 exd4 13 cxd4 ②7b6 14 单b3 \$h8 15 ₩c1 a5 16 a3 2c7 17 2c5!, and White gained the advantage.

The modest **5 c3** \triangle gf6 has no independent significance, as 6 \triangle xf6+ \triangle xf6 7 \triangle f3 or 6 \triangle g3 c5 7 \triangle f3 transposes into other lines.


5 ... **Dgf6**

After 5...包df6 White can play 6 包eg5, transposing into variations examined in Chapter 4 (5 包g5 包dg6 6 包1f3).

Here White's main continuations are 6 ②xf6+ (Chapter 9) and 6 ②g3 (Chapters 10 and 11).

After the sortie 6 Deg5 and the soundest reply 6...e6 7 Ad3, play transposes into variations examined in Chapters 1-3.

After the retreat 6 **ac3**:



(a) Black can equalise using Flohr's prescription of 6... \(\Delta \) b6 7 \(\Delta \) f4 \(\Delta \) f5, e.g. 8 \(\Delta \) d3 \(\Delta \) xd3 e6 10 0-0 \(\Delta \) e7 11 \(\Delta \) fe1 0-0 12 \(\Delta \) g5 h6 13 \(\Delta \) ge4 \(\Delta \) bd5= (Antoshin-Flohr, 22nd USSR Ch 1955);


5 42f3 103

(b) the classical 6...e6 7 \(\hat{2} \)d3 (or 7 g3 b6 8 \(\hat{2} \hat{2} \) \(\hat{2} \)a6 9 \(\hat{2} \)e2 \(\hat{2} \)e7 10 0-0 0-0=, Spassky-Speelman, London 1982) is also possible:

 ②xf6 13 dxc5 \(\text{\text{\text{\$\xet{\$\text{\$\xrighta}\$}}\$} \ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exit{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\exit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\xit{\$\text{\$\ti}\$\$}\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\xitit{\$\xitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\xitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}}}}}\$}\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exit{\$\}}}}\$}}}\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\text{\$\xitit{\$\xit{\$\xitit{\$\exit{\$\}}}}}}}\text{\$\text{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\exit{\$\text{\$\tex

9: 6 ②xf6+ ②xf6

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	4 2d7
5	DB	Øgf6
6	②xf6+	Øxf6



After this unpretentious exchange one may gain the impression that it is now easier for Black to solve his opening problems. But the outward simplicity is deceptive. White retains a solid centre and the advantage of the first move, and has a slight initiative with which Black has to reckon.

Here White's main continuations are 7 ②e5 (9.1) and 7 ②c4 (9.2).

Against the modest 7 c3 Petrosian suggested 7... 全g4. His game with Pilnik (Amsterdam CT 1956) continued 8 全e2 e6 9 h3 全h5 10 包e5 全xe2 11 響xe2 全d6 12 全g5 豐c7 13 0-0-0 包d7 14 單he1 0-0 15 全b1 里ae8, and Black solved his opening problems.

Nowadays after 7... 2g4 White plays more shrewdly: 8 h3 2xf3 (if 8... h5 Black has to reckon with 9 g4 \$g6 10 De5, e.g. 10... Dd7 11 Dxg6 hxg6 12 d5 cxd5 13 \wxd5 \wxd5 14 \$g2 \$\ \$\ \$b8 15 \$\ \$\ \$e3 and White has two active bishops plus a spatial advantage, Nikolenko-Donchenko, Moscow 1990) 9 \ xf3 \ d5 10 \ e2 e6 11 0-0 ₩xf3 (also possible is 11...\$\d6 12 ₩d3 ♠c7 13 ♠f3 ₩d7 14 ⋢d1 0-0 15 c4 Zad8 16 Wb3 We7=, Kasparov-Karpov (WC match (14), Seville 1987) 12 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}}\$} d6 13 \$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$} d2 0-0 14 Zad1 Zfd8 15 g3 Zd7 16 Ac1 Zad8 17 \$\dot{\pm}g2 \$\dot{\pm}e7 18 \$\dot{\pm}e2 \$\dot{\pm}d5 19 f4 with some initiative for White, although Black's position is solid enough (Nikolenko-Podgaets, Moscow 1992).

9.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \(\tilde{Q}\)c3 dxe4 4 \(\tilde{Q}\)xe4 \(\tilde{Q}\)d7 5 \(\tilde{Q}\)f3 \(\tilde{Q}\)gf6 6 \(\tilde{Q}\)xf6+\(\tilde{Q}\)xf6)


7 包e5

An aggressive sortie: White immediately occupies the key square of the position. Here Black's main replies are 7...\$\d7 (9.11) and 7...\$\d26 (9.12).

If he develops with 7....全f5 8 c3 e6 he has to reckon with the flank attack 9 g4! 全g6 10 h4 全d6 (weaker is 10...h5 11 g5 公d5 12 公xg6 fxg6 13 堂c2 全f7 14 里h3 公e7 15 全c4 公f5 16 里f3 豐d7 17 里xf5+! with advan-

tage to White, Karpov-Hort, Bugojno 1978) 11 we2 c5 (or 11...wa5 12 2g2 0-0-0 13 h5±, Malishauskas-Kostenko, Warsaw 1993) 12 2g2 cxd4 13 h5 dxc3 14 wb5+ 2f8 15 hxg6 with advantage to White (Ciric).

However, 8... 2d7 comes into consideration. Kavalek-Barcza (Caracas 1971) continued 9 2xf7 2xf7 10 163 e6 11 g4 16 12 gxf5 13 183 c5 14 2h3 cxd4 15 cxd4 2b4+ 16 161 165+ 17 2g1 168 18 165 19 2e3, although here too White's chances are preferable.



9.11 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \(\tilde{2}\)c3 dxe4 4 \(\tilde{2}\)xe4 \(\tilde{2}\)d7 5 \(\tilde{2}\)f3 \(\tilde{2}\)gf6 6 \(\tilde{2}\)xf6+\(\tilde{2}\)xf6 7 \(\tilde{2}\)e5)

7 ... 包d7

Black aims to exchange or drive back the active knight.

8 Dd3

If 8 **②f3** Black can invite a repetition of moves by 8...**②**f6.

After the exchange of knights he does not experience any difficulties:

8 2e3 2xe5 9 dxe5 2f5 (winning a pawn by 9... \$\mathbb{w}a5+ 10 \$\mathbb{w}d2\$\$ \$\mathbb{w}xe5\$ allows White a lead in development after 11 0-0-0) 10 \$\mathbb{w}xd8+ \mathbb{m}xd8 11 \$\mathbb{m}xa7 \mathbb{n}xc2 12 \mathbb{n}b6 \mathbb{m}a8 13 \mathbb{n}c4 e6 14 f3 \$\mathbb{m}a4!\$ with equal chances (A.Sokolov-Karpov, match (2), Linares 1987);


8 **≜ f4** ②xe5 9 **≜**xe5, and now:

(a) 9... \$\mathbb{B}6?! 10 \$\textit{2}\$d3 f6 (taking the b2 pawn would have left Black seriously behind in development) 11 \$\textit{2}\$g3 \$\textit{2}\$e6 12 \$\mathbb{E}\$e2 \$\textit{2}\$f7 13 0-0 e6 14 c3 0-0-0 15 \$\textit{2}\$c4 \$\mathbb{E}\$e8 16 b4, and White quickly broke through on the queenside (Larsen-Rogoff, Lone Pine 1978);

(b) 9...\$f5 10 \$\d3\$ \$\d3\$ \$\d3\$ (stronger than 10...\$\d2\$xd3 11 \$\dag{\text{w}}\$xd3 e6 12 0-0 \$\dag{\text{w}}\$d7 13 \$\dag{\text{fe}}\$fe1 \$\dag{\text{d}}\$8 14 \$\dag{\text{g}}\$ad1\$\dpm\$ (De Wit-Bakker, Holland 1985) 11 0-0 e6 12 \$\dag{\text{g}}\$e1 \$\dag{\text{w}}\$b6 13 a4 a5 14 \$\dag{\text{w}}\$f3 \$\dag{\text{x}}\$xd3 15 \$\dag{\text{w}}\$xd3 0-0-0 with equal chances (Fleck-Meduna, Porz 1988);

(c) 9... d5 10 c4 (10 2e2 f6 11 2g3 wxg2 12 2f3 wh3 13 d5 is unclear, Jansa-Radulov, Vrnjacka Banja 1983) 10... d5+ 11 d2 xd2+ 12 xd2 2f5 13 2d3 with a drawish ending (Hübner-Karpov, Wijk aan Zee 1988);

8 ♠xd7 ♠xd7 (or 8... ₩xd7 9 c3 ₩g4 with further simplification, Smagin-Chernin, Moscow 1988), and the position is completely equal, as even 9 ♠d3 can be answered by 9... ♠xf5 10 0-0 (or 10 ♠xf5 ₩a5+) 10... ♠xd3 11 ₩xd3 e6 12 ♠xf4 ♠d6 with an imminent draw (Matanovic-Radulov, Surakarta 1982).



8 ... g6

Also possible is 8... 16 6 9 c3 \(\text{2}\)f5 10 \(\text{2}\)e2 (or 10 \(\text{2}\)e5 \(\text{2}\)g6 11 \(\text{2}\)g5 \(\text{2}\)d7 12 \(\text{2}\)xg6 hxg6 13 \(\text{2}\)c4 \(\text{2}\)b6 14 \(\text{2}\)b3 \(\text{2}\)d7 =, Belyavsky-Lerner, USSR 1980) 10...e6 11 g4 \(\text{2}\)xd3 \(\text{2}\)d6 13 f4 \(\text{2}\)c7 14 \(\text{2}\)f3 0-0-0 15 b4 h5 16 g5 \(\text{2}\)d5 17 0-0 f6 18 gxf6 gxf6 19 \(\text{2}\)d2 with slightly the better chances for White (Grünfeld-Gallagher, Tel Aviv 1988).

9 **≜**e3

Or 9 c3 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{9}}}} \) \(\text{\texi}\text{

9 ... ≜g7 10 ₩d2 ②b6

If 10...e5, then 11 ≜h6! is unpleasant.

11 De5 &e6

12 **≗**e2

If 12 0-0-0 Black can risk taking the pawn: 12... 2xa2 13 b3 a5 14

\$\pmub2 a4 15 \mathbb{\mathba\mathba\\\\\\\\\an\and\max\and\max\and\max\and\max\and\max\and\max\and\max\and\ma


12 ... 0-0 13 0-0-0 f6

The piece sacrifice suggested by Timman also comes into consideration: 13...\$\delta xa2 14 b3 a5 15 \$\delta b2 a4 16 \$\mathbb{H}a1 axb3 17 cxb3 \$\delta xb3 18 \$\delta xb3 \$\delta xb3

Timman-Korchnoi (Montpellier CT 1985) now continued 14 2\(\)d3 2\(\)c4 15 \(\)c3 2\(\)xe3 16 fxe3 2\(\)d5 17 2\(\)f4 2\(\)h6 18 \(\) hf1 2\(\)xf4 19 \(\) xxf4 \(\) d6 with equal chances.

9.12 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \(\tilde{2}\)c3 dxe4
4 \(\tilde{2}\)xe4 \(\tilde{2}\)d7 5 \(\tilde{2}\)f6 6
\(\tilde{2}\)xf6+ \(\tilde{2}\)xf6 7 \(\tilde{2}\)e5)

7 ... **≜**e6



Black chooses a plan of piece development.

8 **2**e2 g6

9 0–0 **≜**g7 10 c4

Passive is 10 c3 0-0 11 \(\hat{2}\) d7 12 \(\hat{2}\) f3 \(\hat{2}\) d5 13 \(\hat{2}\) c2 \(\hat{2}\) e8 14 \(\hat{2}\) ad1 e5 15 \(\hat{2}\) dxe5 \(\hat{2}\) (Tal-Agdestein, Wijk aan Zee 1988).

10 ... 0-0 11 ⊈e3 ②e4

11... 2e8 is also played, with the same idea: 12 2f4 2d6 13 d5 cxd5 14 cxd5 2f5! The game is equal (Grünfeld-Dlugy, New York 1985).

To 11...2d7 White can also reply 12 f4 (if 12 2)f3 2)f6 13 h3 2)e4 14 C1 b5!? 15 cxb5 cxb5 16 2xb5 2d5 with active piece play for the pawn, Belyavsky-Korchnoi, Montpellier CT 1985) 12...2xe5 13 fxe5 C7 14 b3 2ad8 15 2ad1 b5 16 C3 b8, and here in Larsen-Arkell (London 1991) he could have retained some advantage by 17 b3.

12 f4


12 \(\mathbb{E}\)c2 can be met by 12...\(\Delta\)d6 13 b3 c5! 14 \(\mathbb{E}\)ad1 \(\Delta\)f5 15 d5 \(\mathbb{L}\)xe5 16 dxe6 \(\mathbb{E}\)c7 17 exf7+ \(\mathbb{E}\)xf7 18 g3 \(\mathbb{E}\)af8 19 \(\mathbb{L}\)g4! \(\Delta\)xe3 20 fxe3 \(\mathbb{E}\)xf1+ \(\frac{1}{2}\)-\(\frac{1}{2}\) (A.Sokolov-Karpov, match (3), Linares 1987).

12 ... f6

Or 12... 2d6 13 b3 Wa5 14 Wc2 Ifd8 15 Iad1 with somewhat the better chances for White (Ivanovic-Watson, Bor 1986) – Game 37.

Psakhis-Tukmakov (54th USSR Ch 1987) now continued 13 ②13 ②17 14 ***©c2 ②16 15 ②16 b5 16 b3 bxc4 17 bxc4, and White's spatial advantage gave him the better chances. 9.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 Dc3 dxe4 4 Dxe4 Dd7 5 Df3 Dgf6 6 Dxf6+ Dxf6)

7 Ac4



White calmly continues his development.

7 ... **≜**.f5 8 0–0

Here too 8 ②e5 e6 9 ②b3 ③d6 10 We2 Wc7 is possible, with a double-edged game. One of Petrosian's first attempts went 10...②d7 11 ②d2 a5? (11...②xe5 12 dxe5 Wc7 is correct) 12 ②xf7! ③xf7 13 g4 with a very strong attack for White (Gligoric-Petrosian, USSR v. Yugoslavia 1957) — Game 38.

The plan with queenside castling is also encountered: 8 We2 e6 9 Qg5 Qe7 (the energetic 9...Wa5+ is also interesting: 10 c3 Qe4 11 0-0 Qxg5 12 Qxg5 Qe7, and here in Xie Jun-Adams, Amsterdam 1994, White could have sacrificed a knight - 13 Qxf7!? Qxf7 14 g4 Qg6 15 f4! Qe8 16 f5 Qf7 17 Zae1 with a dangerous initiative, Adams) 10 0-0-0 Qg4!

(Black can also consider 10...b5!? 11 \(\textit{2d3} \textit{2xd3} \) 12 \(\textit{2xd3} \) 0-0 13 \(\textit{2e5} \) \(\textit{2d5} \) 14 \(\textit{2g3} \) \(\textit{2fd8} \) 15 \(\textit{2b1} \) \(\textit{2ac8} \) 16 \(\textit{2d1} \) c5 with an equal game, Loffler-Lee, Biel 1991), and now:

- (a) 11 h3 \(\text{2xf3} \) 12 \(\text{wxf3} \) \(\text{2d5} \) 13 \(\text{2xe7} \) \(\text{wxe7} \) 14 \(\text{lhel} \) (or 14 \(\text{sb1} \) \(\text{ld6} \) 15 \(\text{we4} \) b5 16 \(\text{dd3} \) a5 17 c3 \(\text{wd6} \) 18 g3 b4 19 c4 \(\text{c)} \) f6 and Black maintains the balance, Fischer-Petrosian, Bled 1961) 14...0-0 15 \(\text{sb1} \) \(\text{lad8} \) with equal chances (Matanovic-Petrosian, USSR v. Yugoslavia 1959) \(Game 1. \)
- (b) 11 \$\delta b1\$ 0-0 (if 11...\(\tilde{D}\)d5 Fischer recommended 12 \$\delta c1!\pm \text{, but}\$ 11...\(\tilde{b}\)5!? 12 \$\delta b3\$ 0-0 or 12 \$\delta d3\$ \$\dds\$ comes into consideration) 12 \hat 3 \$\delta xf3\$ 13 \$\dds\$ xf3 \$\delta d5!? (driving back the bishop; after 13...\text{, b5}\$ 14 \$\delta d3\$ \$\dds\$ d5 15 \$\dds\$ 2ac8 16 g4 \$\dds\$ fd8 17 f4 \$\delta f8\$ 18 f5 White develops a strong attack, Tiviakov-Adams, match (3), New York 1994) 14 \$\delta c1\$ \$\delta g5\$ 15 \$\delta e3\$ with slightly the better chances for White (Tiviakov).

Initially 9 Te1 was played, but in this case Black can prevent the advance of the knight: 9... 24 10 c3 26 (or 10... 27 11 h3 2xf3 12 xf3 0-0 13 g3 b5 14 2f1 265 15 h4! 2f6 16 2d3±, Ehlvest-Kharitonov, 55th USSR Ch 1988) 11 2c2 c7, and now if 12 2c5 Podgaets recommends 12... 2xe5!? 13 dxe5 d8 14 xf4 xf5 15 2f4 xf5 16 2c7 xf4 77 xf7 0-0 18 2xg4 2xg4 19 f3 2f2!? with chances for both sides.

In Short-Gulko (match (1), New York 1994) White played 9 h3 \$\text{\pi}e^7\$ 10 c3 0-0 11 \$\text{\pi}e^2\$ c5 (11...b5!? 12 \$\text{\pi}b3 \$\text{\pi}e^4\$ came into consideration) 12 \$\text{\pi}f4! \$\text{\pi}e^4\$ 13 \$\text{\pi}ad1\$, and here with 13...\$\text{\pi}b6!? Black could have gained a good game.}

9 ... **≜**d6

After the more passive 9... 2e7 10 c3 2d7 11 2f4 0-0 12 We2 2b6 13 2b3 a5 14 a3 2d5 15 2g3 Le8 16 Lad1 White's position is slightly preferable (Rozentalis-Epishin, Vilnius 1988).

10 ₩e2

Or 10 c3 \$\forall c7 11 \$\forall e2 0-0-0 12\$\$\forall e1 \forall b8 13 \horall e4 \forall d5 14 \horall e3 h5\$\$ with chances for both sides (Akopian-Adams, Manila OL 1992).

10 ... ₩c7

11 h3

Preparing in the event of 11...0-0 the pawn attack 12 g4 \(\mathbb{L}\)g6 13 f4.

11 ... h6

12 **Z**e1

12 g4 ♣h7 13 ᡚxf7 ��xf7 14 ♠xe6+��f8 is dubious for White.

12 ... 0-0-0

13 **Å**b3 ②d5


14 🙎 d2

White's chances are preferable (Yakovich-Hoogendoorn, Amsterdam 1995) – *Game 39*.

Game 37 Ivanovic-Watson Bor 1986

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5

3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	Ød7
5	D 13	Øgf6
6	② xf6+	②xf6
7	De5	в̂e6
8	ı⊈e2	g6
9	00	<u>≜</u> g7
10	c4	0-0
11	≜e3	




11 ... **⊘e8**11... **⊘e4** is more active, although after 12 f4 **⊘**d6 the same position is

reached.

12 f4 **4**0d6 13 **b3** ₩a5 14 ₩c2 **¤fd8** 15 **¤**ad1 Hac8 16 g4 **f**6 17 Ø)d3 f5

After 17...2f7 White has the opportunity to strengthen his position by 18 2f3.

18	Øc5	≜f 7
19	h3	b6
20	Ød3	De4
21	De5	₩c3
22	≜ d3!	



White has a spatial advantage, and going into an endgame merely aggravates Black's problems. His pieces are well enough placed for play in the middlegame, and it would have been better to attack the centre: 22...c5! 23 gxf5 cxd4 with adequate counterplay.

Watson considers 24... 1xa2 25 gxf5 1b4! 26 1b1 1d6 to be best, when, although Black's position is still inferior, he can defend.

25 fxe5 fxg4 26 \(\text{\phi} \d 2! \)

An important intermediate move, after which White wins a piece.

26		②xa2
27	e6!	≜ xe6
28	E xe6	¤ xd4
29	🔔 h 6	②b4
30	Exe7	gxh3
31	 ⊈ g7+	∲h8
32	≝ff7	h2+
33	⊈h1	1-0

Game 38 Gligoric-Petrosian USSR v. Yugoslavia 1957

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	②d7
5	DB	Øgf6
6	② xf6+	Dxf6
7	êc4	<u> 2.15</u>
8	ව <u>e</u> 5	e 6
9	♠ b3	


Now White threatens to pursue the bishop: 10 g4 &e4 11 f3 &g6 12 h4.

11 **≗**d2

The idea of the knight sacrifice at f7 is, as they say, in the air, but for the moment it is ineffective: 11 ②xf7 ②xf7 12 g4 ②f6! 13 gxf5 \wathbf{w}a5+ 14 \@d2 \wathbf{w}xf5

11 ... a5

But now the time is ripe! 11... xe5 12 dxe5 wc7 was essential.



12	Dxf7!	⊈ xf7
13	σ 4	Wife

If 13... 2g6 there follows 14 ₩xe6+ and 15 ₩xd6.

Otherwise White plays 16 c4.

16 Ac4 Af6 17 Hhg1 Hae8

Black parries the threat of 18 2xe6+ 2xe6 19 2xg7+ while leaving his rook at h8 for the defence of the kingside. White's position is so impressive, that it seems a miracle that Petrosian was able to hold out for a further 55 moves.

18 IIg5 ₩e4 19 \(\mathbb{e} \)e3 a3 20 ■dg1 **g6** ₩h4 21 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}} \) ₩ß. 22 axb2+ 23 **\$**b1 **⊈**e7 24 Ha5 Ea8

After 25...■xa2 26 🕏xa2 🚊xe5 White can play 27 c3.

¤hf8

26 \(\hat{Q} 5 \) \(\bar{\pi} x d 4 \) \(\bar{\pi} c 5 \)

27...₩c3 fails to 28 \(xe6+! \) \(xe6 \) 29 \(£65+. \)

28 Wh3


25 He5

As shown by Gligoric himself, here he chose an inexact move order (28 ac4 was more accurate), since now Black could have played 28... #f5!

28 ... e5 29 \(\delta\)c4 \(\delta\)d8 30 \(\delta\)e6 \(\delta\)c7

If 30... 2e7 there follows 31 Id1+ 2c7 32 Ixe5.

31	≜ xf6	₩xf2
32	I ff	₩g2
33	Eg4	₩h3



34 **Zd1**?!

After the simple 34 **\(\beta\)**gg1 Black would have been defenceless. Now in a severe time scramble Petrosian as though gains a second wind.

34		X xf6
35	₩xf6	₩xg4
36	₩xd6+	\$ b6
37	≜.e 6	₩e4
38	⊈xb2	g5
39	≜ b3?	0

After 39 **Zd3!** the game would have concluded much more quickly.


39		g4
40	I f1	h5
41	II7	₩d4+
42	₩xd4+	exd4
43	Hf4	27 48

The sealed move. 43... 12e8 44 12xd4 12e2 was interesting, when after 45 h3 g3 46 12d3 h4 or 45 h4 12h2 46 12d7 12xh4 it is hard for White to capitalise on his extra piece (Gligoric).

44	≗c4	≌c5
45	∲ b3	b 5
46	I f5+	\$ b6
47	<u> </u>	c5
48	E xh5	c4+
49	Ġ b4	d3
50	Exb5+!	⊈ a7
51	cxd3	

51 c3 does not work, since the loss of the h-pawn leads to a rook ending with a- and c-pawns, which is well known for its drawing tendencies.

51		cxd3
52	 g5	d2
53	⊈e2	d1=₩
54	≜xd1	≖ xd1
55	Exg4	 ■ d2
56	h4	Ixa2
57	⊈ c5	IIh2



58 **L**b4!

Cutting off the king at the maximum distance from the passed pawn. After the complacent 58 \$\displaystyle{\pha}6\$ \$\displaystyle{\pha}6\$

58 ... **⊈**a6

59	\$ c6	¤ c2+
60	\$ d6	E c1
61	\$ e6	Ic5
62	⊈ f6	Ġ a5
63	 IIf4	Ġ b6
64	⊈ g6	E c1
65	h5	
66	⊈ f7	⊈ c7
67	I f6	Ġd 7
68	h6	∐ h1
69	⊈g7	⊈ e7
70	 Ig6	≖ f1
71	h7	⊑ f7+
72	ŵh6	1-0


Game 39 Yakovich-Hoogendoorn Amsterdam 1995

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	Dxe4	ᡚd7
5	D 13	②gf6
6	Dxf6+	②xf6
7	êc4	⊈f 5
8	De5	e6
9	0-0	≜ d6
10	₩e2	₩c7
11	h3	h6
12	E e1	0-0-0
13	⊈b3	包d5
14	⊈ d2	g5
15	₩h5	Ⅱ h7

In the event of 15... Idg8 White follows the same plan as in the game: 16 2xd5 cxd5 (16...exd5? 17 17 c4! dxc4 18 Idlac 1 2xe5 19 Idlac bb 20 b3, opening lines for an attack on the castled position.

16	≌ad1	Ïg8
17	≜xd5!	exd5
18	c4	₫ 64?

Allowing a decisive exchange sacrifice. 18...dxc4!? 19 ②xc4 鱼e6 was essential.




19	Exe4!	dxe4
20	₩g4+	⊈ d8

If 20...\$\dot\$b8 there follows 21 \dot{\dot}d7+\$\dot\$a8 22 \dot{\dot}f6. But now White strikes a blow from the flank.

21	≜ a5!	b6
22	₩xe4	f5
23	②xc6+	\$ 2€
24	₩e6+	1-0

10: 6 **②**g3 e6

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	②c3	dxe4
4	②xe4	Ød7
5	D 13	Øgf6
6	9)03	- 6



This knight retreat leads to more complicated play. From here it can in some cases be included in the attack on the king (②g3-h5). Black's main counterplay again involves undermining the centre by ...c6-c5.

6 ... e6

6...c5 is examined in Chapter 11.

The attempt to exploit the 'awkward' position of the knight at g3 by 6...h5 can be met by 7 2d3 since 7...h4 runs into the typical attack 8 2f5 h3 9 gxh3 2xh3 10 2e2 e6 11 2g5 2h8 12 2xe6!, while after 7...e6 8 2e2 c5 9 2g5 2s5 2s5 10 2d2 2b6 11 0-0-0 cxd4 12 2he1 2c5 13 c3! dxc3 14 2xc3 White has a strong

initiative (Gurgenidze-Kopylov, USSR 1958).

7 ≜d3

The more modest 7 2e2 c5 8 0-0 is no less dangerous:

- (a) 8... \$\mathbb{w}\$c7 9 c4 cxd4 10 \$\mathbb{w}\$xd4 b6 11 \$\mathbb{L}\$f4 \$\mathbb{w}\$c5 12 \$\mathbb{w}\$c3 \$\mathbb{L}\$b7 13 \$\mathbb{Z}\$ad1 \$\mathbb{L}\$e7 14 \$\mathbb{L}\$d4! (after 14 \$\mathbb{L}\$g5? 0-0 15 \$\mathbb{w}\$c2 \$\mathbb{L}\$fd8! 16 b4 \$\mathbb{w}\$c6 Black gained the better chances in Conquest-Speelman, Hastings 1995) 14...e5 (or 14...0-0 15 \$\mathbb{L}\$b5) 15 \$\mathbb{L}\$b3 \$\mathbb{w}\$c7 16 \$\mathbb{L}\$e3 0-0 17 \$\mathbb{L}\$f5 and White retains a slight, but enduring advantage;
- (b) 8...cxd4 9 ②xd4 (also interesting is 9 Wxd4 &e7 10 &f4 0-0 11 c4 b6 12 ②e4 &b7 13 ②c3, and here in Westerinen-Christiansen, Wijk aan Zee 1976, Black could have maintained equal chances by 13...②c5) 9...&c5 10 b3 0-0 11 &b2 a6 12 c4 Wc7 13 a3 b6 14 b4 &e7 15 &f3 (or 15 Ie1 &b7 16 &d3 Ife8 17 We2?! ②f8 18 Iac1 ②g6 19 Wc2 ②f4 20 &f1 Iad8\(\frac{1}{2}\), Waitzkin-Serper, New York 1996; 17 ②h5!?) 15...&b7 16 &xb7 Wxb7 17 We2, and White's chances are slightly preferable.

7 ... c5


The most energetic move. Delaying this attack on the centre allows White to retain an enduring initiative: 7...\$\text{2}e7 8 0-0 0-0 9 \text{ we2 b6 (9...c5!)} 10 c4 \text{ c5 bxc5?!} 14 \text{ ce5 wb6 15 }\text{ cxh7+!} \text{ cxh7} 16 \text{ cxd7 with}

advantage to White (Tal-Miles, Porz 1981/2).

8 0-0

Accurate play is also required of Black after the modest 8 c3 cxd4 9 ②xd4 oc5 (the less active 9...oc7 10 0-0 ⊙c5 11 oc2 ocd 7 12 oc6 13 oc6 13 oc7 14 we2 allowed White the better chances in Bronstein-Petrosian, Moscow 1967 – Game 3) 10 oc2:

- (a) 10... ②e5?! 11 0-0 0-0 12 皇g5 h6 13 皇xf6 豐xf6 14 里e1 ②d7 15 ②h5! 豐g5 16 h4! 豐xh4 17 里e4 豐e7 18 ②f5 with a strong attack for White (Tseshkovsky-Bagirov, Telavi 1982);
- (b) 10...b6 11 De4 Db7 12 Dxc5 Dxc5 13 0-0 0-0 14 De1 and White's chances are preferable (Mark Tseitlin-Bagirov, Telavi 1982);
- (c) 10...0-0 11 0-0 \(\mathbb{w}c7 (or 11...\(\mathbb{L}e8 12 \(\mathbb{L}g5 a6 13 \(\mathbb{W}f3 \(\mathbb{L}xd4 14 \(\cdot xd4 \(\mathbb{W}a5 15 \(\mathbb{L}e3 \(\mathbb{W}d5 16 \(\mathbb{W}e2 b6 17 \(\mathbb{L}b3\(\mathbb{L}\), Taulbut-Speelman, Hastings 1981/2) 12 \(\mathbb{L}e1 \(\mathbb{L}d8 13 \(\mathbb{L}e3 b6 14 \(\mathbb{W}e2 \(\mathbb{L}b7 with equal chances (Thipsay-Speelman, British Ch 1984) \(Game 40\).




Now Black's main continuations are 8...cxd4 (10.1) and 8...2e7 (10.2).

He can also consider the little-8...**≜**d6 dxc5 @xc5 studied (9...\(\frac{1}{2}\)xc5 10 \(\frac{1}{2}\)b5+) 10 b3 0-0 11 àb2 b6 12 ₩e2 ab7 13 4\e4 ae7 14 **Z**ad1 **₩**c7 (14...**2**)d5 15 **2**b5!) 15 ②eg5 ②c5 16 ♠e5 ₩c8! (this is more accurate than 16...\#c6 17 \&b5 \#c8 18 b4 5\ce4 19 5\xe4 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$xe4}} \) 20 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$xf6}}} \) &xf3 21 ₩xf3 &xf6 22 &c6±) 17 £xf6 gxf6 18 ②xh7 **X**d8 (18... ②xd3? 19 Ixd3 Id8 20 De5!±) 19 De5! fxe5 20 \#g4+ \porple h8 21 \#h5 \porple g8 22 ₩g4+ ½-½ (Tiviakov-Kamsky, Groningen 1994). Instead of 10 b3 Tiviakov recommends 10 We2!? with the idea of 5\e4

10.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2f3 2gf6 6 2g3 e6 7 2d3 c5 8 0-0)

8 ... cxd4



A radical decision. Black eliminates the pawn centre.

9 ᡚxd4 **≜**c5


If 9... ②c5 there is the good reply 10 \(\frac{\phi}{2} \)c4.

Now White's knight is attacked and his main continuations are 10 c3 (10.11), 10 包b3 (10.12) and 10 包f3 (10.13).

The drawbacks to 10 2e3 are emphasised by the manoeuvre ... 2d5, e.g. 10...0-0 11 We2 2d5! 12 Zad1 2xe3 13 fxe3 g6 14 2e4 2e7 15 2b5 Wb6, and Black's position is already preferable (Cherepkov-Petrosian, 28th USSR Ch 1961).

10.11 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2f3 2gf6 6 2g3 e6 7 2d3 c5 8 0-0 cxd4 9 2xd4 2c5)

10 c3



White defends his knight.

10 ... 0-0

Black can give his opponent an isolated d-pawn by 10... xd4 11 cxd4 0-0, but he has to defend carefully:

(a) 12 \$\times f4 \Delta b6 (if 12...\Delta d5?! 13 \$\times d6 \times 8 14 \times e1 \Delta 7f6 15 \times e5 \times d7

16 a4 全c6 17 里a3 with an attack, Varavin-Komarov, Novosibirsk 1989) 13 里e1 全d7 14 公h5 全c6 15 全e5 公bd7 16 公xf6+ 公xf6 17 里e3 g6 18 里h3 里e8! with an equal game (Plachetka-Meduna, Kralove 1981);

11 We2

Or 11 Zel a6 12 ②h5 &xd4! 13 cxd4 Wa5 14 ②xf6+ ②xf6 15 &d2 Wb6 16 &g5 ②d5 17 Wh5 f5 with equality.

11 ... b6!

11... ≜xd4 is premature: 12 cxd4 ②b6 13 **Z**d1 ②bd5 14 ②h5!±.

12 De4


Weaker is 12 \(\mathbb{U}\)f3 \(\infty\)d5 13 c4 \(\text{2xd4}\) 14 cxd5 \(\infty\)c5! 15 dxe6 \(\text{2xe6}\) with slightly the better chances for Black.

12 ... \(\Delta b7 \)
13 \(\Delta xc5 \)
2xc5 \(\Delta c4 \)
26

The game is equal (Dvoiris-Epishin, 58th USSR Ch 1991).

10.12 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2f3 2gf6 6 2g3 e6 7 2d3 c5 8 0-0 cxd4 9 2xd4 2c5)

10 \$\b3



10 ... ≜e7

This is considered the soundest move.

But 10...2b6 comes into consideration: 11 we2 0-0 12 2d2 a5 (risky is 12...wc7 13 c4 we5 14 wf3 wxb2 15 2c3 wa3 16 fe1 le8 17 2e4 we7 18 c5 2c7 19 2g3 lb8 20 lad1, when White has sufficient compensation for the pawn, Tischbierek-Jaster, Cottbus 1983) 13 a4 wc7 14 lfe1 le8 15 2e4 e5 16 wf3 2xe4 17 lxe4 2f6 18 lh4 2d7 with equal chances (Lechtinsky-Meduna, Trnava 1982).

11 He1

11 皇f4 can be met by 11... ②d5 12 皇d2 0-0 13 c4 ②5f6 (not 13... ②b4?! 14 皇xb4 皇xb4 15 豐c2±) 14 皇f4 星e8 (14... b6 15 ②e4 皇a6 16 豐e2±) 15 豐c2 b6 16 星ad1 皇b7 17 星fe1 ₩c8 18 ②e4 ②xe4 19 ②xe4 ②f6 20 ③xb7 ₩xb7 with an equal game (Glek-Epishin, Russian Ch 1995).

Tiviakov recommends 11 a4!?, and if Black does not prevent the pawn's further advance (by 11...a5), but plays, for example, 11...b6, then 12 a5 \$\tilde{2}\tilde{0}\$ to 13 a6 \$\tilde{2}\$ d5 (13...\$\tilde{0}\$c6 14 \$\tilde{0}\$d4±) 14 c4 \$\tilde{0}\$c6 15 \$\tilde{0}\$d4 and White gains a spatial advantage.

11 ... 0-0 12 \(\mathbb{U}\)f3 a5

12... **三**e8, preparinge6-e5, is also possible, e.g. 13 单位2 单位6! 14 单a5 (or 14 单c3 單c7! 15 包h5 e5!?) 14...单c7 15 单c3 包d5 16 单位2 包5f6 with an equal game (Golubev-Solozhenkin, Le Touquet 1994).

13 a4 **2**d5


Tiviakov-Adams (match (1), New York 1994) went 13... \(\tilde{Q} \) bot 14 \(\tilde{Q} \) \(\tilde{Q} \) bot 15 \(\tilde{Q} \) bot 3 \(\tilde{Q} \) dot 7 (15... \(\tilde{W} \) c7 can be met by 16 c4 \(\tilde{Q} \) bd 17 \(\tilde{Q} \) dd 4 \(\tilde{Q} \) dot 8 \(\tilde{W} \) xd6 \(\tilde{W} \) xd6 19 \(\tilde{Q} \) ad1 \(\tilde{Q} \) 10 c4 \(\tilde{Q} \) xb5 (weaker is 16... \(\tilde{Q} \) bd 17 \(\tilde{Q} \) xb4! \(\tilde{Q} \) xb5 20 \(\tilde{Q} \) xf6+ gxf6 21 cxb5 with advantage to White, Tiviakov) 17 axb5?! \(\tilde{Q} \) bd 18 \(\tilde{W} \) xb7 \(\tilde{Q} \) c2 with chances for both sides, but, as shown by Tiviakov, by playing 17 cxd5 \(\tilde{Q} \) c4 18 dxe6 \(\tilde{Q} \) xe6 19 \(\tilde{Q} \) f5 White would have retained the better game.

14 单b5 **②b4** 15 **Ψe2 ②f6**

Leko-Epishin (Dortmund 1994)
now continued 16 c3 ②bd5 17 ②d4
當b6 18 ②f3 单d7 19 单d3 單fd8 20
②e5 单e8 21 ②e4 ②xe4 22 豐xe4
②f6 with an equal game.

10.13 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2)c3 dxe4 4 2)xe4 2)d7 5 2)f3 2)gf6 6 2)g3 e6 7 2)d3 c5 8 0-0 cxd4 9 2)xd4 2)c5)

10 夕f3



White maintains control over e5.

10 ... 11 We2 0-0 b6

12 🙎 f4

12 ②e4 ♠b7 13 ②xc5 ②xc5 14 ♠c4 ₩c7 15 ②e5 ②d5= is harmless for Black (Paunovic).

12 ... ≜b7 13 ⊈ad1 ₩c8

13...②d5? is not good on account of 14 皇g5! 豐c7 15 ②h5 堂h8 16 皇e4 f6 17 皇h4 皇d6 18 c4 皇a6 19 ②xg7! with a strong attack for White (Tal-Vasyukov, 32nd USSR Ch 1964/5).

14 \$\dds

15 De5


Or 15 ②g5 ②e7 16 ②f5 ②f8 17 ②d4 ဩe8 18 ②b5 e5 with a good game for Black (Chandler-Wells, England 1985).

Now 15... 2xe5 16 \$xe5 ₩c6 17

f3 \(\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$}\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\texititt{\$\text{\$\}}}}}\$}}}}}} \end{linethindettinethindet{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$

10.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2 c3 dxe4 4 2 xe4 2 d7 5 2 f3 2 gf6 6 2 g3 e6 7 2 d3 c5 8 0-0)

8 ... **≜**e7



Black does not hurry to release the pawn tension, and retains the option (after dxc5) of recapturing on c5 with his knight.

9 ₩e2

The alternative plan involves the fianchetto: 9 b3 0-0 10 \(\)b2 (or 10 c4 cxd4 11 \(\tilde{\tilde

to White (Tiviakov-Adams, match (11), New York 1994).


The plan of strengthening the centre by 10 c3 b6 11 \$\tilde{2}\$e5 \$\tilde{2}\$b7 12 f4 was discredited in the game Evseev-Flohr (USSR 1949), where after 12...cxd4 13 cxd4 \$\tilde{2}\$xe5 14 dxe5 \$\tilde{2}\$yg4! 15 \$\tilde{2}\$xh7+ \$\tilde{2}\$xh7 16 \$\tilde{2}\$xg4 \$\tilde{4}\$d4+ 17 \$\tilde{2}\$h1 \$\tilde{2}\$ac8 Black gained fine play for the pawn.

10 ... ₩c7

10...cxd4 11 \(\times \)xd4 is less good for Black:

- (a) 11... **Z**e8 12 b3 **W**b6 13 **Q**b2 **D**f8 14 **D**f3 with the better chances for White (Tal-Filip, Moscow 1967);
- (b) 11...包c5 12 全c4 豐c7 13 包b5 豐b8 14 包f5! with advantage to White (Schaefer-Szabolcsi, Budapest 1991).

11 c4



11 ... **Z**e8

After 11...cxd4 12 ②xd4 White has active piece play:

(a) 12...a6 13 b3 (13 a3!? b6 14 b4 \$\displaybreakb7 15 \$\displaybreakb2\pm\$ also comes into con-

sideration) 13... \(\bar{L} = 8 \) 14 \(\bar{L} = b 2 \) b6 15 \(\bar{L} \) h5 \(\bar{L} = b 1 6 \) \(\bar{L} \) xe6 with a very sharp game (Kasparov-Karpov, Amsterdam 1988) - \(Game 41 \). However, the piece sacrifice is not obligatory. Karpov and Zaitsev recommend 16 \(\bar{L} = \alpha 1 ! ? \) \(\bar{L} = \alpha 8 \) 17 \(\cdot c 5 ! ? \) (vacating a square for the bishop) 17... \(bxc 5 \) 18 \(\bar{L} \) xe6 \(\bar{L} = 6 \) (after 18... \(fxe 6 ? \) 19 \(\bar{L} \) xe6 + \(\bar{L} = 6 \) 20 \(\bar{L} = 6 \) 19 \(\bar{L} = 6 ? \) 19 \(\bar{L} = 6

- (b) 12...2c5 13 2b5 \$\cong c6\$ 14 \(\text{2c2} \)
 b6 15 2\(\text{15} \)! exf5 16 \$\cong xe7 \(\text{2b} \) 17 f3

 \$\text{2ae8}\$ 18 \$\cong d6\$ with advantage to White, who effectively has an extra pawn on the queenside (Aseev-Arkell, Leningrad 1989);
- (c) 12...b6 13 ₺b5 ₩c6 14 ೩g5 a6 15 ₺e4 ೩b7 16 ₺d4 ₩c8 17 耳ac1± (Karpov, Zaitsev).

Black takes control of e5 and brings his knight to the defence of the kingside. After 13...b6 14 De5 Db7 15 Df4 White has a solid initiative.

14 Dg5

Preventing 14...b6 due to 15 2xh7!

14 ... **②**f8

15 23e4 2xe4

In the event of 15... 2d7 16 ②xf6+ 2xf6 17 ₩d3 2xg5 18 2xg5 White has a slight but enduring advantage:

- (a) 18... we5 19 wd2 2c6 20 b3 with the better chances (Tiviakov-Adams, match (9), New York 1994);
- (b) 18... Lac8 19 Lac1 We5 (risky is 19... Lac8 20 2d2 Wxa2 21 2b4 2c6 22 2a3±, Adams) 20 Wd2 2c6

21 b4 b6 22 \(\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\$\ext{\$\$\ext{\$\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt}}}}}}}}}} \ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\exi

16 9 xe4

Both sides have chances.

16 wxe4!? is weaker on account of 16...f5! 17 we2 单d7 18 公f3 单f6, when Black's chances are preferable (Leko-Lutz, Horgen 1994).

Game 40 **Thipsay-Speelman**British Championship 1984

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	⊘d7
5	D 13	②gf6
6	∳)g3	e6
7	₽d3	c5
8	c3	cxd4
9	2xd4	≜ c5
10	ı⊈c2	0-0
11	00	₩c7

Otherwise the pin 10 \(\textit{\textit{\textit{g}}} \) is unpleasant.

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13	. <u>⊈</u> e3	b6
14	₩e2	≜ b7
15	Z ad1	a6
16	⊉ h1	Hack


17 \#c2?!

A loss of time - 17 2h5 is better.

17		Ø₁t8
18	₩e2	Z d′
	M	

19 夕6?!

19 \(\hat{\text{\text{g}}} \)5 is more active, although after 19...\(\hat{\text{\text{x}}} \)xd4 20 cxd4 White is obliged to play with an isolated pawn.




19	• • •	≜xe3
20	₩xe3	 ⊈cd8
21	W 47	

White should not have conceded the d-file. 21 We2 was more logical.

1110. 201		was more logi
21		 xd7
22	②d4	4 ∆d5
23	Wc1	

White sounds the retreat, but whereas 'activity' by 23 we5 wxe5 24 xe5 2)f4 is clearly unfavourable for him, 23 wg5!? looks perfectly reasonable (Speelman).

23 ... 包f4



24 Re4?

An oversight, but of course even after 24 f3 White would have been in difficulties.

24		¤ xd4
25	cxd4	₩xc1
26	Wyc1	Ó ve4

White does not even have the consolation of any pawns in return for his material deficit

27	f3	≜d5
28	a3	f5!
29	Ic8	⊈17
30	I c7+	\$ f6
31	b4	4 08g6
32	Z a7	ı⊈c4
33	∐ b7	b5
34	 ■b6	�h4
35	X xa6	€)hxg2
36	Df1	ව්e1 ී
37	包d2	એh3 +

In conclusion Black weaves a mating net.

Game 41 Kasparov-Karpov Amsterdam 1988

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Ød2	dxe4
4	②xe4	包d7
5	D f3	Øgf6
6	∮)g3	e6
7	≜d3	⊈e 7
8	0-0	c5
9	₩e2	0-0
10	Z d1	₩c7

11 c4 cxd4

In recent times Karpov himself has preferred the restrained 11... **Ze8**.

12 **②xd4** a6

13 b3


13 ②e4 gives only an equal game after 13...②xe4 14 ∰xe4 ②f6 15 ゑf4 ∰xc4!

13 ... **Z**e8

13...b6 14 **≜**b2 **≜**b7 is weaker in view of 15 **②**df5! exf5 16 **₩**xe7.

An experimental knight sacrifice, which has not been repeated as yet in any high-level games.

16 ... fxe6 17 ₩xe6+ \$\psi 8 18 \(\pri xh7 \) \(\pri x \) \(\pri x



20 \(\text{\ti}}\text{\tetx{\text{\te}\tint{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texit{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\tex{\texit{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\texit{\text{\t

White has already sacrificed two pieces, and although the black king is exposed, there are no real threats. It was time to regain some material: 20 b4!? g6! 21 2g7 2f6 22 2xe8 2xe8

23 Axf6 Dxf6 24 bxc5 Wxc5 with chances for both sides (Karpov, Zaitsev).

20 ... **\$**g8 21 **\$**b2

21 \(\alpha d4!? \) was somewhat stronger: 21...\(\alpha c6 \) 22 \(\alpha xc5 \) bxc5 23 \(\alpha d7\overline{\pi}. \) Now, however, Black creates counter-threats and exchanges several pieces.

Wc6! 21 ¤d4 De4! 22 23 **E**e1 2eg5 24 ₩g4 **≜a3!** 25 **≜c3** ¤xe1+ 26 & xe1 Ïe8 27 **⊈**d2 **⊈c1!** 28 h4 ⊈xd2 29 Xxd2 ¤e1±


29... we6 is simpler, forcing the exchange of queens.

30 **♦**h2 **L**e4?

A mistake, after which White gains a second wind. This move should have preceded by 30... 2.7+-31 2.64

Now even Black's two extra pieces are unable to compensate for his two


successive mistakes. He should have reconciled himself to 31...\$\to\$ 32 \$\mathbb{Z}d8+\$ \$\mathbb{Z}e8\$ 33 \$\mathbb{Z}xe8+\$ \$\mathbb{Z}xe8\$ 34 \$\mathbb{Z}xe8+\$ \$\mathbb{Z}xe8\$, when even so White has four pawns for the piece.



	\$17
ℤ d7+	\$1 \$
₩xe6	X xe6
hxg5	⊑ e7
Exe7	\$xe7
g4	≗e4
⊈g3	≜ b1
a3	1-0 (time)
	Id7+ ₩xe6 hxg5 Ixe7 g4 \$\precepg3

11: 6...c5

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	包d7
5	DB	夕gf6
6	€]g3	c5



A fashionable continuation, by which Black hopes to manage without having to play ...e7-e6 (in the event of $7 \triangleq d3$).

White's main continuations here are 7 dxc5 (11.1) and 7 \(\hat{L}\)d3 (11.2).


After 7 &c4, apart from the simple 7... © b6 8 &b5+ &d7, Black can also implement the extended fianchetto with 8 &e2 e6 9 0-0 a6 10 c4 bxc4 11 &xc4 &b7 12 Ee1 &e7, after which his pieces are well mobilised:

(a) 13 b3 0-0 14 \(\overline{\hb}62 \) \(\Overline{\hb}66 \) (14...cxd4 15 \(\overline{\hb}2xd4 \) \(\overline{\hb}35= \) is also possible) 15 \(\overline{\hb}f1 \) \(\overline{\hb}6 \) 16 \(\overline{\hb}6 \) 18 \(\overline{\hb}65 \) cxd4 (or 17...\(\overline{\hb}6 \) 18 \(\overline{\hb}64\) (xir.Georgiev-Gulko, Groningen 1994)

18 ₩xd4 Ixcl 19 Ixcl Wa8 20 ②c4 a5 with equal chances (Georgiev);

11.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2f3 2gf6 6 2g3 c5)

7 dxc5



The critical reply, with which White hopes to extract positional gains.

7 ... e6

6...c5 123

8 c6

Black's idea is justified if White tries to defend his pawn: 8 b4 b6 (8...a5?! 9 c3 axb4 10 cxb4 b6 11 a4 bxc5 12 b5! favours White) 9 全e2 (9 全b5!? bxc5 10 全c6 量b8 11 b5 comes into consideration) 9...bxc5 10 b5 全b7 11 c4 豐c7 12 全b2 全d6 13 a4 a5 14 豐c2 h5 15 乞f1 (15 0-0-0 全f4+ 16 全b1 h4 17 乞f1 h3 18 g3 全e4 with a good game for Black) 15...0-0-0 16 乞1d2 全f4 17 乞b3? 全e4! 18 豐c3 g5 19 豐xa5 豐xa5+ 20 ②xa5 g4 and Black gained the advantage (Tiviakov-Adams, Ischia 1995).

Instead of 17 公b3? Adams suggests 17 全c3, but here too after 17...g5 18 公b3 g4 19 单xa5 數b8 20 单xd8 基xd8 21 公h4 单g5 22 0-0 单xh4 Black has a good game.

8 ... bxc6

9 **≜**e2

If 9 **≜d3** Black has the good reply 9...**⊘**c5.

9 ... ₩c7


9...h5, threatening a flank attack, is also interesting, e.g. 10 ②f1 ②c5 11 ②e3 ②g4 12 h3 ②xe3 13 ③xe3 ③xe3 14 fxe3 ¥b6 15 ¥d4 e5? 16 ¥c3 ∑b8 17 0-0-0, and White's control of the d-file gives him the advantage (Vogt-Speelman, Altensteig 1994). 15...¥xd4 16 ②xd4 is sounder, although here too White has the better endgame.

Tiviakov-Gulko (Groningen 1994)
now continued 10 0-0 皇e7 11 c4 0-0
12 皇d2 a5 13 皇c3 皇b4 14 豐c2
皇xc3 15 豐xc3 皇b7 16 公d4 c5 17
②b5 豐e5 18 豐xe5 公xe5 19 f4 ②eg4

20 \(\text{2} f3 \) \(\text{x} f3 \) 21 \(\text{x} f3, \) with slightly the better ending for White.

11.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②f3 ②gf6 6 ②g3 c5)

7 \(\mathbb{\text{\pm}}\)d3



As in the main variation, White continues his development.

7 ... cxd4

After 7...g6 8 0-0 \(\text{2g7} \) White can defend his centre with 9 c3, not fearing the creation of an isolated pawn, since he can advantageously use the pressure of his rooks on the e-and c-files, e.g. 9...0-0 10 \(\text{Ze1} \) cxd4 11 cxd4 b6 12 \(\text{We2} \) \(\text{2d5} \) 13 \(\text{2g5} \) \(\text{2b7} \) 14 \(\text{Zac1} \) \(\text{Ze3} \) 15 \(\text{2b5!} \) h6 16 \(\text{Zxc8} \) \(\text{Wxc8} \) 17 \(\text{Zc1} \) \(\text{Wd8} \) 18 \(\text{2d2} \) \(\text{27f6} \) 19 \(\text{2e5} \) \(\text{Wd6} \) 20 \(\text{2c6} \), and the occupation of the weak c6 square gives him the advantage (Apicella-Arkell, Capelle la Grande 1991)

8 2 xd4 g6

An alternative is 8... 2c5 9 \(\text{\pm} b5+ \) \(\text{\pm} d7 \) 10 0-0 a6 (less good is

10... xb5?! 11 \(\Delta xb5 \) a6 12 \(\Delta d4 \) g6
13 \(\text{2e3} \) \(\text{2d5} \) 14 \(\text{2f3} \) e6 15 \(\text{2ad1} \) \(\text{2f6} \) 16 \(\text{2df5}! \) with advantage to White,
Hausner-Luce, Prague 1992) 11
\(\text{2xd7} + \text{2xd7} \) 12 b3 g6 13 \(\text{2b2} \) \(\text{2g7} \)
14 \(\text{2e2} \) 0—0 15 \(\text{2fe1} \) \(\text{2fe8} \) 16 \(\text{2ad1} \) with slightly the better chances for White (Luther-Arkell, Leningrad 1989).

9 0–0 ≜g7

10 c3 0-0 11 He1 a6

Or 11... 2c5 12 2c2 2g4 13 2d2 2c8 with equal chances (Zapata-Spiridonov, Moscow 1989).

12 **⊈c2 ℤe8**

13 ≜g5

Here in Aseev-Lutz (Budapest 1989) Black could have maintained the balance by 13... #c7.

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- 2 8 \ e2 h6 9 \ 2 e4 \ 2 xe4 10 \ \ xe4 \ 2 f6 11 \ \ e2 b6 12 \ \ \ d2 \ \ \ b7 13 0-0-0 \ \ \ e7 - 25
 - 2.1 14 De5 28
 - 2.2 14 **\(\mathbb{Z}\)**he1 − 29
 - 2.3 $14 \implies b1 30$
- 3 10...₩c7 43
 - 3.1 11 \(\mathbb{\psi}\)g4 \(\mathbb{\psi}\)f8 12 0-0 c5 43
 - 3.11 13 **≝**e1 − 44
 - $3.12 \ 13 \ c3 44$
 - 3.2 11 **≜**d2 − 45
 - 3.3 11 0-0 46
- 4 5... 2 df6 51
 - 4.1 6 **a**d3 − 51
 - $4.2 6 \triangle c4 52$
 - 4.3 6 包 1f3 53

PART II: 5 **≜**c4 **②**gf6 6 **②**g5 e6 7 **₩**e2 **②**b6 – 58

- 5 8 **å**d3 h6 9 **②**5f3 c5 10 dxc5 **≜**xc5 11 **②**e5 **②**bd7 12 **②**gf3 61
 - 5.1 12...**₩**c7 *62*
 - 5.11 13 0-0 62
 - 5.12 13 \(\text{13} \) f4 64
 - 5.2 12... 2xe5 13 2xe5 0-0 14 2d2 \dd d5 65
 - 5.21 15 0-0 65
 - 5.22 15 0-0-0 *66*
- 6 10...**②**bd7 11 b4 − *74*
 - 6.1 11...b6 12 2 d4 74
 - 6.11 12... ②d5 75
 - 6.12 12...₩c7 76

7 8 ≜b3 h6 9 €\25f3 a5 - 82 7.1 10 c3 - 82 7.2 10 a3 - 84 7.3 10 a4 - 85

9...c5 - 95

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9 6 ②xf6+ ②xf6 - 104 9.1 7 ②e5 - 104 9.11 7... ②d7 - 105 9.12 7... ②e6 - 106 9.2 7 ③c4 - 107

10 6 ②g3 e6 7 ②d3 c5 8 0-0 - 113 10.1 8...cxd4 9 ②xd4 ②c5 - 114 10.11 10 c3 - 115 10.12 10 ②b3 - 115 10.13 10 ②f3 - 117 10.2 8... ③e7 - 117

11 6...c5 – 122 11.1 7 dxc5 – 122 11.2 7 \(\text{d} \) d3 – 123



Caro-Kann Smyslov System 4...Nd7

The Smyslov Variation of the Caro-Kann is one of the most solid and dependable openings for Black. It is a favourite of many top players, including FIDE World Champion Anatoly Karpov and the British No. 1, Michael Adams, both of whom have used the system to defeat many top-class opponents.

This book presents an objective, detailed coverage of all the lines of the Smyslov System, with special attention devoted to the most dangerous attacking systems available to White - such as that used in Deep Blue's sensational match-clinching victory over Garry Kasparov.

Grandmaster **Eduard Gufeld** is one of the most colourful characters in international chess. His entertaining style of play and lively annotations have gained him many fans around the world. His previous books for Cadogan include *The Modern French Tarrasch* and *An Opening Repertoire for the Attacking Player*.

Oleg Stetsko has earned a reputation as a researcher and theoretician of the highest order.

